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SYNOPSIS
The purpose of this thesis is to establish the 
contribution of the Soviet weekly, Literaturnava gazeta, to 
the debunking of official dogmas during the Brezhnev years.
Launched in 1967, the second section of Li teraturnava 
gazeta has frequently been dismissed as a mere safety valve, 
highly controlled by the authorities, to placate the educated 
middle classes demoralized by the conservative backlash.
It is argued^ in this study that, although the paper 
accepted the political parameters of the post-Thaw 
conservative leadership, as evinced, in particular, by the 
extreme limitations of the economic debates and the absence 
of any material investigating the country's Stalinist past, 
it nevertheless succeeded in promoting values which ran 
counter to the official ideology.
The paper reflected the demoralization of Soviet society 
and its inability to change within the existing structures. 
Soviet society emerged as being morally corrupt, riddled with 
individualism, suspicion and petty authoritarianism. 
Individuals were shown at the mercy of faceless bureaucracies 
and overpowered by a judiciary system dominated by the state
procuracy.
The paper actively promoted a more individua1-centred 
type of society by overtly challenging the collectivist 
ethos, campaigning for the recognition of consumer rights and 
arguing the case for a fairer judiciary system.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my thanks to Wo 1verhamp ton
Polytechnic and The Open University for providing me with the
financial support I needed in order to write this thesis.
I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Dr Nick Lampert, 
whose help and advice were always forthcoming and dispensed 
with extreme friendliness.
Finally, my warmest thanks to Chris for his unwavering 
moral support and invaluable help in proof— reading my final 
draft .
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
PART ONE - THE NEW FORMAT 28
I. THE EDITORIAL BOARD 28
1. The Editor-in-chief 28
2. Significance of Chakovskii's Appointment as
Editor-in-chief 36
3. The Board of Editors 41
II. THE LAUNCHING OF THE NEW FORMAT 52
1. For a Partnership between Journalism and Sociology 52
2. Change and Continuity 68
PART TWO - THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVE 83
III. PERCEPTIONS OF THE COLLECTIVE 94
1. Bad Manners and Anti-Social Behaviour 94
2. The Defence of the Weak: the Case of the Invalids 100
3. 'Little Stalins 1 and Individualists 110
4. Victimization of the Individual by the Collective 115
5. The Individual's Evasion of his Responsibilities 122
6. Conclusion 127
IV. ACADEMICS AND THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVISM 134
1. Collectivism: an Inadequate Theory 134
2. Shift of Emphasis: From the Collective to the 145 
Indivi dua1
3. Conclusion 157
V. SEARCHING FOR NEW FORMS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS 163
1. Popular Disaffection from Officially Organized
Act ivi ties 164
2. The Emergence of Informal Gatherings 177
3. A Plea for Diversity and Freedom of Choice 186
4. Conclusion 190
PART THREE - GROWTH OF CONSUMER AWARENESS 197
VI. THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF MATERIALISM 203
1. Widespread Corruption: the Dark Side of
Materi a 1i sm 204
2. Materialism and Socialism: a Contradiction
in Terms? 209
3. 'What Do We Need Transistors For? 1 223
4. Conclusion 231
VII. FRUSTRATION WITH STATE-RUN SERVICES 237
1. Rubinov's Crusades against Managerial Incompetence 238
2. Bureaucratic Contempt for the Public 247
3. Bureaucratic Management and Lack of
Professionalism: The Case of Housing 255
4. Conclusion « 265
VIII. IN DEFENCE OF THE CONSUMER 273
1. The Case for the Leisure and Tourist Industries 274
2. The Case for a Consumer-Friendly Environment 282
3. In Defence of Consumers' Rights 290
4. Conclusion: Consumers' Demands in the Light of
the Economic Debate 295
PART FOUR - THE LEGAL SYSTEM ON TRIAL 309
IX. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 319
1. The Controversy over the Development of
Criminology 321
2. Vaksberg's Plea for Softer Sentences 331
3. Perel'man on the Unfair Treatment of Ex-Convicts 340
4. Conclusion 347
X. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 353
1. Investigators and Judges under Suspicion 355
2. People's Assessors versus Judges 366
3. The Case for the Defence 372
4. Conclusion 387
CONCLUSION 396
Appendix 1 Space Allocated to Subject Areas (1) 407
Appendix 2 Relative Popularity of the Various Sections 408
Appendix 3 Relative Popularity of the Various Topics 409
on Domestic Life
Appendix 4 Space Allocated to Subject Areas (2) 411 
Appendix 5 Composition of the Editorial Board of LG 412
Appendix 6 Content Analysis of Chakovskii's Novels: 414
God zhizni and Dorogi. kotorye my vybiraem
Appendix 7 Leaflet Advertising the New LG 423
List of Abbreviations 425
Bibliography 426
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
The transliteration system used in this thesis is that 
of the British Standards Institution (without diacritics). 
However, names which have a generally accepted English 
spelling are given in that form, e.g. Gorky.
The name of the sociologist VI. Shlyapentokh is 
transliterated according to the British system, unless 
references are made to the works which he has published in 
English. On these books his name is spelt Shlapentokh.
INTRODUCTION
1980s reading the press became a completely new exper 
for both the Soviet public and long-standing observers i
The Soviet media have never received a good press in the 
West. So the astonishing liberalization triggered off by 
Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' came as the latest and most 
spectacular proof of the extreme repression which had gagged 
Soviet journalism over the past seventy years. In the late
c
ience
in the
West, who, ironically, were finding it increasingly arduous 
to keep up with the exciting, yet overwhelming, flood of 
information and critical debates from all sorts of 
periodicals. Soviet journalists soon began to wage their 
battles with censorship in the open, becoming increasingly 
determined to reclaim their profession from the clutches of 
political power and to substitute the conveniently hazy 
notion of glasnost' (openness? publicity?) with the more 
assertive concept of freedom of the press.
While the relatively ill-informed Western general public 
tends to dismiss the pre-glasnost' press as unworthy of any 
attention, sovietologists have long recognized its importance 
not only as an institution reflecting the nature of the 
regime, but also as a valuable, albeit limited and frequently 
unreliable, source of information. In his book Glasnost' in 
Act ion, Alec Nove warns the 'nonspecia1ist reader 1 for whom
the work is intended against 'simplifying 1 , and points out 
that '[under] Brezhnev too there emerged some challenging and 
original material' and that 'even under Stalin's despotism 
certain types of critical material could see the light of 
day'.1
While Western scholars have always made extensive use 
of the Soviet press to nourish their particular area of 
research, the number of works that are specifically concerned 
with the nature and the role of the Soviet press before the
c
introduction of glasnost' is relatively limited. On the 
whole, these existing studies address two different, yet 
interconnected issues, that is, on the one hand, the nature 
and mechanisms of the political censorship; on the other, the 
scope of the debates and the degree of dissent tolerated by 
the political establishment.
A number of works indeed tend to focus on what used to 
make the Soviet press unacceptable in the eyes of Western 
liberal democracies, namely its partisanship and submission 
to the ruling party. There have been detailed analyses of the 
mechanisms by which prescriptive and prescriptive censorship 
has been implemented. A good example of such a study is 
Gayle Durham Hollander's book. Soviet Newspapers and 
Magazines, published in 1967, which the author introduced as 
an attempt to update the work carried out by Alex Inkeles in 
the fifties. Hollander examines the overall structure of the 
Soviet press, including the distribution network and the news 
agencies, as well as the internal organization of a Soviet
newspaper, emphasizing the role of the editor as 'ideological 
pace setter' .2 A great deal of attention is given to the 
different methods used by the CPSU to control the press. One 
of them consists of training journalists in the spirit of the 
official Marxist-Leninist ideology, neatly encapsulated in 
the famous 'Leninist principles', such as, for example, 
part i inost' (loyalty to the Party's ideology and goals) and 
pravdi Vos t ' (commitment to giving true information), two 
concepts which, in reality, have turned out to be
c
particularly incompatib1e.3 Hollander's study is less 
informative on the content of Soviet periodicals, focusing 
on what is missing in comparison with the Western press (no 
crime or accident section, no advertising etc...) rather than 
on what the Soviet reader can learn from it.
Further research into the different forms of censorship 
was carried out in the seventies, in particular by Lilita 
Dzirkals together with her colleagues Thane Gustafson and A. 
Ross Johnson. In a chapter from the book Press Control Around 
the World, published in 1982, Dzirkals discusses the relative 
importance of the three sources of media control in the 
Soviet Union: firstly, the Propaganda Department of the CPSU, 
which plays a dominant role in overseeing the central media, 
organizing weekly meetings where editors-in-chief receive 
critical comments on their paper's latest issue and are 
provided with specific guidelines for the next one; secondly, 
the ministries, which lobby for their institutional interests 
through their press centres, controlling the information
- 3 -
concerning their activities by means of the visa procedure; 
finally, Dzirkals notes the lesser importance of the 
censorship agencies such as the once all-powerful Glavli t. 
arguing that the tight control that the Party exerts over the 
media has resulted in a high degree of self-censorship 
amongst journalists whose editors have become the effective 
censors.*
A number of analysts, however, have examined aspects of 
the Soviet press other than its submission to the ruling
<•
party, thus greatly enriching our perception of its role and 
influence. Readership studies, for example, carried out by 
scholars both in the West and the Soviet Union, have 
contributed to highlighting the limits of censorship. As 
Mickiewicz points out in the introduction to her book, Media 
and the Russian Public, nowhere can it be assumed that the 
messages put across in the media are automatically received 
or assimilated by the public, and opinion polls conducted in 
the Soviet Union have shown that 'the Russian public is much 
less homogeneous and malleable than the Soviets had 
thought'.5
Another approach has been to demonstrate that the Soviet 
media can still be a source of information and a forum for 
debate in spite of the harsh censorship to which it is 
subjected. This type of research was greatly encouraged by 
the Khrushchev Thaw when the process of liberalization was 
evident. Studies focusing on this period have shown that the 
Soviet system is not necessarily threatened by a relaxation
- 4 -
of the censorship and that the notion of legitimate criticism 
can indeed be redefined depending on the political mood that 
prevails within the leadership. This phenomenon has been 
examined, for example, by Spechler, who argues in her study 
of Novyi mir, that dissent was tolerated between 1956 and 
1964 because it served as a weapon in the power struggle 
within the leadership. Another factor was the belief held by 
an increasing section of the political establishment that 
wider debates were needed to improve the management of the
<•
country. For a time the political confusion existing in the 
higher echelons of power gave courageous and liberally-minded 
journalists the opportunity to probe the frontiers of the 
permi ssible.6
While Tvardovskii's Novyi mir has been widely recognized 
as a truly liberal journal containing bold and genuinely 
controversial debates, there is less of a consensus amongst 
analysts when it comes to evaluating the role of the Soviet 
press as a forum for debate in the much more reactionary 
Brezhnev years. Most authors, though, accept that some degree 
of criticism continued to be permitted through the seventies 
as long as the basic principles on which the whole system 
rested were not questioned. The articles published between 
1982 and 1985 selected by Angus Roxburgh for his book on 
Pravda cover many of the problems which have long been 
identified as the commonest targets of the Soviet press, 
i.e., for example, housing shortages, bad quality consumer 
goods, inadequate services or women's double burden.7
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As early as 1970, in an account of the Soviet press that 
was more sympathetic than most, Mark Hopkins argued that 
since the mid-fifties the Soviet press had regained its role 
as 'public forum and social critic 1 even though 'off-limit 
areas' had remained.8 While neither ignoring nor 
underestimating the weight of political controls and 
propaganda, Hopkins believes that the authorities do actually 
value the critical function of the press; they have realized 
that total submission to political power can only lose the
c
media the credibility they need in order to retain their 
'effectiveness as molders and shapers of opinion';9 hence a 
substantial amount of open, albeit carefully monitored, 
controversy that is instrumental in shaping the opinions of 
both general readers and high-ranking officials responsible 
for finding solutions to thorny socio-economic problems. Any 
interest group which is part of the political establishment 
has the possibility of presenting its scheme and subjecting 
it to the test of public analysis and criticism through the 
media, in the hope that the leadership will eventually 
endorse it. According to Hopkins, there is therefore a 
visible relation between social developments and the function 
of the mass media.10
Ten years later, Dzirkals, Gustafson and Johnson were 
more sceptical. In a study carried out on the basis of 
information obtained between 1978 and 1981 from fifty or so 
Soviet emigres 'formerly involved in the media process 1 , the 
three researchers examined the interraction between political
- 6 -
power and the editorial process, using Literaturnaya gazeta 
as one of their case studies. 11 While conceding that the 
Soviet press contains different viewpoints, they reach the 
conclusion that it cannot be used as a reliable tool for 
analysing Soviet political life. The general feeling amongst 
the emigres interviewed was that 'much controversy is sham 1 , 
'at best a distant reflection of behind-the-scenes debates'. 
Even the quite commonly held view that a skilful reading of 
the Soviet press can give an insight into the leadership's
c
intentions or the interplay of publicly unavowed political 
currents seems to be questioned.! 2
The authors of the study do acknowledge that the 
emigres' attitude must be treated with some caution and that 
the dearth of hard information makes it extremely difficult 
to assess to what extent the Soviet press actually reflects 
and influences the country's political life. While agreeing 
that Literaturnaya gazeta was the most interesting and 
sophisticated Soviet newspaper at least in the early part of 
the seventies, their assessment of it nevertheless reflects 
the pessimism of their interviewees and the disappointment of 
many Soviet intellectuals who eventually deemed the 
publication 'a demagogic fraud.'13 The authors' opinion is 
succinctly summed up in these two extracts from their short 
study of Literaturnaya gazeta, which is based on a selective 
reading of it as well as on interviews with former Soviet 
journa1i sts:
We lack evidence of Li teraturnaya
gazeta's impact on policy discussions,
- 7 -
but it clearly has sometimes served as a 
forum for raising and debating new 
issues on which the leadership has not 
taken a stand.
The editors of Literaturnaya gazeta may 
not impress us with the depth or honesty 
with which they pursue 'interesting 1 
social and economic problems, but at 
least they raise them. By doing so, they 
accustom a mass audience to the idea — 
potentially a highly subversive one - 
that the shape and evolution of Soviet 
society and economy are the proper 
concerns of the broad public...!*
It is, however, debatable whether the degree of
c
Literaturnaya gazeta's 'liberalism' or 'subversiveness' can 
be best measured in terms of its impact on the formulation of 
policies or, for that matter, whether any newspaper, whatever 
the socio-political system in which it operates, can be 
directly instrumental in launching a new government policy. 
Soviet journalists themselves were already at the time 
questioning the conception of the press as a 'corrective 
organ 1 and favoured the idea that the press should 
concentrate on providing mass information and creating a 
climate conducive to new ideas.15
A different approach, therefore, will be adopted in this 
study, which is based on a systematic analysis of the content 
of Literaturnaya gazeta (second section) over a period of 
five years from January 1967 to December 1971. Rather than 
attempt to establish a relationship between public debates 
and policy-making, the aim will be to assess to what extent 
the shifts in attitudes, values and expectations disclosed by 
the paper contradict the principles and practices advocated
- 8 -
by the political establishment. Literaturnaya gazeta has been 
described by the above-mentioned team of researchers as the 
outcome of 'a conscious high level policy to provide a safety 
valve for the expression of unorthodox and experimental 
views'.16 Safety valves, however, do not last for ever, a 
fact which the world has been reminded of once more by the 
extraordinary events triggered off by Gorbachev's brand of 
liberalization in the mid-eighties; hence the importance of 
fully appreciating the import of the new ideas which
c
Literaturnaya gazeta helped to publicize during the 
uninspiring Brezhnev years. It is the purpose of this study 
to show that the 'liberalism' of Literaturnaya gazeta does 
not lie only in the acknowledgement that 'the shape and 
evolution of Soviet society and economy are the proper 
concern of the broad public 1 ; the paper's 'subversiveness' 
can indeed be measured more precisely in terms of the level 
of attention which it gave to the new ideas and attitudes 
that were emerging in Soviet public opinion in the post- 
Stalin era, thus contributing to widening the gulf between 
the Soviet polity and society at large.
Literaturnaya gazeta: a paradoxical phenomenon 
Accounts of Soviet citizens and circulation figures 
have shown that Literaturnaya gazeta enjoyed a high level of 
popularity in the late sixties and early seventies. The 
increase in circulation figures began in 1967 when the paper 
had its format radically transformed from a four-page paper
- 9 -
published three times a week into a sixteen-page weekly 
composed of two very distinct sections of eight pages each. 
The first section (pervaya tetradka) was to be devoted to 
news and debates concerning the literary world, as might be 
expected from the organ of the Writers' Union. It was, 
however, the second section (vtoraya tetradka) focusing on 
economic, social and moral issues, as well as foreign 
affairs, which earned the paper its 'good reputation' and 
rise in popularity. Circulation jumped from 350,000 to 1
<•
million within a year and is reported to have reached 3 
million by the early 1970s.17
Literaturnaya gazeta was given its facelift under 
Brezhnev roughly two years after the fall of Khrushchev. By 
1967, A. Tvardovskii, the legendary editor-in-chief of the 
literary journal Novyi mir who succeeded K. Simonov in 1958, 
had finally come into open conflict with the new leadership. 
Painfully aware that Soviet society was not yet ready to 
renounce its Stalinist legacy, Tvardovskii nevertheless 
bravely carried on fighting his long-standing conservative 
enemies for another three years until February 1970 when he 
was forced to resign amidst a campaign of slander against his 
colleagues and himself. 18 Ironically, Literaturnaya gazeta 
enjoyed its highest level of popularity and gained its 
reputation as a 'liberal 1 publication when Novyi mir was 
losing its battle and the repressions were forcing an 
increasing number of intellectuals into illegal dissidence.
- 10 -
Both publications are aimed at roughly the same public. 
Like Novyi mir, Li teraturnaya gazeta is read by the most 
highly educated section of the Soviet population, the 
'specialists' or professionals, a group commonly referred to, 
in the Soviet context, as the inte11igentsia.*9 According to 
surveys carried out in 1968, nearly 54% of the readership of 
Literaturnaya gazeta also read Novyi mir. 28.7% on a regular 
basis, 24.9% from time to time.20 Furthermore, the success of 
both publications, whose raison d'etre was originally to deal
<
with literary and artistic issues, was due, to a great 
extent, to their openly declared commitment to discussing 
matters directly bearing on the shortcomings of Soviet 
society. In 1968 only one third of the readership of 
Literaturnaya gazeta read the paper mainly for the literature 
or the arts. 2 i
Therefore, by 1967 many readers of Literaturnaya gazeta 
had had their awareness shaped by Tvardovskii's Novyi mir 
and the discussions it generated in the privacy of their 
homes. A whole generation of readers was familiar with the 
journal's highly controversial material, ranging from harsh 
criticisms of socialist realism to accounts of Stalin's 
terror. The 'collective 1 , including the Party, was already at 
the time frequently accused of stifling the individual's 
initiative and creativity. Even the type of criticism which 
was most welcomed by Khrushchev, that which focused on the 
socio-economic flaws of the system such as its
- 1 1 -
overcentra1ization and the incompetence of officials, was 
hard-hitting.22
That the Soviet intelligentsia should have enjoyed 
reading the second section of Literaturnaya gazeta after 
having been exposed to such a high degree of openness in 
Novyi mir seems to suggest that the paper might have indeed 
retained a certain degree of subversiveness in spite of the 
increasingly conservative political climate. It is, indeed, 
the aim of this study to substantiate and qualify such a
<•
claim. However, the relative success of the paper must also 
be appreciated in relation to the mood of the intelligentsia 
and its relationship with the political authorities at the 
t ime .
A brief summary of this social group's position in the 
post-Stalin era could read thus: crushed under Stalin, the 
long silenced intelligentsia was first inspired by the Thaw, 
only to be disappointed by Khrushchev's half—hearted 
reforms. It finally became completely demoralized by 
Brezhnev's conservative rule and repressive methods which 
intensified in 1968 following the Prague Spring. Therefore it 
would seem that the job of the new Li teraturnaya yazeta was 
to address a defeated and docile intelligentsia.
This wilfully schematic judgement contains more than a 
grain of truth. In his book Soviet Intellectuals and 
Political Power, V. Shlapentokh goes so far as to argue that 
the 'mass intelligentsia 1 and most 'intellectuals' 
'capitulated 1 before the repressions directed against the
- 12 -
liberal movement in the seventies. Out of fear for their 
lives, for their material comfort and careers, professionals 
either became public supporters of the regime or withdrew 
into complete passivity, trying to rationalize their 
political surrender as best they could.23 Highlighting the 
pernicious relationship between intellectuals and bureaucrats 
- but also, perhaps, following a very old Russian tradition 
whereby the term 'intelligentsia' tends to be reserved for 
those who oppose the forces of reaction - Shlapentokh
c
frequently refers to professionals holding high-ranking 
positions under Brezhnev as 'bogus' intellectuals, who owed 
their success to their political conformism rather than their 
talents or academic achievements.24 Collaboration with the 
authorities, however, meant loss of 'civic prestige'. For 
instance, Shlapentokh claims that in the seventies Georgii 
Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and 
Aleksandr Chakovskii, editor—in—chief of Literaturnaya 
gazeta, 'were viewed by the public as bearers of great 
official prestige, but were barely considered citizens by 
Soviet inte11ectua1s'.25 if one did not belong to the 
minority who bravely continued to oppose the regime openly, 
silence was best.
Churchward's assessment of the intelligentsia's function 
in Soviet society since the fifties differs a great deal from 
that of Shlapentokh. Regarding the sixties as a mere 
parenthesis, when a small number of 'alienated 1 intellectuals 
reasserted the traditional role of the intelligentsia as 'the
- 13 -
conscience of humanity 1 , Churchward stresses the high degree 
of social and political integration of the mass 
intelligentsia whose job it is to provide 'specialized 
leadership under firm party control 1 . 'Intellectual- 
apparatchiks' working in local and national government as 
well as propaganda agencies including the press, have greatly 
contributed to the "general process of political 
1egitimisation', assisting the Party in 'its objective of 
"perfecting" the State and social strueture'.26
«•
While not ignoring the negative aspects of this close 
relationship between the intelligentsia and the apparat 
(censorship, restriction on travel and publication, red tape 
etc...), Churchward believes in the Party's commitment to 
the rapid extension of Soviet science and culture, arguing 
that the intelligentsia is extensively used to give advice on 
policy matters and that the increasingly blurred distinction 
between intelligentsia and officialdom has resulted in a 
higher educational level among the apparatus. Churchward 
concludes that the vast majority of the intelligentsia is 
made up of 'careerist professionals' , most of them being 
'party-minded loyalists', others 'pure careerists' or 'loyal 
oppositionists', critical of the establishment but broadly 
supportive of the system and the Party.27 Churchward does not 
regard this collaboration between the intelligentsia and 
political power as a uniquely Soviet phenomenon, arguing that 
'the Soviet Union is merely in advance of most countries',
- 14 -
the trend in the West being 'toward the decline of free 
professionals'.28
To a certain extent, Churchward's arguably cynical 
acceptance of the political integration of the intelligentsia 
echoes Sh1apentokh's pessimistic 'capitulation' theory. There 
are two essential points, though, on which the two academics 
differ. While Churchward looks favourably on the 
collaboration between apparatchiks and professionals, 
Shlapentokh argues that, as a result of the Party's re-
c
emerging 'deep anti-inte11ectua1 ism' under Brezhnev, the 
participation of professionals and academics in decision- 
making was minimal all through the seventies until Gorbachev 
came to power.29 It is interesting to note that another 
Soviet analyst, Boris Kagarlitsky, expressed similar views 
when analysing the technocrats' failure in the seventies to 
reform the system from within; the laws that govern the 
bureaucracy, Kagarlitsky argues, are indeed irremediably 
incompatible with those of technical rationa1ity.30
Shlapentokh is also careful not to equate silence and 
compliance with satisfaction or inner conformism. The 
outpouring of recriminations that emanated from the 
intelligentsia in the late eighties, unambiguously showed the 
limits of this group's political integration during the 
'period of stagnation 1 . Many would agree that even before 
Gorbachev came to power, there were clear signs that the 
repressions of the seventies had failed to crush the new 
sense of identity that the Soviet intelligentsia had acquired
- 15 -
by the end of the Thaw. Spechler argues that one of Novyi 
mi r's lasting achievements had been to contribute to breaking 
the isolation of intellectuals; 31 and indeed many accounts 
from Soviet emigres or Western observers have testified to 
the fact that what Yu. Glazov calls 'behavioural 
bi1ingua1ism* was commonplace amid the mass intelligentsia of 
the seventies, criticisms of the regime continuing to be 
voiced and discussed in private meetings.32 The material 
publicized by the literary journal had left an indelible mark
c
on its readers even if not all of them were prepared to face 
up to the realization that they had consciously or innocently 
cooperate with an inhumane political regime, even if most of 
them kept a low profile during the Brezhnev years.33
It must also be stressed that a high degree of 
dissatisfaction could be observed amongst the younger 
section of the Soviet intelligentsia during the Brezhnev 
years. As J. R. Mi liar remarked when commenting upon a series 
of interviews with Soviet emigres who left the Soviet Union 
in the late seventies, it was the younger generation, the 
most highly socially and politically integrated of all Soviet 
generations, which was the most likely to be involved in 
'unconventional behaviour 1 , ranging from listening to the BBC 
to distributing samizdat 1iterature.34
As these highly educated and socially integrated, yet 
dissatisfied members of the reading public gave the new 
Literaturnaya gazeta a good reception, at least in the early 
seventies, it is reasonable to assume that the paper must
- 16 -
have expressed a number of their concerns and aspirations. 
Shlapentokh, who directed a survey of the paper's readers and 
who himself occasionally contributed to it when still working 
in the Soviet Union, seems indeed to have shared this view: 
'More so than any other periodical ' , he once wrote, 
'Literaturnaya gazeta reflects the mood and views of Soviet 
intellectuals'.35
Which of these views did the paper choose to take on 
board during the period of reaction following the Thaw? To
c
what extent did it contribute to defending the liberal ideas 
of the sixties? Even if the paper's function was only to 
articulate a certain amount of loyal opposition before a mass 
audience of highly educated professionals, how 'loyal' was 
this opposition? What role did Literaturnaya gazeta play, if 
any, in the debunking of official dogmas? It is hoped that a 
close analysis of the paper's content over a period of five 
years will help to find some answers to these questions.
Methodology and Focus of the Study
This study deals exclusively with the second section of 
Literaturnaya gazeta, the literary paper owing its rising 
popularity in the late sixties and early seventies to these 
newly introduced eight pages that focus on economic, social 
and moral issues as well as international events.36 However, 
a close examination of the paper's first twenty-six issues in 
the year 1967, when the new format was introduced (from 
4/1/67 to 28/6/67), showed that a wide range of subjects
- 17 -
were discussed in the second section and that, consequently, 
a detailed analysis of its content would necessitate a 
further selection of the material.37
First of all, it was decided to leave aside the foreign 
affairs section. A study of the paper's readership, conducted 
in the Soviet Union in 1973, had shown that this section 
enjoyed a high level of popularity, though not to the same 
extent as articles on domestic issues which were read on a 
regular basis by 96% of subscribers . 38 More importantly,
c
however, a cursory reading of this section confirmed the 
observation frequently made by Soviet and Western observers 
that foreign coverage remained conventional after 1967. It 
has even been argued that Literaturnaya gazeta 'served as the 
Central Committee's international slander column 1 and that 
some of the material in the 'international life' section is 
likely to have originated directly from the Central Committee 
or the KGB rather than the paper's offices.39
A systematic reading of the second section (minus 
foreign affairs) over the period 1967-71, revealed that the 
most abundantly covered subjects were economics, including 
both industrial and agricultural issues, and the services 
(byt), including housing problems. Then came the 'woman 
question' and family relations, legal matters, moral issues, 
and the protection of the environment (both natural and 
cultural). By comparison, questions pertaining to the 
educational, academic and professional world received less
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attention, and only a few articles were published on the 
young and the health service.*0
It soon became apparent, however, that it was not 
necessarily the most generously covered areas which produced 
the most interesting copy. For example, many of the articles 
on economic issues are rather dull, which might account, at 
least partly, for the fact that they rank quite low on the 
popularity chart established by Fomicheva and her team.*l By 
1967, the disappointment caused by the half-hearted economic
<•
reforms introduced in 1965 was already making itself felt, 
and bold advocacies of market socialism were no longer 
welcome in the official press.*2 The debates on agriculture 
display a greater degree of polarization, in particular on 
the question of rural housing; Gosstroi (the planning 
authorities for construction) is fiercely criticized for 
neglecting old villages and for building blocks of flats in 
rural areas that only alienate farmers from the land even 
further.*3 Yet the more muted debates on other aspects of the 
agricultural question also suggest that the heyday of reform- 
minded economists was indeed over.
On the other hand, the debate on women's double burden, 
which also takes up a substantial amount of space, contains 
some of the liveliest controversy to be found in the paper. 
Pro-natalist articles by male demographers, like V. 
Perevedentsev, who believed that women should be encouraged 
to stay at home in order to look after their young children, 
were challenged by women sociologists, in particular Larisa
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Kuznetsova, who argued for a better trained female workforce 
and better services. 44 An article by B. Urlanis urging women 
to 'take care of men' triggered off a flow of angry letters 
from women readers as well as a series of articles permeated 
with very strong feminist sentiments. 45 As to the numerous 
articles attacking Gosp1 an and industrial managers for 
destroying the natural environment, in particular forests, 
rivers and Lake Baikal, they reveal a deep awareness, albeit 
restrained in expression, of the seriousness of the country's
<•
ecological problems.
The debates on the 'woman question 1 and the environment 
certainly deserve a great deal of attention, not least 
because they are reported to have greatly contributed to the 
high popularity of the paper. According to the above- 
mentioned readership study, the articles read on a regular 
basis by the largest proportion of readers (88X) tackled 
issues concerning the individual's 'private life', marriage, 
the family and the role of men and women within the family 
and society; the section of the paper concerned with 
environmental issues was also a favourite, ranking third 
among the most popular subject areas on 'domestic life'. 4 ^ 
However, like the more subdued economic controversies, these 
outspoken debates do not best illustrate what emerges as a 
leitmotif throughout the second section of Li teraturnaya 
gazeta between 1967 and 1971, namely the oppressive nature of 
Soviet society and the slow reawakening of the individual. 
This recurrent theme, which dominates a number of debates,
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some more lively than others, challenges the very essence of 
Soviet society as defined in officially promoted collectivist 
dogmas and, therefore, will be the focus of this study.
The study is divided into four parts and ten chapters.
Part I, which includes chapters 1 and 2, examines the 
composition of the editorial board and the circumstances in 
which the new format was launched.
Part II focuses on the relationship between the 
individual and the collective. The articles examined in
<•
chapter 3 are concerned with the decline in morals and the 
degradation of human and social relations in everyday 
situations. Chapter 4 is based on pieces written mostly by 
academics who explicitly challenge the very theory of 
collectivism. Finally, chapter 5 discusses the contributions 
which highlight the population's alienation from officially 
sanctioned collectives and the search for new forms of social 
re 1 a t ions.
Part III examines the large amount of material dealing 
with the Soviet population's living standards, which 
highlights the consequences of an ideology denying 
individuals their consumer rights. While chapter 6 analyses 
the debates generated by the emergence of 'material is tic 
tendencies' in Soviet society, chapter 7 assesses the value 
of the much less controversial, yet fiercely voiced 
criticisms of incompetently managed public services. Chapter 
8 focuses on the contributions which reveal a growth of 
consumer awareness in Soviet public opinion.
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Part IV tackles the debates on Soviet law that emphasize 
the vulnerability of the individual caught up in the judicial 
system. Chapter 9 examines articles which question the 
backwardness of Soviet criminology, the extreme harshness of 
the law and society's rejection of former offenders. Chapter 
10 concentrates on the contributions which question the very 
nature of the criminal procedure, including the excessive 
powers of the procuracy.
Although these subject areas roughly coincide with
c
specific sections, there has been no attempt to organize the 
material in the same way as it is presented in the paper. For 
instance, while Literaturnaya gazeta has a section called 
'The Individual, the Collective and Society 1 , many of the 
articles examined in part II, which is entitled 'The 
Individual and the Collective', appeared under various 
headings such as 'Life and Mores', 'Private Life', 'Ethics 1 , 
or 'Pedagogy' . The need to reorganize the material was also 
prompted by a degree of overlap between sections. For 
example, legal and economic problems are occasionally raised 
in the section on 'ethics', and the services can be discussed 
either in the economics or the ' byt page'. Furthermore, a 
substantial amount of articles are published under general 
headings such as 'Various Themes' or 'Writers and Life'.
Finally, it must be pointed out that there is no 
correlation between the length of a debate and the amount of 
attention it receives. A number of short, yet outspoken 
controversies, or even isolated contributions, are more
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effective than longer debates in disclosing the shifts in 
ideas, values and expectations that jeopardize the official 
dogmas. The relative length and openness of the debates are 
also indicative of the paper's varying degree of commitment 
to nonconformist views.
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PART ONE
THE NEW FORMAT
I. THE EDITORIAL BOARD
1.The Editor-in-Chief
When the first issue of the new format Li teraturnaya 
gazeta was published on 4 January 1967, A. Chakovskii had 
already been its editor-in-chief for four years. (The issue 
of 27 December 1962 was the first one to be published under 
its editorship.) This fact alone might suggest that no great 
change was to be expected in the tone of the paper, or at 
least that the mentors of the Party considered Chakovskii as 
perfectly well qualified to carry out the new task they had 
in mind for the organ of the Writers' Union. The new job was, 
in fact, entrusted to the man who owed his appointment to a 
successful conservative attack on the 'liberals' of the 
literary world at the end of 1962.
Indeed, during the Khrushchev Thaw, Literaturnaya gazeta 
made an attempt to elude the stifling authority of the all- 
powerful Union of Writers, whose political conf orrni sm has 
been abundantly documented, i Clearly, the paper had remained 
the mouthpiece of the literary establishment up until the
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death of Stalin, subserviently and relentlessly publicizing 
the hysterical attacks launched by Zhdanov and his acolytes 
on the literary world. In his study of the anti-West witch- 
hunt of 1946-48, G. Struve relates how Literaturnaya gazeta 
'easily broke all the records' when it came to denouncing 
various manifestations of 'cosmopo1itanism'.2 When Zhdanov 
died in 1948, the paper published a tribute to him entitled 
'A friend of Soviet writers'.3
In the early sixties, Literaturnaya gazeta, which was
r
then under the editorship of V.A. Kosolapov (from 15/12/60 to 
25/12/62), was commonly perceived as belonging to the 
'liberal camp' together with Novyi mir. even though its 
'liberalism' was considerably less outspoken and enterprising 
than that of the literary journal. The conservative camp was 
represented by the executive board of the Writers' Union of 
the RSFSR, assisted by the magazine Oktyabr' and the 
newspaper Literature i zhizn'.* Amidst the continuous 
fighting which was characteristic of the Khrushchev Thaw, the 
'liberals' eventually lost the battle for the editorship of 
Literaturnaya gazeta when in December 1962 Kosolapov was 
replaced by Chakovskii at the head of the paper. The last 
straw seems to have been Kosolapov 1 s decision to publish 
Evtushenko ' s poem, Bab'ii* yar, which contained an unmistakable 
acknowledgement and denunciation of Soviet anti-Semitism. 
Chakovskii was to remain chief-editor of Literaturnaya gazeta 
for twenty-six years until December 1988 when he was replaced 
by Yu. P. Voronov, a keen supporter of perestroika.s
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In his study of the political aspect of the Soviet 
literary scene in the sixties, P. Benno writes that Kosolapov 
was replaced by Chakovskii, 'a former NKVD agent 1 .6 While it 
would be unreasonable to expect any confirmation or denial of 
such a piece of information from the Great Soviet 
Encyclopedia . it is interesting to look at the entry (two 
thirds of a column) it devotes to this obviously well 
established writer, if only to compare it with that of 
Tvardovskii. The Encyc1opedia's board of editors obviously
c
decided that the former editor-in-chief of Novyi mir, who had 
been ruthlessly removed from the official literary scene, 
deserved, after all, a longer article (two and a half 
columns) which would unequivocally praise his literary talent 
and contribution to Soviet literature.
The article on Chakovskii is a more sober account of his 
numerous achievements as a writer and editor, for which he 
has been generously rewarded throughout his life. His career 
as a 'kul'turnyi deyatel 1 ' (literary functionary) began in 
the fateful year of 1937 when he was invited to join the team 
of Oktyabr' at the early age of twenty-three. Since then his 
career seems to have progressed without hindrance. He was 
appointed to the editorial board of Znamya after the war and 
finally reached the top at the age of forty-two when, in 
1955, he became editor-in-chief of the literary journal 
Inostrannaya literature. This appointment was indicative of 
the trust invested in him by the political and literary 
establishment. He was to be one of the 'happy few 1 whose role
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in deciding what might be shown to the general public gave
him unrestricted and legitimate access to Western literature.
Chakovskii's literary career has also been very
successful. An outspoken supporter of socialist realism and
the idea of the writer as an active propagandist of the Party
line, Chakovskii has written extensively about the Great
Patriotic War. When appointed editor-in-chief of
•
Literaturnaya gazeta, he was engaged in writing his lengthy 
novel , B1 okada , on the siege of Leningrad, for which he was
c
awarded the Lenin Prize in 1978.7 He also demonstrated his 
ability to attune himself to the leadership's preoccupations 
by writing about the young technical intelligentsia, 
precisely the audience at which the new Literaturnaya gazeta 
was to be aimed.8 Needless to say, the success of 
Chakovskii's literary career must be appreciated in the 
context of the Soviet literary establishment. His Stalinist 
prose and bombastic style have not been to everyone's liking, 
as shown by the following assessment of his fiction by 
literary critic D. Rzhevsky:
The second trend in present-day Soviet 
literature is represented by the 
programmatic writers - notably by those 
who write for Oktyabr' (e.g., 
Panfyorov, . . and Chakovskii) and many 
others who in practice support the 
theory that their craft should be an 
'aide of the Party 1 and back this belief 
by adhering to the vocabulary and 
didactic principles of socialist
rea1i sm.
The predominant trait of these 
authors...., is, I would say, virtual 
disregard of the word as a creative end 
in itself ..... In the works of the 
programmatic writers the pictoral
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function of the word yields to what must 
be called the communicative function. 
Meaningful description is replaced by 
empty decorative, creative inventiveness 
and stylistic individuality by rhetoric 
and sti1tedness.8
Finally, Chakovskii's portrait would be incomplete, and
to some extent incomprehensible within the Soviet context, if
one did not mention his high social and political
responsibilities. A member of the Party since the age of
twenty-eight, secretary of the board of the Writers' Union
since 1962, deputy of the Supreme Soviet, candidate member of
the CC since 1971, Chakovskii has obviously been a loyal
servant of the Party. Not only has he been awarded several
prestigious prizes and decorations, but his frequent trips
abroad are evidence of his high socio-political status. The
Soviet Biographic Archive contains more than a dozen
references to his participation in various Soviet delegations
to the West (including the USA) between 1973 and 1985. He
made most of these trips in his capacity as a political,
rather than a literary, activist. He has also frequently been
a member of delegations meeting Western politicians in
Moscow. His role as an occasional spokesman of the Soviet
Union abroad seems to date back to the mid-sixties. It is
mentioned in I zvest iya of 3 February 1965 (p.2) that he was
interviewed by the New York Times magazine. In 1977
Literaturnaya Gazeta (No.7, p.3) reports that during his trip
to Italy with the paper's first deputy editor, V.
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Syrokomskii, Chakovskii spoke on Italian radio and 
te1evi s ion.
All would seem to indicate that Chakovskii fits 
perfectly well the description of the typical high-ranking 
official of the Brezhnev era. Trained under Stalin, he 
overtly helped to implement some of Zhdanov's most outrageous 
policies. In her memoirs, R. Or 1 ova relates how friends tried 
to dissuade her from accepting a post on the editorial board 
of Inostrannaya literature because its editor-in-chief, A.
«•
Chakovskii, was famous for his intransigent attitude during 
the officially launched campaign against 'cosmopo1itanism'.l° 
In the late sixties Chakovskii published two overtly 
didactic novels, God zhizni (1957), and its sequel, Dorogi, 
kotorye my vybiraem (1960), which give us an insight into 
their author's post-Stalin conservative views. The second 
volume, in particular, shows Chakovskii's reluctance to 
interpret the XX Congress of the CPSU as an event which could 
jeopardize what he sees as the fundamentally sound continuity 
of the Soviet system. While not disputing the need to 
denounce 'Stalin's mistakes', he chose to promote the 
Congress as evidence of the Party's strength and of the 
country's determination to carry on the building of 
communism. Providing that one works hard and one has the 
courage to fight negative elements, namely parasites, 
careerists, demagogues, as well as the half-hearted, inside 
and outside the Party, the old dream cannot fail to come
true.i1
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All through the sixties Chakovskii continued to show his 
support for the conservatives publicly by taking an active 
part in the campaign waged against Novyi mir and those who 
were being gradually forced into dissidence. From 1963 to 
1969 when Solzhenitsyn was finally expelled from the Writers' 
Union, Literaturnaya gazeta fiercely attacked both the writer 
and the literary journal which published some of his works.
The two publications became enemies as soon as 
Chakovskii took over from Kosolapov. Their differences of
<
opinion became particularly acute at the end of 1963 when 
they crystallized into a heated public disagreement about the 
value of So 1zhenitsyn's works. On 19 October 1963 the 
editorial of Literaturnaya gazeta made it clear that the 
paper agreed entirely with Yu. Barabash's criticism of 
So 1zhenitsyn's short story, For the Good of the Cause. Novyi 
mir replied by publishing three letters from readers who were 
all unquestioning supporters of the writer. In its issue of 
12 December 1963 Literaturnaya gazeta interpreted Novyi mir's 
reaction as evidence of its bias.12
Literaturnaya gazeta's hostility towards Novyi mir and 
the ideological current it represented, repeatedly manifested 
itself until the ousting of Tvardovskii in 1970. It was 
evident that the paper had resumed its role as a mouthpiece 
of the establishment, which it had briefly forsaken under 
Kosolapov, and that it was playing a decisive role in 
bringing Tvardovskii down. Izvestiya of 30 March 1967 (p.5) 
reported a meeting held by the secretariat of the Writers'
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Union 'devoted to a discussion of the activities of Novyi mir 
for the past few years' . The session began with a 
contribution by Tvardovskii, who, judging by the wording of 
the article, had to respond to harsh criticism about the 
'ideological and artistic errors and shortcomings' of the 
journal. Chakovskii's name was mentioned in the list of the 
participants, together with two colleagues on the editorial 
board, L. Novichenko and G. Markov.13
After the 'liberals' of Novyi mir had been defeated,
c
Literaturnaya gazeta could concentrate on discrediting 
individual dissidents. The issue of 26 June 1968 contained a 
lengthy anonymous article entitled 'The ideological struggle 
- The writer's responsibility', in which So 1zhenitsyn' s 
First Circle was scathingly criticized for being a 'malicious 
slander on the Soviet system', and its author called a 
'traitor'. Numerous articles in the same vein were to be 
published in Literaturnaya gazeta.**
D. Burg and G- Feifer have described Chakovskii as 'a 
highly intelligent and articulate conservative' who 'was 
emerging as one of So 1zhenitsyn's most determined and 
enduring foes.'I 5 However, it would be wrong to assume that 
the determination with which Chakovskii attacked Solzhenitsyn 
stemmed from personal hatred alone. There is no doubt that 
his stand was a political one. Chakovskii's denunciation of 
political dissidents has been consistent, whatever the degree 
of their dissidence. Yu. Glazov reminds us that Chakovskii, 
'a close associate of Andropov' contributed to the campaign
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against Sakharov by publishing, in 1973, an article in 
Literaturnaya gazeta in which the scientist was portrayed as 
a 're 1igious fool '.16
There is evidence that the man Solzhenitsyn described in 
his memoirs as 'nimble 1 , 'keen-scented' and 'venomous', was 
disliked by many of his peers. He was among the writers who 
were attacked by name for their participation in campaigns of 
abuse against fellow writers during a Party meeting which 
took place a few days after the XX Party Congress, * 7 More
<•
than thirty years later, the literary critic Yu. G. Burtin 
would accuse him in public of being one of the numerous 
timeservers who in the mid—sixties were instrumental in 
bringing about 'the move from democratization to neo- 
Stalinism and stagnation'.18 Commenting upon Voronov's 
appointment as chief-editor of Literaturnaya gazeta in 1988, 
Wishnevsky remarks that 'few writers in the Soviet Union have 
as negative a reputation as does Aleksandr Chakovsky', who, 
she continues, 'is regarded by the intellectual community as 
both a bad writer and a bad person'.1 .1 9
3.Significance of Chakovskii's Appointment as Editor-in- 
Chief
There is no doubt that the transformation of 
Literaturnaya gazeta took place under the aegis of a 
conservative editor-in-chief. Chakovskii's political 
loyalties should certainly make us cautious about 
uncritically accepting the reputation of the paper as being
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'liberal 1 or 'progressive 1 in comparison with other Soviet 
publications.
In fact, one wonders to what extent it is relevant at 
this stage to use such terms in order to assess the 
specificity of Literaturnaya gazeta. The word 'liberal 1 
conveys very different meanings when applied to Western or 
East European societies, and, to make matters worse, tends to 
be used indiscriminately to describe any supporters of the 
Thaw under Khrushchev. What exactly is meant by 'liberalism'?
c
Would it be more appropriate to speak of 'openness 1 ? Would it 
be the case that Chakovskii could afford to welcome some 
degree of 'openness' now that the 'liberals 1 had been 
defeated?
Obviously, these questions cannot be adequately answered 
prior to a close analysis of the paper's contents. But some 
suggestions can already be made as to why the second section 
was perceived by many as a new, more ' liberal ' departure in 
Soviet journalism in spite of the conservatism of its chief- 
edi tor.
It could be argued that the creation of the new section 
represented a novel venture inasmuch as official statements 
and speeches and straightforward propaganda had given way to 
sophisticated discussions of social and economic issues 
usually found in the specialized 'thick 1 journals. By 
adopting this more subtle approach, the paper broke fresh 
ground and encouraged the intelligentsia in its belief that
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the ousting of Khrushchev had not meant a complete retreat 
into the past.
While it would be wrong to underestimate the importance 
of such a change, not least because, as a result, the paper 
became more readable, one must nevertheless be careful not to 
confuse form and content and always keep in mind that the 
degree of openness can be adequately measured only after it 
has been established what issues have been discussed, how and 
by whom.
c
In fact, a cynical view would be to argue that the 
creation of the second section was nothing more than the 
implementation of the Soviet leadership's long-standing 
policy of using the press as a tool for propaganda capable of 
reaching all strata of society by addressing each of them in 
an appropriate language. The question of the differentiation 
in the structure of the press had been raised as early as the 
twenties. Several references to it can be found in Lenin's 
writings, and the principles of the diversification of the 
press were laid down in 1923 at the XII Party Congress.20
The Soviet press under Stalin has not been the object of 
extensive research. Yet the view, commonly held among Soviet 
propagandists and journalists in the sixties, that it is 
wrong to assume that there is such a thing as an 'average 
reader", suggests that the XII Congress's resolutions had not 
led to a great deal of 'differentiation'.2l The uniformity of 
the press which, according to some scholars, persisted for 
nearly four decades, seems to have resulted from the
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obsessive need, characteristic of any dictatorship, to 
control everything and everyone. A. Buzek argues that under 
Stalin not only did the Party use to impose the same content 
and journalistic approach on all newspapers in broad terms, 
it also intervened in the technical details of editing, 
layout and so on . 2 2
With the political relaxation of the late fifties, 
however, it was possible again to put the issue of 
diversification on the agenda. The position of the
<•
intelligentsia had become much stronger as a result of its 
growing numbers and the need for professional expertise in an 
increasingly sophisticated Soviet society. Its active, 
sometimes restive, contribution to the process of de- 
Sta1inisation during the Thaw had certainly been indicative 
of its thirst for more information and debates. It was time 
to address the intelligentsia in its own language. In this 
respect, the new format of Literaturnaya gazeta can indeed be 
regarded as a mere application of the old principle of 
diversification. Chakovskii's job was to involve the 
intelligentsia in carefully controlled debates about the 
state of the country in order to facilitate its political 
integration.
There is still a case for arguing, however, that the new 
format could be the beginning of a more 'liberal' venture 
inasmuch as it was also a conscious departure from a 
completely monolithic presentation of the establishment. 
Chakovskii is said to have been told by one of Brezhnev's
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close associates that Literaturnaya gazeta was an 'unusual 
newspaper', 'like a sort of socialist Hyde Park 1 . This is how 
Chakovskii is believed to have understood this remark:
. . . the leadership saw Li teraturnaya 
Gazeta as a medium through which a 
wide range of establishment opinions 
could be voiced without committing the 
leaders to an official position. The 
importance of this role of 
Li tera turnaya Gazeta was to make the 
reader aware that the Party recognized 
that certain problems were important, 
that it was thinking about them and 
encouraging others to do so as well - in 
short to demonstrate to intellectuals 
that the Party was on the job.23
This arguably cynical conception of the paper's function 
would account for both the limits of its outspokenness and 
the wide scope of debate to be found in its pages. Only 
establishment opinions would be allowed to be voiced, yet a 
certain degree of plurality was acknowledged, which in the 
end could be instrumental in giving professionals a better 
understanding of the complexities and shortcomings of their 
society.
The appointment of Chakovskii as editor-in-chief of 
Literaturnaya gazeta undoubtedly meant that the paper was to 
remain loyal to the conservative leadership of Brezhnev. 
Hence, in particular, the attacks on dissidence. However, a 
total condemnation of political dissent does not necessarily 
imply a refusal to discuss domestic problems, which is 
precisely the area in which the paper enjoyed a reputation 
for a certain degree of openness in the late sixties and 
early seventies.
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Finally, while Chakovskii was directly answerable to the 
political leadership for the content of Literaturnaya gazeta, 
the everyday running of the paper was not controlled by 
himself but by a small team of editors. What little 
information is available on them might give some more insight 
into the development of the paper.
3.The Board of Editors
Between the end of 1962 when Chakovskii took over from
c
Kosolapov and the beginning of 1967 when the new format was 
launched, the editorial board of Literaturnaya gazeta 
underwent great changes.24 Only four members of the board 
(Guliya, Medvedev, Prudkov and Terteryan) stayed on. Without 
additional information it is difficult to surmise why as many 
as two thirds of the previous team (11 out of 15) left. Was 
it Chakovskii's conscious decision to achieve a radical 
reshuffle of the board, whether for political or professional 
reasons, in view of the new type of paper Li tera turnaya 
gazeta was to become? Or would it have happened even if the 
paper had not been drastically transformed, merely as a 
result of the appointment of a new boss? And there is also 
the possibility that some of these people did not really mind 
relinquishing this job in order to go on to better things 
without necessarily severing all links with the paper; it 
might have been the case, in particular, of well established 
writers such as Bondarev, Leont'ev or Soloukhin. Yu. Ya. 
Barabash, deputy editor together with Terteryan under
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Kosolapov, was obviously heading for more prestigious 
positions. He eventually became director of the Institute of 
International Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences and 
later was appointed first deputy minister of culture (1977- 
1984) .25
While the reasons for such a drastic change of personnel 
remain undocumented, it is undeniable that the new format was 
the work of a largely new team. Its gradual formation over 
four years was finally completed by January 1967 in time for
c
the launch of the new format and changed very little over the 
next ten years. At the end of 1977, eleven of the nineteen 
members of the original team were still on the board, which 
was headed by the same small group of top editors. Of the 
eight persons whose names had disappeared from the list of 
editors by the end of 1977, three had died. So, in fact, only 
five out of the nineteen editors decided, or were asked, to 
leave the paper.
Although considerations of a strictly professional 
nature should not be overlooked, one cannot help noticing 
that such a degree of stability in the composition of the 
editorial board, following the upheaval of the mid-sixties, 
conspicuously reflects what happened on the political scene. 
The Brezhnev administration is, indeed, well known for its 
low turnover of political personnel.
There were also some elements of continuity in the team 
of 1967, which should not be altogether disregarded. It is, 
though, difficult to assess whether the four editors who
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survived the reshuffle represented a link, however tenuous, 
with the 'liberals' of the fifties and sixties or with their 
conservative opponents.
All of them were still on the board in 1977 with the 
exception of V.S. Medvedev who died in 1970. Whereas little 
is known about the precise function and influence of G.D. 
Guliya, an Abkhazian writer who was awarded a decoration for 
his work for Literaturnaya gazeta in 1979, there is no doubt 
about Prudkov's and Terteryan's high status. O. N. Prudkov
*
was responsible for the international section and was also 
the secretary of the paper's Party committee.26 A.S. 
Terteryan, who was already fifty nine in 1967, retained the 
post of deputy editor he already held under Kosolapov; 
however, he was not promoted to the position of 'first deputy 
editor' which was created in 1967 and entrusted to V.A. 
Syrokomskii, a newcomer to Literaturnaya gazeta. Terteryan 
was believed to have been a high-ranking military censor, and 
as the editor in charge of the domestic affairs section, had 
the reputation of being 'less strict' than E. A. Krivitskii, 
the newly recruited deputy editor in charge of 1iterature.27
This is yet another reminder that whether Li tera turnaya 
gazeta was just an establishment paper with pretensions to 
openness or was genuinely committed to openness in spite of 
conservative pressure, a newspaper that could accommodate old 
stagers like Terteryan could not be such a ground-breaking 
venture after all.
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The most important changes in the composition of the 
editorial board took place in the second half of 1966. The 
four new members - V. A. Syrokomskii, E. A. Krivitskii, V. A. 
Gorbunov and A. I. Smi rnov-Cherkezov - were all to fulfil 
important functions or exert a decisive influence on the 
development of the paper. The timing of their appointments 
seems to indicate that they had been selected to do just 
that .
Vitalii Aleksandrovich Syrokomskii was only thirty-four
c
when appointed first deputy editor, a position which in 
practice, when it comes to the actual running of the paper, 
made him the boss. But he had already gained a great deal of 
experience and recognition as a journalist. A graduate of the 
notoriously prestigious Institute of International Relations 
( I MO) , he had worked in the Moscow Party city committee and 
held the position of editor-in-chief of Moscow's evening 
newspaper, Vechernyaya Moskva.28 v. Perel'man portrays him as 
an enthusiastic innovator committed to the new image of 
Li tera turnaya___gaze ta and appreciative of talented 
journalists, yet inclined to manage his team in a rather 
autocratic manner. Journalists were selected on the basis of 
a 'competition* ( ' po konkursu' ) , a practice which was then 
unheard of in Soviet journalism, but the turnover was high.29
Evgenii Alekseevich Krivitskii was born in 1929, 
graduated at the philological department of Leningrad State 
University in 1951 and worked for the regional newspaper 
Sta1ingradskaya pravda from 1951 to 1958. He then continued
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his education at the Academy of Social Sciences attached to 
the CC of the CPSU and completed a 'kandidat ' thesis in 
philological sciences.30 His qualifications both in the 
humanities and politics had probably made him an ideal 
candidate for the post of ' instruktor ' at the Propaganda 
Department of the Central Committee which he held before 
joining the editorial board and where one of his functions 
was to supervise Literaturnaya gazeta.3i For this reason, his 
appointment could be regarded, to some extent, as yet
c
another element of continuity.32
Syrokomskii and Krivitskii shared common features. Both 
were highly educated successful professionals who had held 
high-ranking positions at a relatively young age. Neither of 
them had been trained to be a journalist, but this was not at 
all untypical in the Soviet Union. M. Hopkins pointed out 
that schools of journalism had difficulty attracting 
students, and in 1966 the majority of editors lacked a formal 
journalistic education.33 However, both editors had the 
qualities and experience required to lay claim to the job 
in jo far as they were broadly educated people committed to 
the idea of propagandist journalism and already in close 
contact with politicians. Furthermore, both of them had 
previously practical experience of newspaper editing.
Valerii Arkad'evich Gorbunov also shared some of these 
characteristics. He was thirty-nine when he was appointed 
first secretary (otvetstvennyi secretar'). His name first 
appeared in the list of editors on 6 October 1966, and his
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title was specified on the first issue of the new format. It 
is not clear, however, what his function entailed, and he 
seems to have been the only one among the managing team to 
have divided his career between writing and journalism. In a 
short tribute to him on the occasion of his fiftieth 
birthday, he was praised for having concentrated in his 
writing on the theme of work and the young worker and helped 
to publicize 'the achievements of Soviet literature 1 and the 
'socialist way of life'.34
c
Although these three men showed every sign of being 
socially and politically well integrated, their relatively 
young age — mid and late thirties - set them apart from 
Chakovskii. They belonged to a younger generation which 
received its professional training in the fifties at a time 
when the need for some change was publicly acknowledged. They 
were more likely to push for greater openness.
Aleksandr Ivanovich Smirnov—Cherkezov, who also joined 
the board of editors in 1966, belonged to the same generation 
as Chakovskii, but had a very different personal history. 
Born in 1909, he began his working life as a construction 
engineer, a trade which he would later use as a springboard 
for entering the world of journalism. Indeed, he worked as a 
correspondent for the specialized newspaper Stroi te1 ' naya 
gazeta from 1954 to 1957. He also was a writer of popular 
science and fiction . 3S
Not only had Smirnov-Cherkezov gained work experience 
outside the realm of academia and journalism, unlike
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Chakovskii, but as a political prisoner in labour camps until 
Stalin's death, he had also gained first hand knowledge of 
the most sinister aspects of Stalinism.3 6
Although Smirnov-Cherkezov did not officially hold any 
managing position on the board, he is believed to have been 
directly responsible for the second section together with the 
first deputy editor, Syrokomskii. Both men had the reputation 
of being committed to a more daring approach to journalism. 
Judging by the accounts given by former Soviet journalists,
«•
Smirnov-Cherkezov was not afraid of speaking up and 
supporting new initiatives from below.37 He stayed with the 
paper for five years until August 1971, a little more than 
a year before his death, which was announced in Literaturnaya 
gazeta of 22/11/72.
So, the team of top editors in charge of the second 
section showed both signs of conformism and some potential 
for open-mindedness. On the one hand, as might have been 
expected, they were all men (between 1967 and 1977 only one 
woman, L. Pankina, was on the editorial board for one year 
only); two of them, Syrokomskii and Terteryan, were highly 
integrated into the socio-political fabric and in close 
contact with politicians, with Terteryan possibly 
representing, for some, a reassuring link with the past.
On the other hand, Terteryan did not have the reputation 
of being stubbornly conservative; Syrokomskii's youth made 
him more likely to welcome some degree of change and Smirnov- 
Cherkezov's past was unlikely to encourage complacency.
- 47 -
Finally, none of them seemed to have vested interests in the 
implacably conservative Union of Writers, unlike Chakovskii 
and some of their colleagues in the literary section.
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II. THE LAUNCHING OF THE NEW FORMAT
1• For a Partnership between Journalism and Sociology 
Literaturnaya gazeta began to inform its readership of 
the forthcoming new format in the winter of 1966, greatly 
emphasizing the need to use the expertise of sociologists in 
order to enhance the quality of journalism. The issue of 
12 November 1966 had its page 2 entirely devoted to 
sociology with a short paragraph at the bottom of the page
<
announcing the paper's intention to include a regular 
sociology section.
The introductory article, entitled 'Sociology: problems 
and facts', refers to the XXIII Party Congress's appeal for 
more research into social phenomena and proposes that 
Literaturnaya gazeta should contribute to popularizing 
sociological findings.
We would like sociologists, and anyone 
interested in sociology, to regard 
Literaturnaya gazeta as their platform 
where they can familiarize the public 
with the results of their research... 
Today we are publishing the first of 
our pages devoted to sociology.1
This first page contains two main articles written by 
experts (one of them is the well established economist and 
demographer V. Perevedentsev) and one humorous piece; all 
three in defence of sociology. Readers are also invited to 
return a questionnaire on job satisfaction, the results of 
which will be published in the paper. This seems to suggest 
that Li teraturnaya gazeta did not only wish to serve as a
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receptacle for the work of sociologists, but also intended to 
borrow certain methods of this developing science in the hope 
of regaining some latitude to practise a degree of 
investigative journalism. The word 'science 1 ( ' nauka' ) 
enjoys great status in the Soviet Union, and it is likely 
that journalists saw in their alliance with sociologists a 
way of stressing the scientific, therefore acceptable, 
foundation of research into social phenomena as well as a 
chance to secure a certain amount of leeway for themselves.
<c
Journalists could only benefit from the recognition and 
development of a new social science aimed, in particular, at 
examining the effects, good or bad, of economic policies on 
peop1e's 1ives.
Perevedentsev argues that sociology can help to manage 
society more efficiently by destroying myths and stereotypes. 
As an example of what it can achieve, he examines the 
question of high labour turnover (tekuchest ' ) , and disputes 
the fact that this phenomenon should be described solely in 
negative terms. Workers who wish to give up jobs they have 
not been trained for should not be frowned upon, but 
congratulated. Perevedentsev also establishes a link between 
the high rate of turnover and the lack of job satisfaction - 
precisely the issue tackled in the questionnaire -, and calls 
for the setting up of an adequately vocational guidance 
service. Finally, he draws the more general conclusion that 
economic measures alone cannot solve economic problems.
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Sociology was not a completely new discipline for Soviet 
academics. In her study of the development of sociology in 
the Soviet Union, E. A. Weinberg notes that courses in this 
discipline were already taught in a number of Russian 
universities before the Revolution and that Russian 
sociologists appeared well acquainted with the works of their 
European counterparts whose writings were often available in 
translation. In the twenties the tone of the debate amongst 
sociologists was to a great extent set by Bukharin's book,
c
Theory of Historical Materialism - A Popular Textbook of 
Marxist Sociology. At the same time, during the relatively 
liberal decade following the October Revolution, a 
significant amount of empirical research was carried out. It 
was in the thirties when sociology was assigned the task of 
serving the Party that it finally disappeared as an 
independent academic subject. Some sociological research did 
take place during the Stalin years, but under the cover of 
other disciplines, in particular ethnography and 
anthropology. In the fifties, encouraged by the political 
thaw started by the XX Party Congress, Soviet academics 
worked for the re-establishment of sociology as a science in 
its own right, albeit within the constraints of Marxism- 
Leninism. The battle proved to be arduous and, arguably, 
yielded disappointing results, yet the discipline received 
official recognition at the XXIII Party Congress held in 
March-April 1966.2
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The development of sociology held out a promise of 
openness. Potentially it was a way of pushing back the limits 
imposed by political and economic theories which had so far 
resolutely denied the legitimacy of human resistance to the 
system. The official brand of Marxism had artificially 
organized people into neat social groups whose aspirations 
had been overlooked for many years. Perevedentsev's article, 
for example, acknowledges the fact that people had found ways 
of resisting the system, thus pointing up its inadequacies.
<•
The 'human factor', a notion which would frequently 
recur in the discourse of Gorbachev's supporters, was 
beginning to be seen as a vital element to be taken into 
account in order to provide a more realistic assessment of 
the system's shortcomings. While the tendency under Gorbachev 
was to emphasize the positive ways in which the 'human 
factor' could and should be exploited - personal initiative 
and the competitive spirit were now actively promoted - in 
the sixties the main concern was to show the limits of a 
rigid, predominantly economic approach to the management of 
soc i e ty.
The new emphasis on the importance of studying social 
phenomena was part of a broader attempt at reintroducing a 
human dimension into a dehumanizing political system which 
had functioned for nearly three decades showing little 
consideration for the individual's well-being. It was finally 
recognized that the system could no longer be allowed to 
exist for its own sake, ignoring people's needs and
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aspirations. It is significant that, during the press- 
conference where he presented the new format, Chakovskii 
should have spoken of the 'spiritual demands' ( ' dukhovnye 
zaprosy') of the nation.
This Cthe reorganization of the paper] 
has been done first of all because 
during the past few years the spiritual 
life of Soviet people in general and of 
the intelligentsia in particular has 
become richer and more complex. We 
decided to reorganize Literaturnaya 
gazeta precisely in order to cater for 
the spiritual needs of Soviet readers in 
the best possible way.3
Chakovskii's assumption that Soviet people's 'spiritual 
demands' did not deserve so much attention in the past is, to 
say the least, debatable. However, the message was clear: the 
readership had become more demanding and the paper would 
regain - or is it 'gain'? - some credibility only if it 
addressed issues going beyond 'myths and stereotypes'. As 
sociology was a new discipline, free from cumbersome 
Stalinist traditions, it was hoped that it could make a 
substantial contribution to this process of enlightment.
In the years 1967-71 Literaturnaya gazeta did contribute 
to the promotion of sociological research, printing a 
significant number of articles written on various social 
issues by sociologists. On the other hand in the years 1970- 
71 the rarity of contributions focusing on the problems 
encountered by the profession itself testified to the 
precarious position of this recently resuscitated science, 
increasingly perceived by the conservative political
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establishment as a threat to its vested interests. In her 
conclusion on the development of Soviet sociology from the 
mid-fifties to the mid-seventies, Weinberg argued that, while 
there was no evidence of Marxism-Leninism shaping 'concrete 1 
sociological research, the future of the discipline would 
depend on political developments and that the general 
tightening up observed since 1967 was undoubtedly an ominous 
sign.* And indeed most of the articles that Li teraturnaya 
gazeta published on the subject between 1967 and 1971 are
c
suffused by the fear of seeing the further development of 
sociology hindered by the conservative backlash.
Looking at page 2 in the issue of 12 November 1966, one 
can already detect a certain degree of caution in the way the 
paper set out to promote sociology, which suggests that this 
social science had not yet attained the highest level of 
academic respectability on a par with, say, economics. 5 The 
enthusiasm permeating the already mentioned articles is 
somewhat tempered by two other pieces exploring the possible 
danger of misusing questionnaires and surveys.
In the article entitled 'Responsibility 1 Ya . B. 
Aleksandrovich, himself a sociologist, warns fellow 
researchers against jumping to hasty and reckless 
conclusions. However, it is clear that the article was 
written not so much for the benefit of sociologists as for 
that of the authorities. Aleksandrovich's warning against 
unsound investigation techniques turns out to be a mere 
stratagem for advocating further development of the
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discipline. He argues that the occasionally low level of 
sociological research is due to a lack of adequate training 
and facilities, and calls for the provision of urgently 
needed suitable teaching material and the setting up of more 
sociology courses in higher education. The humorous piece, 
which aims to show how one can reach ludicrous conclusions 
by asking the wrong questions in the wrong way, echoes 
Aleksandrovich's defence of the discipline. Sociology is a 
serious business which needs to be treated seriously.
«•
The dozen or so articles on sociology published by 
Literaturnaya gazeta between 1967 and 1971 (approximately 
18,000 words) reiterate and develop the main arguments put 
forward by Aleksandrovich. Several authors warn, in 
particular, against the danger of using unsound methods of 
research in studying public opinion. As in Poland, opinion 
polling was initiated by the media. In the Soviet Union it 
was the newspaper Komsomo1'skaya pravda which set up the 
first public opinion institute with the help of the 
sociologist B. Grushin. In her study of Soviet sociology, 
Weinberg argues that while some criticisms levelled at the 
polls conducted by Komsomol'skaya pravda between 1960 and 
1967 were justified, the youth paper should nevertheless be 
given its due for bringing the discussion on public opinion 
research into the academic world, thus serving the best 
interests of Soviet sociology. 6 Yet judging by the articles 
published by Literaturnaya gazeta in 1967-69 academic 
sociologists felt that they had to distance themselves from
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these sometimes unprofessiona11y conducted polls in order to 
defeat any attempt at tarnishing the reputation of their 
still immature discipline. V. Yadov, for instance, in an 
article revealingly called 'Prestige under threat... 1 , 
condemns the 'questionnaire mania' ('anketomaniya') that seems 
to have swept the country; yet he vehemently rejects the 
thought that Grushin and his colleagues could be held 
responsible for it, and sees the unwillingness of the Central 
Statistical Board to make vital data available and authorize
c
nationwide surveys as the main obstacle in the way of sound 
and productive sociological research.7
The failure of sociology to bring about reforms is 
identified as an additional reason for the decline in its 
prestige. Some contributors unceremoniously urge 
sociologists, 'too busy writing their theses', to go out and 
work in industry; others maintain that the job of 
sociologists is to make recommendations, on the basis of 
which state organizations ought to take practical steps.8
V. Perevedentsev is among those who deplore the lack of 
concrete results, pointing the finger at the decision-makers 
who ignore the research already achieved and hamper the 
development of academic structures that would enable 
sociology to attain higher levels of sophistication and 
efficiency. In three lengthy articles, Perevedentsev, clearly 
angered by the authorities' passive resistance, calls for the 
urgent setting up of sociology departments in Soviet 
universities and institutes. Sociology needs all the
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facilities made available by the higher education system in 
order to build on the work already achieved by all these 
philosophers, economists, demographers and so forth who have 
already been involved in sociological research for many years 
in more than a hundred academic units scattered across the 
country. The work of some researchers, for example, 
Zaslavskaya, Levada and Grushin, has already met with great 
acclaim and shown how necessary sociology has become for the 
drawing up of socio-economic policies. Several contributors
c
use similar argument. For instance, I. Bestuzhev, chairman of 
the Soviet Sociological Association's Research Committee for 
Social Prognosis, argues - predictably, one may say - that 
'long-term planning is effective only when it is based on 
scientific findings'.9
Perevedentsev's articles, respectively published in 67, 
69 and 70, stand out amongst the contributions for the 
defence of sociology in that they contain direct attacks on 
conservatives in the academic and political worlds. Sociology 
has its supporters, he remarks, but also its critics, such 
as, for instance, this 'very famous philosopher 1 who 
expressed misgivings about the need for such a discipline 'at 
a top scientific (vysokouchenom) meeting'. Nobody doubts that 
there is a need for sociology, he later suggests, 'at least 
no one has expressed any doubts in public'. Perevedentsev 
also takes the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Education to 
task because of its opposition to the training of 
sociologists and denounces the authorities' claim that no
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money is available to finance the further development of the 
discipline. 1 o
Very little was to be published on sociology after 
Perevedentsev's third piece, apart from a laudatory review of 
Shlyapentokh's book, Sociology for Everyone, and a 
journalist's article, taking up two whole pages, about the 
town of Taganrog, where a series of sociological surveys had 
been conducted. This report was a good example of cooperation 
between journalism and sociology, although, ironically, it
c
must not be interpreted as a sign of impending victory for 
sociologists, who were in fact being increasingly silenced by 
censorship: only a small fraction of Grushin's study on 
propaganda and the media in Taganrog was allowed to be 
publi shed.* 1
The idea, however, was not only that sociology could 
help journalists to loosen the grip of stifling political and 
economic dogmas and publish more realistic accounts of Soviet 
life. The sociologist's expertise was much sought after as a 
means of reviving the whole profession of journalism and 
improving the 'efficiency' of the press. In 1967 the year-old 
monthly journal Zhurnalist published a series of articles 
stressing the need to encourage sociological research into 
the media to this effect.
In 1967 the first issue of the journal contained an 
article entitled 'Research destroys stereotypes' by Vladilen 
Kuzin, who was deputy head of the Propaganda and Agitation 
Department of the Leningrad regional party committee.12
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Kuzin argues that journalists must seek the expertise of 
sociologists in order to increase the 'efficiency 1 of the 
press. The media have failed to exert a significant influence 
on public opinion for the simple reason that journalists do 
not know their readership. The assumption that letters to the 
editor reflect the preoccupations of the vast majority of 
readers has been disproven, and journalists cannot gauge 
their readership on the basis of their experience alone. They 
need sociologists to tell them what their readers expect of
<•
the newspaper.
Kuzin also points out that the principle of 
differentiation, according to which different publications 
must be targeted at different social groups, is not a new 
one. However, although it was enunciated as early as the 
twenties, it has remained a 'mere slogan'.* 3
Finally, Kuzin puts forward three different suggestions 
aimed at improving the quality of the press: 1) sociological 
surveys should be carried out in order to gain better 
knowledge not only of the readership, but also of the staff. 
(He gives the example of an illuminating survey which showed 
to the surprise of many that the majority of journalists in 
Leningrad and its region were over fifty years old.) 2) 
Cooperation between sociologists and editors should be 
reinforced. Whereas up till now their collaboration has 
occurred merely on a consultation basis, in the future each 
publication should have a sociologist and/or a psychologist
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on its editorial board. 3) Finally, the training of 
journalists needs improving.
Kuzin's article was followed by several others in the 
same vein which contained equally strong appeals for what in 
the West would be termed 'market research'.l* Obviously, such 
an exercise was geared to securing profits of an ideological 
rather than financial nature. Propaganda staff (several of 
these articles had been written or co-written by heads of 
propaganda departments) were becoming increasingly impatient
c
to modernize the old-style propaganda techniques. It had 
become routine to argue that the media had failed not only to 
differentiate between different types of readership and 
audience, but also to keep up with the ever growing demands 
of a better educated population.
Such critical evaluation of the media stemmed from an 
awareness and recognition of the social changes which had 
occurred, in particular, as a result of the development of 
the education system. Perhaps more importantly, though, one 
can detect a veiled re-appraisal of the changing political 
climate. Since post-Stalin Soviet society had become less 
coercive, propaganda was to play an even more important role 
in winning the support of the population. All the above 
mentioned articles from Zhurnalist advance the same argument, 
i.e., the mass media will be more influential in shaping 
public opinion - or, to put it more crudely, propaganda will 
work better - if one can respond to people's expectations. 
Hence the need to seek the expertise of sociologists.
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Each article makes out a case for a more realistic
account of Soviet life, to which the reader will be able to
relate. In the first article to appear under the new heading
'Sociological laboratory', Boris Firsov speaks of the
'infinite diversity and wealth of [the public's] demands
which the media 'must absorb and reflect'. 15 In another
article published under the same heading Yurii Kurganov,
editor of the Gorkii region youth newspaper Leninskaya smena,
and Tamara Kharlamova, head of the Propaganda Department of
f
the same publication, insist that 'there is no such thing as 
an average reader' - a catchphrase which frequently recurs in 
various articles on the same theme. 1 6
At the same time all these authors make it clear that 
the ultimate goal is to reinforce the impact of the media on 
public opinion. Firsov wants to know what 'changes in social 
and individual consciousness... have occurred as a result of 
the influence of the mass media'.17 Kurganov and Kharlamova 
state bluntly that 'propaganda "in general" ("voobshche") has
:er
target it. 18 Only one article put the emphasis on the need 
for 'K1asnost'' to encourage social participation rather than 
propaganda.* 9
It is tempting to argue that sociologists were merely 
required to provide the information that would enable 
propagandists to manipulate readers more successfully. It is 
probably safe to assume that the concern of propagandistswas, 
indeed, to respond to an increasingly critical audience more
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never been successful', thus pointing out the need to bett
efficiently. On the other hand, it is equally important to 
evaluate the contribution of sociologists and their 
commitment to exposing reality. Propagandists and 
sociologists had different, potentially conflicting, 
professional interests, and some degree of collaboration 
between the two professions was likely to generate a certain 
amount of openness which, in the end, could undermine the 
impact of propaganda.
It is significant that none of the already mentioned
c
articles from Zhurnalist attempt to examine the latent 
contradictions between the traditional propagandist function 
of the Soviet media and the publicly recognized need to voice 
the public's concerns and expectations in order to retain its 
attention. But, after all, what guarantee was there that by 
'absorbing and reflecting people's expectations' the media 
would help to secure popular support? While admitting that it 
was time to modernize and refine their methods, propagandists 
were not questioning their basic and, one might argue, 
somewhat naive, assumption that the media, together with 
other socio-political agencies, can control the way in which 
opinions are shaped. Neither did they discuss whether the 
impact of propaganda could be undermined by a more honest 
account of reality and its numerous shortcomings.
Propagandists were unable, quite understandably, to 
resolve a contradiction which is inherent in the nature of 
the Soviet media. Indeed, while they had no alternative but 
to let reality creep into propaganda in the hope of exerting
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some degree of influence on the public, there was no 
guarantee that, in the end, this would not go against their 
own interests.
This is not to say, however, that propagandists were 
incapable of holding their inevitably awkward relationship 
with social sciences in check. Recent Soviet studies of the 
Soviet media, covering the period from 1964 to 1985, seem to 
confirm this constant, albeit closely monitored, conflict 
between the basic demands of propaganda and the need for a
«•
greater flow of information. We know from accounts by former 
Soviet journalists now living in the West that these 
frictions could take various forms. They occurred at 
institutional level (propaganda department versus chief- 
editors), within the hierarchical structure (chief-editor 
versus journalists) or, very simply, within the professional 
activity of the journalist. As a matter of fact, it could be 
argued that the contradiction between the propagandist 
function of journalists and their responsibility to report 
on what actually goes on has always been embedded in the very 
'Leninist principles' on which the profession is founded. 
It is, indeed, difficult to believe in the supposedly non- 
problematic juxtaposition of the principles of part inost' and 
pravdinost'.20
In his book published in 1986, The Efficiency of the 
Press, S.V. Tsukasov unintentionally demonstrates that the 
recipe does not really work.21 Having reaffirmed the 
educational function of the Soviet media and paid tribute to
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the past by acknowledging the gradual, but steady improvement 
of media 'efficiency 1 since the Revolution, Tsukasov 
eventually points to their many weaknesses and shortcomings. 
The media, he claims, have failed to keep up with the ever 
increasing cultural level and demands of the pub 1ic.22 This, 
of course, is a familiar argument - the usual coded way of 
saying that readerships have become more critical of the 
media and society at large.
Judging by Tsukasov's study the situation remained
c
unchanged throughout the Brezhnev years, as is shown by the 
criticisms of the media voiced at the April 1985 Plenum of 
the CC of the CPSU. The media were still suffering from too 
much 'verbiage and the inability to talk to people with the 
language of truth' and, consequently, could not successfully 
educate public opinion ( ' vospi tanie. and ' ubezhdenie ).23 The 
argument has come full circle again and still fails to 
convince.
It is important to examine the support given by 
Literaturnaya gazeta to sociology in the broader context of 
the somewhat uneasy relationship which the Soviet press has 
with its readership. Two different, although not necessarily 
contradictory interpretations come to mind. On the one hand, 
the paper's appeal to sociologists that they should regard it 
as their platform indicates the board's willingness to move 
away from a cruder form of propagandist journalism. On the 
other hand, the move was possible only because propagandists 
were anxious to avoid the complete alienation of the
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intelligentsia, and, therefore chose to open up the spectrum 
of debates. (The distinction between propagandists and 
journalists is an artificial one, made for the sake of the 
discussion. In reality, they can be one and the same person.)
The first interpretation might appear to be more 
optimistic. However, the second one suggests, perhaps more 
interestingly, that while one should not assume that Soviet 
journalists are powerless to defend their professional 
interests, it is evident that some important changes can take
c
place as a result of the pressure from readers. After all, in 
any society, readers can demonstrate their dissatisfaction by 
removing their support.24
2. Change and Continuity
It is interesting to compare the Literaturnaya gazeta 
editorial of 4/1/67 with the advertising leaflet which was 
slipped into an earlier issue in the winter of 1966.25 While 
in both cases the new format is presented as a promising 
development, the two items differ greatly in tone. Such a 
discrepancy cannot be accounted for solely by the intrinsic 
difference in the very nature of the documents. The leaflet 
goes to great lengths to highlight the changes that will 
transform the ageing organ of the Writers' Union into an 
exciting new weekly. Obviously, the editorial also sets out 
the ways in which the paper will improve, but unlike the 
leaflet it strongly emphasizes the paper's allegiance to the 
old ideological principles and its commitment to carrying out
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the necessary changes in the spirit of its well-tried 
journalistic traditions.
The advertising leaflet is worth examining more closely, 
as it most probably reflects some of the expectations of both 
readers and journalists. Judging by the increasing 
circulation figures in the late sixties, these expectations 
seem to have been, at least partly and temporarily, 
fulfilled. In the second part of his memoirs, Pokinutaya 
Rossiya, former Soviet journalist Viktor Perel'man remembers
c
how exciting it was to be working for the 'most popular 
publication in the country'. Literaturnaya gazeta, he 
recounts, 'had been printed on sixteen pages for more than a 
year and had won the support of hundreds of thousands of 
readers. ... It seemed that as far as it was concerned there 
were no forbidden topics'.26
First of all, the leaflet lays great emphasis on news 
and topicality. 'Literaturnaya gazeta', it claims, 'will 
introduce you to new works of fiction, poetry and plays which 
have just been completed or, even, which are still in 
progress'. Information is promised on forthcoming books, 
films and theatre productions. More space is to be devoted to 
'the latest scientific discoveries', 'the latest political, 
sociological and philosophical theories from abroad', to 
'news on literature and the arts from each of the five 
continents'. In conclusion it is proclaimed that although 
'Literaturnaya gazeta will come out every week 1 , 'it is not a 
weekly' - a somewhat cryptic statement which is further
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clarified in these terms : 'This is a new type of publication 
combining the specific character of a newspaper (i.e. topical 
socio-political information) with the publication of 
polemical (problemnyi) material 1 .
The second main objective of the leaflet is, indeed, to 
promote Literaturnaya gazeta as a forum for public 
discussion. The paper had been expanded with a view to 
publicizing 'various opinions on burning issues', whether in 
the field of literature and the arts or in the socio-economic
<•
domain. One cannot help feeling, though, that it is the 
discussion of socio-economic issues which is meant to put new 
life into the paper. (The section on literature and the arts 
takes up only a fifth of the leaflet.) The suggested areas 
include the economic reform, problems pertaining to the 
education system, moral and ethical questions, the law, 
living conditions (byt) and scientific discoveries. All 
'aspects of the spiritual, social and working life of the 
Soviet person (sovetskii chelovek)' will be looked into.
Only a close analysis of the paper's content will make 
it possible to assess to what extent such ambitious 
intentions were realized. At this stage in our discussion it 
might be more helpful to look at what was actually missing 
from the leaflet. It is not suggested that the issues which 
are not mentioned in the leaflet - or, for that matter, in 
the editorial - will not be given any attention in the paper. 
But the mere fact that they do not figure prominently in 
documents aimed at stressing the most attractive qualities of
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Literaturnaya gazeta, gives us some insight into the nature 
of the newborn weekly.
Most striking of all is the total absence of history. 
The word itself is nowhere to be found in the leaflet. A new 
section on contemporary history appeared as early as January 
1967 with an introduction by Ernst Genri.27 However, it 
appeared among the pages on 'International Life', and from a 
cursory reading of some 1967 issues it is evident that no 
such attention was to be focused on Soviet history. (The
<•
articles on Lenin and the fiftieth anniversay of the 
Revolution were unlikely to contain controversial material.) 
Literaturnaya gazeta intended to stay away from the debates 
on the Stalin years which had been initiated, in particular, 
by Novyi mir.28 This seems to corroborate the argument that 
the new Literaturnaya gazeta was the product of a compromise 
between the Brezhnevite political establishment and the 
intelligentsia, a kind of political contract the terms of 
which can be crudely formulated as follows: more debates on 
certain aspects of contemporary society, but no digging into 
the past. It is clear, though, that the inability to question 
the past could only limit the depth and scope of the debates 
on the present.
One is also struck by the lack of allusion to the
existence of various social groups and their possibly
conflicting interests. The leaflet clings to the notion of
'sovetskii chelovek', which presupposes a romantic and
mythical image of Soviet society as a perfectly harmonious
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community. Obviously, this does not mean that the paper's 
content will reflect such an unrealistic view of society. The 
emphasis on sociology, in particular, runs counter to the 
propagandist's insistence on social harmony. However, the 
latent contradictions between the two tendencies were likely 
to be instrumental in determining the way the paper would 
portray Soviet reality. The reluctance, or inability, to 
fully discuss the value of such criteria as, say, gender, 
nationality or class was bound to limit the paper's critical
v
judgement and social awareness. (The drawing at the top of 
the leaflet portrays men only - what's more, men of 
European, or even, perhaps, Russian origin. Is it indicative 
of the way the staff unconsciously imagined their readership? 
Would the supposedly neutral word 'che1ovek' happen to be 
more masculine than feminine?)
On the other hand, judging by the leaflet, the paper 
eemed to be genuinely concerned that the notion of 
'sovetskii che1ovek' should be interpreted in a liberal way. 
One could, perhaps, even speak of a certain form of 
pluralism; not in the sense, though, that group interests 
would be overtly acknowleged or the political leadership 
challenged. The understanding was that Soviet citizens could 
publicly appear to differ in their views so long as 
individual opinions did not blend into formally organized 
plat forms.
Both the leaflet and the editorial stress that 
Literaturnaya gazeta will seek contributions from 'writers,
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researchers and public figures' on socio-economic issues. 
The editorial also acknowledges the importance of the 
'scientific and technical revolution' in the evolution of 
Soviet society. It contends that while Literaturnaya gazeta 
does not wish to compete with specialized publications, it 
will endeavour to alert the public to the impact of 
scientific and technical achievements on the 'spiritual and 
moral life of society 1 . At the same time , the editorialist 
seems to be anxious to play down the novelty of such a
*
project by establishing a supposedly self-evident link 
between the unquestioned and unquestionable theory of 
socialist realism, and the need to give professionals from 
different backgrounds sufficient space to allow a broad 
discussion of socio-economic issues:
Faithful to its traditions, 
Literaturnaya yazeta will strive to 
examine questions of literature and art 
in close relation with the life of the 
people ... with all that in fact serves 
as the basic source and main object of 
artistic creation. Hence the interest we 
take in the observations of writers, 
researchers, public figures on various 
aspects of people's lives, in their 
thoughts about problems concerning the 
economic reform, morals, ethics etc.., 29
The editorial clearly recognizes the need to popularize 
knowledge and increase the flow of information. However, it 
neglects to say that the appeal to academics and 
professionals, whose commitment was likely to be primarily to 
their subjects or work areas, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, which in fact has little to do with the demands
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of socialist realism. In comparing some 1951 and 1971 issues 
of Pravda and Izvestiya J. F. Hough noticed a sharp increase 
over these twenty years in the proportion of academic and 
scientific personnel writing for these newspapers. In the 
past articles 'articulating demands' used to be produced 
predominantly by officials.30
Hough's observation also brings to our attention the 
fact that Li teraturnaya gazeta was not the only publication 
to benefit from this new development, and, consequently, its
c
increasing popularity in the late sixties cannot be accounted 
for by the rising participation of professionals only. 
Literaturnaya gazeta could potentially provide a more 
satisfactory platform for professionals as it had expanded 
considerably with the new format and addressed the most 
highly educated section of the population. Unlike Pravda and 
I zvest iya, for instance, it did not have to make allowances 
for the average reader (however mythical this notion may be). 
It was a newspaper made by professionals for professionals. 
Nevertheless, the crucial issue remains the quality of their 
involvement. How lively and varied were the debates? To what 
extent did the demands of propaganda make themselves felt?
The leaflet, unlike the editorial, lays heavy emphasis 
on the paper's intention to publicize a wide range of 
opinions, not only by inviting professionals to make 
contributions, but also by publishing a greater quantity of 
letters from readers. A whole paragraph in the leaflet 
deals with readers' participation, pledging that there will
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be a special section for readers' letters in each issue of 
the paper. Readers are offered the opportunity to 'join any 
of the discussions and debates which will take place in the 
pages of Literaturnaya gazeta and to express their views on 
any question worrying them'. The wording seems to suggest 
that Literaturnaya gazeta would particularly welcome letters 
containing opinions on general issues rather than particular 
grievances. Finally, the leaflet generously advertises the 
section to be devoted to humour - yet another possible
c
channel for social comment. 31
The editorial, unlike the leaflet, lays great stress 
upon ideology. Whereas the leaflet mentions the word only 
once, in the section on international affairs ('polemics with 
our ideological opponents'), the editorial strongly insists 
on the paper's past and future allegiance to Marxism and 
socialist realism, enthusiastically announces its coverage of 
the fifieth anniversary of the October Revolution and warns 
that while readers will be informed on foreign politics and 
culture, there will be no 'ideological compromises'. This is 
how the main functions of the paper are summed up:
1. Active participation in the communist 
educatiqn of working people.
2. Defence of the heroic traditions of 
the Soviet people, of its high humanist 
idea 1s.
3. Exposure of all that hinders the 
building of the new society.
4. Uncompromising struggle against any 
hostile ideology, against any attempt at 
revising Marxism-Leninism. 32
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Points 1, 2 and 4 hold out little promise of
openness. The references to the educational function of the
press and the 'heroic traditions' might possibly be dismissed
for the sake of argument - as routine statements, the
significance of which should not be exaggerated. There is
little doubt, though, that the last point contains a clear
warning for the benefit of 'revisionists' at home, including
Novyi mir and its supporters. At the same time, point 3 can
be seen as echoing the more liberal tone of the leaflet,
«
while being sufficiently vague to fit in with what is, on the 
whole, an orthodox declaration of principle.
The extremely cautious stance of the editorial does not 
so much question the veracity of the leaflet as suggest that 
each attempt at 'exposing 1 what 'hinders the building of the 
new society' will have to be negotiated separately behind the 
scenes, and the success of such attempt will depend on the 
political conjecture of the time.
The whole issue of 4/1/67 presents a somewhat 
uninspiring mixture of conservative material and items 
indicative of some degree of openness. One needs only to look 
at the names of the well-known literary figures whose 
contributions were included in the first isssue. The 
'liberals' are not totally absent. For instance, the issue 
contains some poetry by A. Tvardovskii. (By 1967 the position 
of Novyi mir had greatly weakened, but Tvardovskii was still 
its editor. )
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More revealing, perhaps, is the choice of Pushkin's 
self-portrait as the symbol of the new Literaturnaya gazeta - 
the same portrait which appeared on the front page of 
Pushkin's and Del'vig's paper in 1830. At the bottom of page 
3 a short tribute to Pushkin and Del'vig includes an extract 
from their first editorial in which they pledged to publish 
'European and Russian literature, fiction and poetry, 
bibliographies and scientific news'. The names of Gogol and 
former Decembrists figured in the list of contributors. The
c
editors attacked Grech and Bulgarin who had spoken against 
the introduction of progressive (peredovaya) literature into 
Russia in the paper Severnaya pche1 a . Commenting upon the 
extract Literaturnaya gazeta pays tribute to its ancestor, 
pointing out that it had set a priceless precedent in the 
history of the country by 'contributing to the diffusion of 
progressive ideas.'
Pushkin seems to have been a very thoughtful choice. On 
the one hand, the reference to the 'great Russian poet* could 
only flatter the nationalistic feelings of the conservatives. 
On the other, there was something promising in the choice of 
a literary figure who, for obvious reasons, had no 
connections with Soviet power and was famous for having 
angered the political Establishment of his time.
Yet there is no shortage of Establishment figures in the 
first issue of the new format. Gorky, whose portrait takes 
much of the front page, should certainly be included in this 
category. This is not so much a judgement on his literary
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works, or political stance in the thirties, as a recognition 
of his official image as the first president of the Writers' 
Union and the father of socialist realism, who contributed a 
great deal to 'the development of the best traditions of the 
Russian national culture 1 .33 i n fact, a drawing of Gorky's 
profile eventually appeared at the top of the paper on the 
centenary of the writer's birth in April 1968.34 The idea had 
been suggested by a reader and 'unanimously supported by the 
editorial board'. The reader argued that the symbolic
<•
reference to Pushkin was insufficient to convey the raison 
d'etre of Literaturnaya gazeta. The paper's function was, 
indeed, to 'contribute to shaping the consciousness of 
builders of communism, to help writers understand all the 
difficulties facing them... to train young cadres'; in short, 
'to realize all that the proletarian writer M. Gorky fought 
for 1 .35
The front page also contains a short item announcing the 
fourth publication of Sholokhov's works, and an article by K. 
Fedin wishing the new Literaturnaya gazeta good luck. 
Furthermore, although there are some non-Russian names (for 
example, Gamzatov and the Ukrainian writer Oles 1 Goncharov) 
and a contribution by Nataliya Il'ina, the paper seems to 
have remained predominantly Russian and male-dominated.
It has, of course, never been suggested that 
Literaturnaya gazeta was not a product of the cultural and 
political Establishment of the late sixties. But the very 
notion of Establishment is in itself imprecise, and refers to
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a constantly, even if slowly, changing reality. After all, in 
the late sixties, Tvardovskii still belonged to the 
Establishment, while others had already been forced into 
dissidence or, simply, reduced to silence. It has been shown 
that the Establishment of the late sixties, usually - and 
rightly - described as more repressive than ten years
and 
that in 1967 Literaturnaya gazeta was showing some signs of
wanting to explore this opportunity. It is, however,
t
important to acknowledge the heavy conservative presence in 
the paper.
earlier, was prepared to allow for a degree of openness
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PART TWO
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVE
Over the years 1967-71 Literaturnaya gazeta published a 
considerable number of articles (approximately 150,000 words)
<
which discuss the quality of human relations in Soviet 
society. These articles appeared under various headlines such 
as 'Life and Mores', 'Private Life', 'Ethics 1 , 'Pedagogy', 
'Writers and Life 1 or 'The Individual, the Collective and 
Society'. The above—mentioned number of words also includes 
readers' letters, accounts of round tables and Discussion 
Club pages on the same themes. These topics enjoyed a very 
high degree of popularity, unlike economic issues, for 
instance, which received 3,5 times more coverage.*
A number of issues were, tack 1 ed, ranging from criticisms 
of bad manners, 'little Stalins' and uncaring administrations 
to the social organization of leisure and the urgently needed 
development of human sciences, in particular psychology. 
While the debates differ widely in tone, scope and approach, 
they all seem to stem from the basic concern to reassess the 
relationship between the individual and the collective.
Soviet ideologists have repeatedly refuted the 
assumption made by some Western critics that the socialist
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system is incompatible with the freedom of the individual. 
They usually reverse the accusations, reminding us of the old 
masters' theory of alienation in capitalist society. A. 
Arnoldov's defence of socialist humanism is a model of the 
genre:
Karl Marx and Frederick Enge1s 
consistently defended the individual, 
came against the social conditions that 
deformed the individual, called 
for the revolutionary transformation of 
social relations in order to eliminate 
all forms of alienation of the 
individual... Revolutionary humanism 
is linked with the practical fight of 
working people, led by the working 
class, for a radical transformation of 
social relations along Communist lines. 
Only such a transformation of society is 
a reliable basis for full, all-round 
development of the individual.2
According to this theory the emancipation of the 
individual can be achieved only through the emancipation of 
the group. It is assumed that working people - and all 'good' 
Soviet citizens are working people - share the same interests 
in the building of the new society as they did in the 
destruction of the old one. The unity of the oppressed, which 
crystallized in a specific set of historical circumstances 
culminating in the revolutionary events of 1917, has been set 
up as a timeless and unquestionable moral principle. It is 
taken for granted that no new relations of oppression can 
replace the old ones. Harmony is what characterizes the new
order.
Collectivism was not a new concept born of the October 
Revolution. In The Origin of Russian Communism. Nikolai
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Berdyaev convincingly argues that in fact 'Bolshevism fitted 
in with the Russian collectivism which had its roots in Cthe 
orthodox] religion 1 and emphasizes that collectivist values 
were promoted by both religious and materialist Russian 
thinkers throughout the nineteenth century.3 Discussing the 
ideas of Belynsky, 'an intellectual ancestor of Russian 
communism', Berdyaev describes the tragic logic of 
revolutionary collectivist theories in these terms:
Revolution overthrows the 'general 1 
which hdd oppressed the human individual 
person, but makes him subject to a new 
'general', to a society which demands 
for itself the complete submission of 
man. Such is the fateful development of 
re 1igious —socia1ist and atheist 
thought. 4
Furthermore, the socio-economic fabric of pre — 
Revolutionary Russia presented a number of collectivist 
features. The Russian peasant commune (mi r), a structure that 
was often reproduced in the towns where workers tended to 
organize themselves into co-operatives (artel ' ) , placed a 
great deal of emphasis on community of interests, collective 
decision-making and discipline in both economic and ethical 
matters. G. Hosking suggests that, before they became mere 
instruments of the Party, councils of workers greatly 
benefited from the experience that peasants and workers had 
acquired in running rural or urban communes.5 According to 
the same author some aspects of the old Russian commune 
might have even survived in modern Soviet life:
It is my impression... that even after 
these popular communities were 
destroyed, something of their spirit
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survived in distorted form in the 
dwelling patterns of the city... 
The underlying habit of mutual aid, 
combined with mutual supervision, has 
survived and indeed spread to other 
strata of the population as former 
peasant children left the village and 
moved up the social scale.6
It is, nevertheless, equally important to stress that 
the bolshevik conception of collectivism differed 
significantly from the traditional Russian commune. 
Collectivism as a principle governing social relations was 
perceived by the hew rulers as the natural corollary of the 
public ownership of the means of production. A form of 
patriarchal collectivism based on the unquestioned 
domination of the elders (starosta) as well as the wealthy 
was clearly incompatible with the communist vision.
The idealism of the bolshevik collectivist dream, 
however, coexisted with a realistic appreciation of existing 
social relations, and the intolerance of the peasant commune 
was soon to be replaced by the increasing authoritarianism of 
the dominant ideology. Publicly recognizing that even the 
workers' psychological make-up would not change overnight, 
the Bolsheviks, who never had any qualms about proclaiming 
their alleged superior understanding of what was best for the 
masses, set out to 'educate' and 're-educate 1 them. In a 
highly propagandist book published in 1973, Soviet Man - The 
Making of a Socialist Type of Personality, G. Smirnov 
stresses the extent of the work that awaited the new regime 
in the wake of the Revolution with irreproachable frankness:
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. . . the task was not confined to the 
peasantry and the old intelligentsia. It 
was necessary to 'remake' and 're- 
educate' the proletarians themselves, 
who would not shed their petty-bourgeois 
illusions at once but only in the course 
of prolonged and difficult mass struggle 
against petty-bourgeois influence. 7
Smirnov unwittingly suggests that the collectivist ethos 
was imposed upon the population, and perhaps even implies, if 
one accepts that he is likely to have written these lines 
with his contemporaries in mind, that the endeavour has not 
been altogether successful.
Smirnov's book is particularly relevant to this study as 
it was written roughly at the time when the debates examined 
in this section were publicized. Clearly designed to serve as 
both a reply to Western critics of Soviet society and a 
warning to Soviet citizens attracted to the ideas of the 
Prague Spring, the book is a useful reminder of where 
official ideology stood on the subject of the individual 
versus the collective.
Content to recognize that the question of individual 
freedom lies at the centre of the ideological and theoretical 
contest between socialism and capitalism, Smirnov 
enthusiastically advocates 'communist humanism 1 , which, he 
argues, 'comprises the ideas of the freedom and dignity of 
the individual, the ideas of collectivism and the idea of the 
liberation of man by means of revo 1 ut ion ' . 8 As expected of 
any dutiful ideologist, he reaffirms the superiority of the 
collectivist vision, invoking the name of Anton Makarenko,
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who has been officially proclaimed the father of collectivism 
since the mid-forties.
Recent studies on Makarenko suggest that his character 
and ideas might have been somewhat simplified and distorted 
by official propaganda and that further research is needed to 
establish to what extent his ideas have influenced Soviet 
educational practices.9 The purpose of the present study, 
however, is not to discuss the work of Makarenko as such, but 
only to highlight his views on collectivism which have been
«•
taken over by official ideology.
In his book on Makarenko, J. Bowen underlines the Soviet 
educationalist's extreme isolation in the twenties. His views 
were at variance with the development of theoretical research 
which inspired the educational policies laid down by the 
government.l0 At the time most Soviet educationalists 
researched into theories that had originated in the West, 
involving, in particular, the study of the psychology of the 
individual. At the same time they contributed to the 
development of educational practices based on the assumption 
that the goal of the new society was to allow the parallel 
blossoming of both the individual and the collective. Bowen 
points out that the officially endorsed policy of Soviet 
education during the twenties was clearly concerned 'with 
realizing the values of the individual personality and with a 
decidedly democratic, child-centered rationale for the whole 
educative process 1 . 11
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Makarenko, on the other hand, was very dismissive of all 
these new theories, his interest lying with social psychology 
only. His conception of collectivism significantly differed 
from that advocated by the progressive educationalists of the 
twenties. He firmly believed in the supremacy of the 
collective over the individual as he clearly demonstrated 
himself in fictionalized accounts of his work with delinquent 
orphans (bezprizorniki ) . While readily acknowledging that 
some individuals may rebel against the collectivist way of
<•
life, he regarded this rejection as the failure of the 
individual to identify with the collective or possibly the 
failure of the collective to persuade the individual to 
conform. The collectivist system, however, was never at 
fault. Commenting upon the lack of compassion in Makarenko 1 s 
account of one of the youngster's suicide, brought about, it 
would seem, by his inability to fit in with the commune and 
to accept its severe criticism of his actions, Bowen remarks 
that Makarenko 'adamantly refused to admit of any 
individuality being more important than the group'.*2
Not only was Makarenko in the twenties isolated from the 
vast majority of educationalists, he also frequently found 
himself in conflict with the political, social and
JljoJut, <x*-xi ioi&XA 
~^\ /^ ~\/^—educational agencies. It is only in the V thi rt i esv that he 
became an officially recognized and adulated figure, even 
though there is evidence that some of his theories were still 
criticized by the Party, in particular his neglect of the 
formal side of school ing.13 On the whole, however, Stalin's
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oppressive policies of forced collectivization and rapid 
industrialization created a climate hospitable to Makarenko's 
authoritarian brand of collectivism based on self-sacrifice, 
self-discipline and the work ethic. His influence did not 
wane after Stalin's death. Bowen remarks that in the fifties 
and sixties Makarenko 'was accepted by most Soviet educators 
in some form or other as their educational model and 
mentor'.1* In her study of Soviet children's literature, 
O'De11 identifies collectivism as one of the main features of
c
Soviet morality. From early childhood, she argues, the Soviet 
individual learns
to suppress his own desires if they 
clash with those of the collective. It 
is held that, in fact, the ultimate 
interest of the individual will not be 
at variance with those of society.15
Writing in the seventies Smirnov exposes the 
collectivist theory with a certain degree of circumspection. 
While Makarenko had little time for the dissenting 
individual, Smirnov seems to favour a more equal partnership 
between collective and individual, as shown by this extract:
... collectivism in terms of actual 
relationships signifies that a person 
should act with due consideration for 
the general interests and rules of 
collectivism and not undertake actions 
that could harm the collective as a 
whole. Collectivism also presupposes 
that the collective should show equal 
care and consideration for each one of 
its members. l 6
The message seems to be that it takes a bit of give and 
take. In fact, Shlapentokh remarks that most of the
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officially sanctioned literature on Soviet ideology that was 
published between the mid-fifties and the mid-eighties put 
'a more "humanistic" emphasis on the "combination" of 
individual and social interest 1 . However, the assumption 
remained that the individual's main concerns coincided with 
those of the co11ective.17 And indeed, returning to the 
question of possible divergence between individual and 
collective interests at a later stage in the book, Smirnov 
leaves his readers in no doubt as to how the conflict must
c
eventually be resolved:
The personal remains personal as long as 
it does not conflict with the interests 
of society, and thus once again is not 
an entirely personal matter. For other 
people, for society, the behaviour of 
the individual continues to be entirely 
his personal affair only as long as it 
does not affect other people, the 
interests of society.18
The dogma is still alive and kicking.
The attention given by Literaturnaya gazeta to 
conflictual situations - an expression frequently used by the 
paper - between members of the collective does not 
necessarily signify that the official theory of collectivism 
is being questioned. Once they have defined the fundamental 
principles of socialist morality, Soviet ideologists hasten 
to add that Rome was not built in a day. A number of 'anti- 
social phenomena' are usually mentioned - namely alcoholism, 
lack of work discipline, money-grabbing, selfishness and 
hooliganism - which are inevitably presented as remnants of 
the old morality, 'survivals of capi ta 1 i sm 1 .19 The aim of
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this study is to establish whether the debates on the quality 
of human relations in Soviet society cohere with this 
theoretical framework, which was still part of the official 
dogma at the time, or whether they constitute an attempt to 
question its limitations.
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III. PERCEPTIONS OF THE COLLECTIVE
1. Bad Manners and Unsocial Behaviour
The majority of the articles dealing with human 
relations aim at decrying some of the harsh aspects of Soviet 
everyday life. On the whole the social comments remain fairly 
tame, merely hinting at the human miseries produced by the 
system. Yet they nevertheless serve to undermine the Soviet 
dream of the happy collective, which figured so prominently
<•
in Stalinist imagery. The discussion on bad manners belongs 
to this category of seemingly innocuous debates which 
nevertheless expose some aspects of popular discontent and 
social conflicts.
The discussion, which took place in a dozen articles and 
readers' letters over the years 67, 68 and 69, was triggered 
off by V. Dudintsev in the third issue of the new 
Literaturnaya gazeta.i It is pointed out in the introduction 
that with this article Dudintsev is making his contribution 
to a six-year-old debate on people's behaviour in the social 
environment, at work and in the family. As a matter of fact, 
the writer had been asked to respond to the flood of mail 
received by the paper following the publication of an article 
on 'Soviet etiquette'. It is clear that Dudintsev sympathizes 
with the readers' common complaint that they often have 
their everyday existence ruined by rude, unkind or even 
aggressive behaviour. 'Boorishness' ('khamstvo') can take 
various forms and manifests itself in different places: at
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home - especially in communal flats -, in shops - on each 
side of the counter - f or at work where management do not 
think twice about addressing their staff as 'ty' and 
generally do not see it as their job to spare their 
feel ings.2 ' Boor i shness ' can also be the kind of behaviour 
which at night 'forces women to take to their heels at the 
sound of footsteps behind them'.
Dudintsev's article was followed by a series of 
contributions from readers, fellow writers and journalists
c
who share the same indignation and weariness of being 
regularly exposed to insensitive behaviour. A reader blames 
teachers for taking the liberty of using the ' ty' form when 
addressing children, whether they know them well or not; it 
is argued that youngsters will internalize better patterns of 
behaviour only if adults set a good example.3 Worse cases of 
offensive behaviour are reported. For instance, B. Volodin 
sympathetically relates the story of a woman reader who has 
had to put up with tactless remarks about her disfigured face 
all her life. She was even laughed at by a cosmetic surgeon 
who unceremoniously wondered why she should worry about her 
looks so late in life.* VI. Amlinskii reports how a shop 
assistant gratuitously brought an elderly woman to tears. 
'What do you want bread for, granny? 1 , she gently inquired, 
'You should be on your way to the crematorium! ' 
Amlinskii was relieved to hear that the rest of the queue 
vehemently stood up for the elderly lady.5
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A reader raises the problem of social snobbery. 6 The 
author of the letter, a porter at the Moscow restaurant 
'Ararat 1 , complains of having been repeatedly abused by 
customers. He gives the example of a 'people's artist in a 
state of intoxication' who called him a 'lackey' because he 
refused to let him in. Remembering with conspicuous nostalgia 
the kind words of prestigious visitors, such as Gagarin, the 
porter laments the declining moral standards, especially 
among young people - even those from 'good families' - who
c
think they have the right to be rude to porters, waiters and 
cleaners. After all, he concludes, society does not need 
highly educated specialists only. The letter, which at times 
is reminiscent of a servant longing for his forever lost 
'good master 1 , is followed by a thank-you note from the 
editors, who send their regards to its author and his 
colleagues. Porters are, indeed, easy targets for vindictive 
members of the public, but they also have the power to keep 
you out.
Except for this letter, most contributions have this in 
common; that they highlight offensive behaviour on the part 
of men and women in the course of their professional duties 
whether they are doctors, teachers, managers or shop 
assistants. In fact, with all due respect to the porter of 
the 'Ararat' , one might want to add his occupation to the 
list; it is, after all, difficult to keep one's composure 
when dealing with frustrated customers.
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Unsocial behaviour is not the preserve of unsocial 
elements. It can be witnessed amongst people who belong to 
various social strata and whose professional and social 
contribution might have been acknowledged and rewarded. What 
links these people is an awareness that their work is not 
judged according to public opinion, and therefore their 
position within a work collective gives them power over the 
outsider. Shortages of consumer goods and inadequate services 
also help to create a climate of hostility between some
c
categories of personnel and the general public.
The authors of the articles and letters do not 
consciously establish a connection between function and 
behaviour. The debate is rather superficial. Any attempt to 
seriously tackle the roots of the problem would involve 
discussing some aspects of Stalinism which have had 
disastrous effects on the social fabric of the country. It is 
significant that no social scientist was asked to take part 
in the debate. Some contributors only appeal to their 
compatriots' sense of responsibility. Others believe in the 
educational virtue of propaganda, like, for instance, the 
journalist A. Protopopova who calls for more popular 
literature on Soviet etiquette for the benefit of schools and 
fami 1ies.7
However superficial the debate might be, it is 
nevertheless interesting because it focuses on relationships 
between individuals rather than on the relationship between 
the individual and the collective, which is at the heart of
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the doctrine of collectivism. Furthermore, unsocial behaviour 
is not presented as a remnant of capitalism. As a matter of 
fact, most contributors agree with Dudintsev that the root 
of the problem is to be found in the rejection of what used 
to be called 'bourgeois morality 1 in the years following the 
Revo1ut ion.
Dudintsev does not go so far as to question the 
supposedly revolutionary nature of the new morality promoted 
in the twenties. He claims to understand how the banishment
<•
of the tie, and the systematic use of the 'ty' form and the 
word 'comrade' came to symbolize the beginning of a new era. 
People were eager to leave behind what they saw as 
manifestations of social hypocrisy. However, new socio- 
political conditions dictate new moral norms.
The irony is that Dudintsev cannot find an alternative 
better than resurrecting the pre-1917 code of behaviour. It 
would simply need updating so that it encompasses the notions 
of equality and mutual respect promoted by the October 
Revolution. Judging by the response to his article, the 
common feeling seems, indeed, to be that the country needs a 
Soviet code of behaviour which would be a mixture of 
socialist principles and pre-revo1utionary values. A 
librarian from Kalinin agrees that the moral standards of the 
twenties are irrelevant to the present times, and that 
politeness and chivalry are essential to help people to 
respect one another.8 Protopopova concedes that pre-
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revolutionary etiquette was not all bad. Just think of 
Chekhov who never failed to stand up when a woman came in!
None of the articles contains so much as an attempt to 
analyse the reasons why the revolutionary values of the 
twenties have produced such disappointing results. A Western 
observer might be hard pressed to grasp the connection 
between Soviet people's legitimate demand for a more caring 
society and their longing for outmoded rules of behaviour. It 
is clear, however, that etiquette is not what it is all
<•
about. Al1 contributors see good manners as a way of showing 
consideration and kindness. The message is that the time has 
come to create a social environment where the individual can 
feel safe and dignified. And this can be achieved only by 
rehabilitating certain universal moral values which have been 
rejected by the class-based doctrine of collectivism and 
undermined by a series of traumatic upheavals in the history 
of Soviet society. No matter how trivial the debate on 
etiquette may seem, it shows a willingness to de-ideo1ogize 
moral issues and to shift the focus from the supremacy of the 
collective to the neglect of the individual.
During a round table, an account of which appeared under 
the title 'About Human Dignity 1 , the writer Yurii Yakovlev 
openly questions the view that priority should be given to 
collectivist values.9 While approving of the high status 
enjoyed by such notions as patriotism, love of work and 
social duty, he deplores the fact that little has been done
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to protect 'the dignity and honour of the individual 1 . The 
moral code of Soviet society needs to be reassessed.i0
Z. The Neglect of the Weak: the Case of the 'Invalids' 
In his contribution to the debate on etiquette the 
writer Sergei Mikhalkov warns that good manners are no 
guarantee of kindness and altruism. What Soviet citizens 
should aspire to is 'spiritual beauty', which involves 
assisting one another and caring for the weak. 11 This rather
t
banal advocacy of what could easily pass for Christian values 
is worth noticing only inasmuch as the protection of the weak 
has never been very high on the social agenda of the CPSU. 
The debate organized by Li teraturnaya gazeta on the problems 
faced by disabled war veterans seems to show that Mikhalkov's 
article may well echo a widely felt need for a more caring 
society, capable of looking after its weaker members.
The discussion began in 1968 with an article in which 
Leonid Zhukhovitskii relates the dreadful experience suffered 
by a disabled war veteran while trying to buy a rail 
ticket.!2 The man, who had lost a leg in the war, was 
first of all knocked down by someone who did not even take 
the time to apologize; he was then rudely reminded by the 
station staff that only 'Heroes of the Soviet Union' did not 
have to wait in the queue, and was finally rebuffed by an 
equally unhelpful policeman. The man returned home humiliated 
and ticketless. Zhukhovitskii concludes that disabled war 
veterans should be shown the respect they deserve and urges
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the relevant authorities to take concrete measures to make 
their lives more comfortable.
It could be argued that Literaturnaya gazeta did not 
take much risk in choosing to concentrate on the case of war 
veterans, as the Establishment had no alternative but to 
support such a noble cause. Zhukhovitskii certainly does not 
hesitate to play the patriotic card. By doing so, he 
underlines the discrepancy between deeds and words, the 
hypocrisy of leaders who are swift to endorse Soviet
c
patriotism, but show little concern for the everyday problems 
of disabled war veterans. Yet Zhukhovitskii puts the emphasis 
on the need to help these people primarily because of their 
physical handicap, thus considerably broadening the debate.
In a second article published a few months later, 
Zhukhovitskii makes it clear that the problem does not lie in 
inadequate social policies only, but also in the often 
unsympathetic attitude of the general public and 
organizations towards the disabled.13 This is the conclusion 
he drew from reading letters the paper received from many 
physically handicapped people following the publication of 
his first article. The letters contain many practical 
suggestions, such as allowing disabled war veterans to be 
served outside the queue and to wear a badge proving they 
are entitled to preferential treatment. But the authors of 
the letters also describe many occasions on which they were 
prevented from leading a normal life because they were openly 
rejected by their fellowmen. A reader, for instance, relates
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how he has been repeatedly refused access to beaches, parks, 
stadiums or even exhibitions by staff or the police on the 
ground that he was in a wheelchair. Another man, who needed a 
medical certificate to apply for a holiday abroad, was told 
by his doctor that 'he would never let anyone in a wheelchair 
go abroad'. The disabled do not only have their social life 
impaired by their compatriots' prejudices. They often are 
completely ostracized as it is practically impossible for 
them to get a job. They are condemned to loneliness and, in
c
some cases, poverty. Finally, Zhukhovitskii enthusiastically 
supports one of the letter writers who suggests that an 'All- 
Union Association of Invalids' should be set up independently 
- one is to understand - of the already existing 'Committee 
of War Veterans' . The association would have the job of 
coordinating the efforts made by various individuals or 
groups all over the country to put pressure on the ministries 
and other organizations, which could improve the life of the 
di sab 1ed.
That Literaturnaya gazeta should publicize and support 
such an initiative at all is certainly of great interest. It 
is, indeed, a way of acknowledging publicly the failure of 
the collective to cater for the various and often conflicting 
needs of all its members, as well as the legitimate right of 
those who have been neglected to unite into a pressure group. 
Individuals can no longer fully rely on institutions led or 
supervised by the Party to put things right. They must take 
action themselves.
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Unfortunately Literaturnaya gazeta does not pursue the 
matter any further. Instead, it falls back on its traditional 
function as an 'agitator and organizer', taking the relevant 
authorities to task. Rather than investigating further the 
need for the disabled to organize independently in order to 
give a collective voice to their demands, the paper takes it 
upon itself to act as a mediator between them and central 
power. This is common practice in the Soviet press. The paper 
addresses its readers' grievances to the institutions
c
concerned, which are obliged by the law to respond within a 
month. The reply, often signed by the deputy-minister or 
other second in command, is likely to follow this pattern: 1) 
We agree with the criticisms expressed in Li teraturnaya 
gazeta and thank the editors for raising such an important 
issue. 2) We have already introduced such and such measures 
to this effect and intend to introduce others in a near 
future. 3) We are, however, impeded from achieving the best 
results by the inadequate performance of other organizations. 
A large part of the discussion on disabled war veterans 
is, indeed, devoted to this dialogue between the paper and 
various high-ranking officials responding to its critics. It 
began four months after the publication of Zhukhovitskii's 
first article when Literaturnaya gazeta proudly presented its 
readers with long-awaited replies from three deputy-ministers 
as well as an apology from the head of the railway station 
criticized in the article in question. 14
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One of these letters was sent by A. Sergeev, RSFSR 
Deputy-Minister of Health. It characteristically follows the 
pattern previously described. 15 A. Sergeev first of all 
recognizes the shortcomings of the health service in dealing 
with war veterans, and then promises a number of imminent 
improvements. He pledges, in particular, that in the future 
every polyclinic will have a doctor especially appointed to 
look after them. However, there remains problems which the 
medical staff are unqualified to solve, such as the poor
«•
quality of artificial limbs or the insufficient quantity of 
places reserved for the invalids in rest homes and sanatoria.
Letters from officials were published five more times 
during the debate. They usually follow the publication of 
articles which sum up readers' further complaints, criticisms 
or suggestions and urge the relevant organizations to come up 
with solutions as soon as possible. For example, seven weeks 
after the publication of the article 'Two hundred more 
letters', six official letters appeared in the paper, 
including one from the USSR Minister of Trade who proposed 
the setting up of a delivery service for war veterans.is
The efficiency of such a system remains doubtful. Do 
officiails promise to take measures they intended to take all 
along? Or is it the case that they are susceptible to bad 
publicity and feel they have to take positive action which, 
they hope, will placate nosey journalists, disgruntled 
members of the public and dissatisfied supervisors? The 
motives would not matter so much if some concrete outcome
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could be safely expected. But are these new policies ever 
implemented? After all, circulars have to travel a long way 
from the minister's office in Moscow to the local authority 
concerned. A. Sergeev, whose letter has already been 
mentioned, seems to be aware that readers might not be 
impressed by these official announcements when he specifies 
that a team of representatives from his ministry and the 
Committee of War Veterans will check upon a series of 
hospitals and polyclinics.
<•
However, in the end, regardless of the fact that the 
paper's investigative work is closely supervised by the 
Party, the problem is that a newspaper cannot keep a close 
watch on the performance of a particular institution 
indefinitely. It seems that Soviet journalists themselves 
were already doubtful about their ability to make a 
significant impact on institutions at the time. Rosemary 
Rogers points out that an increasing number of Soviet 
sociologists and journalists share the view that the press 
should stop wanting to be a 'corrective organ' and 
concentrate instead on its mission as provider of mass 
information.i7 The Soviet sociologist Verkhouskaya regrets 
that too many people do not consider the newspaper 'as a 
press organ... for which the printed word is the basic weapon 
for action', but as an administrative one 'possessing special 
authority and influence in society'.18
Whatever its immediate outcome, the debate undoubtedly 
contains a harsh criticism of Soviet society. It exposes a
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high degree of insensitivity towards individuals with 
specific needs amongst both officialdom and the population 
at large. It also highlights these individuals' helplessness 
when faced with the large organizations from which they are 
supposed to receive assistance. Yet, except for one short 
reference to the need for an association of the disabled, the 
emphasis is very much on the inadmissible lack of awareness 
and inertia of organizations, as well as the inability of the 
economy to provide for small groups.
<•
Some allusions to the economic aspect of the problem are 
made by officials in their letters, in particular by the 
RSFSR Deputy-Minister of Health who stresses that the 
disabled cannot be provided with the best medical care 
because good quality artificial limbs are unavailable. 
Several readers raise this particular issue, which is 
eventually examined in detail by the writer Vadim 
Sokolov.19 Commenting upon readers' letters, Soko1ov comes 
to the conclusion that the best way of helping the disabled 
is to produce comfortable and reliable artificial limbs. 
It is outrageous, he argues, that they should have to put up 
with heavy, ill-fitting appliances, usually made of wood and 
in constant need of repair. There is an acute shortage of 
adequately trained staff capable of making, repairing or 
fitting good artificial limbs. The truth of the matter is 
that enterprises are not in the least interested in 
manufacturing products aimed at a limited market, because 
small orders do not bring in the bonuses.
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Furthermore Soviet factory managers are well known for 
their reluctance to take new ideas on board. In another issue 
of the paper the writer VI. Amlinskii relates the story of a 
sixty-four year old man, Zalogin, who has been unable to find 
a manufacturer willing to produce the artificial limb he 
himself designed.20 His model has been praised by both 
professionals and patients who have tried it. Yet none of the 
steps Zalogin has taken have been effective. In fact, his 
initiative has cost him his job and his flat. The City
c
Executive Committee of Simferopol has eventually promised to 
help, but only after the writer and Literaturnaya gazeta 
intervened.
The issue is discussed again a year later in a second 
article by Sokolov, which is, in fact, an account of a round 
table organized by Literaturnaya gazeta.21 The participants 
include representatives of the Committee of War Veterans, 
officials from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Defence and managers of enterprises which manufacture 
artificial li mb s.
The article begins with horrifying stories about 
disabled people who slipped on the snow or on stairs because 
of deficient artificial legs. It then sets about tackling the 
roots of the problem which, it is argued, lie in the 
bureaucratic nature of the economic system.
As manufacturers do not consult the medical staff, an 
even relatively well produced appliance often gives 
unsatisfactory results because it is not adapted to the needs
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of a particular individual. This lack of coordination between 
industry and the medical profession is not only due to an 
economic system geared towards mass production. It also stems 
from a bureaucratic division of responsibilities. Orthopaedic 
appliances are not the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Health, but that of the Ministry of Social Security, and 
ministries show little talent in coordinating their efforts. 
One of the participants pessimistically remarks that 'as 
long as this old institutional barrier exists, it is
<•
difficult to expect any progress in the field of 
prosthetics' . It is also suggested in the course of the 
debate that the only solution is to set up small workshops 
which would be in charge of the whole process, combining 
industrial and medical expertise, so that the 'element of 
individua1ization' could be preserved.
The debate on the disabled war veterans makes explicit 
the inability of the Soviet economy to diversify, and its 
resultant neglect of the specific needs of individuals. The 
criticism of certain economic and governmental mechanisms is 
undoubtedly damning. Yet contributors to the debate do not 
come up with radical alternatives as they would entail the 
total rejection of basic principles on which the Soviet 
economic and political structure is based. Furthermore, 
judging by the letter from V. V. Trofimov, RSFSR Minister of 
Health, which was published four months after the round 
table, little practical outcome is to be expected. As a 
matter of fact, Trofimov's reply is rather comical in the way
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it so predictably follows the usual pattern: the criticisms 
were, indeed, justified; the following measures have already 
been taken, but, in the end, manufacturers have to be blamed 
for the low quality of artificial limbs.22 We are back to 
square one.
This disappointing denouement certainly lends weight to 
the argument that the corrective function of the press is a 
myth. It also highlights the governing bodies' inability to 
come up with radical solutions. It could be argued, however,
c
that this is precisely the message which Literaturnaya gazeta 
puts across, whether consciously or not. Readers must be 
credited with the ability to put two and two together, and 
the juxtaposition of critical articles and conformist 
official responses to them is likely to undermine the 
authority of the regime.
Contributors to the debate repeatedly infer that the 
present regime is in some way incapable of adequately 
catering for the needs of individuals. The discussion which 
began with the outraged account of a disabled man's 
predicament in a railway station turned into a critical 
analysis of the country's economic and administrative 
structure. To sum up, the message is that individuals suffer 
from the inability of the economy to diversify and modernize 
rapidly as well as from the inertia of ministries and other 
organizations. It is also implied that people are deprived of 
any efficient and independent means of articulating their 
demands, and therefore cannot easily raise public awareness
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of their specific needs. The debate clearly establishes links 
between the ethical, socio-economic and to some extent 
political dimensions of the issue.
3. 'Little Stalins' and Individualists
It has already been noted that the debate on bad manners 
highlights inconsiderate behaviour mainly on the part of men 
and women in the course of their professional duties. Some 
articles, however, take the issue one step further by
c
establishing a link between offensive behaviour and abuse of 
power.
The issue was discussed at length during the round 
table, an account of which was published under the title 
'On Human Dignity 1 . 23 A reader's letter serves as an 
introduction to illustrate the problem.24 T. Minchukova, from 
Minsk, recounts how an inspector accused her of not paying 
her trolleybus fare when she was, in fact, looking for the 
right change. Not only was the inspector extremely rude and 
vulgar, but she also threatened to exhibit Minchukova's 
photo in the trolleybus, which is the form of public 
humiliation reserved for professional fare-dodgers. Finally, 
irritated by Minchukova's determination to stand up for 
herself, the inspector took her to the police station. The 
police and the head of the trolleybus station willingly 
defused the situation and assured Minchukova that they 
believed in her innocence. Yet, although they had promised 
that the inspector would be reprimanded, Minchukova
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subsequently received a letter from the station authorities 
stating that she had been in the wrong after all. Minchukova 
is outraged that the authorities should have taken sides with 
the inspector whose priority was clearly to show off her 
power rather than to enforce the law. Inspectors have, 
indeed, the right to fine passengers for not paying their 
fares, Minchukova argues, but 'there is not a law which gives 
them the right to be offensive 1 .
Numerous similar examples are quoted during the
c
debate.25 Criticisms are levelled at various services and 
administrations, where the general public has no alternative 
but to hope for the staff's goodwill. Unfortunately, as a 
participant points out when recalling how rude and unhelpful 
post office employees can be, too many people 'feel that 
as soon as someone depends on [them], everything is allowed'. 
Referring back to Minchukova's story nearly a year 
after the round table, VI. Amlinskii paints a rather bleak 
picture of Soviet society with a detectable Orwellian note, 
as shown in the extract from his article:
... Everyone in life has met his 
'inspector'. That is to say, someone who 
sees it as his job to distrust you, who 
is suspicious of every step you take 
and who will trample your dignity at 
every available opportunity. Someone who 
thinks that he is not here for your 
benefit, but that you are here for his. 
He can come in many guises: he can be 
the shop assistant who utters the ritual 
phrase: "There're a lot of you, but I'm 
on my own'; or the control officer at 
the airport who tells you coldly and 
indifferently: 'I don't know... the 
flight has been cancelled... I'm not 
sure ..." 2 6
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The debate certainly contains a number of far-reaching 
observations, yet lacks a sense of direction. Some 
participants focus on the reprehensible behaviour of 
employees while others attempt to examine the objective 
conditions which make misuse of power possible. This 
diversity of approaches gives us an insight into the manifold 
aspects of the issue. At the same time the paper stops short 
of making an explicit distinction between causes and effects, 
thus throwing the blame on both individuals and the system.
c
At first, most comments assume a moralizing character 
and refer exclusively to low-ranking employees who deal 
directly with the general public. It is justly argued that 
Soviet citizens are weary of being bullied or ignored. 
However, it is unfortunate that no one cares to look at 
working conditions in the consumer services. Was the control 
officer at the airport in a position to pass on the necessary 
information? How are we to interpret Aleksandr Kron's 
indignation at the shop assistant who tried to stop him from 
buying an imported suit because she wished to keep it for 'a 
friend 1 ? The anecdote may simply reinforce readers' low 
opinion of shop assistants who use their position to dabble 
in a bit of illicit trading, rather than invite a calling 
into question of the economic system.
VI. Amlinskii concludes his 1971 article by arguing 
briefly that the problems require 'a business-like, 
governmental and economic approach 1 .27 However, unlike 
contributors to the debate on disabled war veterans,
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participants in the round table carefully leave economics 
aside, merely attacking the large institutions for their 
inadequate performance. Airports are criticized for their low 
degree of 'professionalism' which leads to a 'lack of respect 
for people 1 . It is also suggested that the transport 
organizations should simplify their system of fares, possibly 
by introducing a single travel card for several types of 
transport. All agree that the media have a duty to publicize 
these matters. 'Silence means consent', and after all, the
c
press has shown that it can successfully bring pressure to 
bear on institutions to improve their performance. For 
example, hotel regulations were modified after Li teraturnaya 
gazeta reported the case of an elderly professor who died of 
a heart attack shortly after he was forced out of his hotel 
room at 1.00 in the morning. His room had been allocated to 
an unexpected foreign visitor.
So, in the end, no one proposes radical economic and 
political measures which would compel the big organizations 
to change their practices and improve the work of their 
employees. The interest of the debate lies elsewhere. All the 
contributions highlight the fact that the existing 
supposedly socialist - socio-economic system has produced a 
set of values which run counter to the collectivist 
philosophy, namely individualism and authoritarianism. 
Although the debate concentrates on the services and 
employees who do not hold high positions of power, 
contributors occasionally make generalizations, hinting that
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these values have permeated the whole of society. Amlinskii, 
in particular, outspokenly reflects upon mundane 
manifestations of tyrannical behaviour. Some people, he 
argues, cannot be trusted with any degree of authority as 
they will use it primarily as a 'means of asserting 
themselves 1 . As there is nothing to stop them from doing so, 
the tension keeps escalating. The offended party works off 
his frustrations on someone else, who will work off his 
frustrations on someone else and so on, thus creating a
«•
'dangerous chain reaction of rudeness, boorishness and 
humi1i at ion' .
This is hardly the description of a happy collective. 
Individualism and authoritarianism are thriving in a society 
crippled by shortages and bureaucratic structures. It may be 
regrettable that Literaturnaya gazeta should have chosen to 
concentrate on abuse of power at a low level. On the other 
hand the debate highlights the existence of entrenched 
authoritarian attitudes amongst all layers of the population 
regardless of their position in the political hierarchy. An 
undemocratic political structure engenders an undemocratic 
culture which manifests itself in all areas of life, thus 
debasing human relations between individuals. Participants in 
the debate do not go so far as to draw such conclusions, but 
their observations and arguments certainly point in that 
di rect ion.
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4. Victimization of the Individual by the Collective
A number of authors are anxious to point out that
individualism and authoritarianism are not solely to be
observed in separate individuals. Such behaviour can
influence the life of a whole collective either because it is
dominated by an unprincipled individual, or because the
majority of its members close ranks to defend their own
'selfish 1 interests. Whatever the circumstances may be, it is
often the case that moral norms alien to the officially
c
sanctioned doctrine of collectivism meet in practice with the 
tacit approval of the collective.
Nataliya I 1 ' ina is one of the few contributors to 
Literaturnaya gazeta who openly writes about the harassment 
of the individual by the collective. In an article published 
in 1968 I 1 ' ina discusses the case of two women, a medical 
doctor and a school teacher, who were demoted overnight.28 
The doctor was suddenly declared professionally incompetent 
because she had had the misfortune to take sides with a nurse 
who had antagonized the consultant's wife. The teacher was 
criticized for not having completed her degree, a fact which 
the head of the school had so far chosen to overlook as she 
was renowned for her excellent teaching abilities. Yet the 
head decided that it was time to enhance the academic 
prestige of the school and, as a result, did not hesitate to 
sacrifice this talented teacher's career. I 1 ' ina clearly 
rejects the notion that the interests of the school might 
have been above those of the teacher.
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I 1 ' ina is less concerned with the fact that the head of 
the school and the consultant felt that they could misuse 
their authority with impunity than with the means by which 
they achieved their aims. In the conclusion of her article 
she expresses her indignation at people whose praises and 
criticisms do not reflect their genuine opinion of a person, 
but simply constitute a means of manipulating her; they 
publicly praise those they need, they publicly criticize 
those they want out of their way. I 1 ' ina does not express her
c
argument in political terms, yet all readers will understand 
the reference to the old Stalinist method; shock-workers knew 
their portraits would not be hanging for ever.
Ironically, Il'ina's article shows that the idea of the 
supremacy of the collective over the individual has retained 
all its power. The people who demoted the two women had to 
justify their actions in terms which were acceptable for the 
collective. On the other hand, although I 1 ' ina does not 
specify whether the women appealed against the decisions or 
not, we are left with the impression that an individual 
who has been blackened by, or in the name of, the collective 
will not find it easy to fight back. After all, the collective 
is always right. At the same time, the article clearly 
suggests that Stalinist practices have perverted and 
discredited the very concept of collectivism by using the 
collective as a means of controlling, manipulating and 
oppressing the individual.
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It is not only those in authority who can ruin the lives 
of individuals by dressing up their own selfish schemes as 
measures aimed at protecting the interests of the collective. 
I 1 ' ina also harshly criticizes those do-gooders who take it 
upon themselves to defend what they assume to be the moral 
code of the collective, thus claiming to act on its behalf 
and for its sake.
In an article published in 1967 I 1 ' ina tells the story 
of a woman whose reputation had been considerably damaged by
c
three elderly men who kept harassing her in various ways.29 
They sent the authorities and the press several letters in 
which they accused her of the worst felonies, including 
wearing ear-rings' and murdering her first husband, showing the 
same degree of indignation whatever the 'crime'. It is hinted 
that the men might have had their eyes on the woman's 'living 
space', although the harassment did not stop when they moved 
into the other rooms of the flat. However, Il'ina is not so 
much interested in exploring the motives of their actions as 
in exposing the means which they use to discredit their 
vi ct im.
And Il'ina does not mince her words, arguing bluntly 
that these supposedly honourable, senior citizens who are very 
much involved in 'public work' - one of them used to be 
deputy chairman of a comrades' court - are, in fact, self- 
righteous petty-minded busybodies, who cannot tell the 
difference between idle gossip and well founded accusations. 
Whether they believe what they say is beside the point. What
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is worrying is that they should view informing - an activity 
greatly encouraged under Stalin - as an acceptable way of 
settling scores or, should they be honest crusaders for 
justice, of regulating social behaviour.
Even more importantly, I 1 ' ina objects to the fact that 
these people should receive official recognition, and hence 
power, by becoming 'public workers', whereas they are in fact 
self-appointed guardians of society who make people's lives a 
misery. Not only is I 1 ' ina attacking yet another remnant of
c
Stalinist practices, - although the word of 'Stalinism 1 is 
nowhere to be found -, she also casts doubt on the supposedly 
noble nature of 'public work'.
The comrades' court is presented by several contributors 
as the favourite platform of these devoted 'public workers' 
eager to defend the collectivist morality. A product of the 
Revolution - they were first introduced to strengthen 
discipline in the Red Army - comrades' courts fell into 
disuse in the mid-thirties as the criminal courts were called 
upon to deal with the most minor offences, and extremely 
harshly withal. They were revived by Khrushchev as a means of 
increasing popular participation in public affairs and 
enhancing Soviet citizens' 'feeling of co11ectivism'.3o
Western observers have reacted to this institution in 
different ways. Johnson remarks that comrades' courts have 
relieved professional tribunals of the job of dealing with 
petty conflicts that occur in work and housing co11ectives.31 
The American journalist G. Feifer, who attended a number of
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comrades' court sessions in the early sixties, did not think 
that they were 'an absurd alternative', vehemently rejecting 
the argument that they constitute yet another totalitarian 
instrument:
Some Western specialists consider 
institutions like the Comradely Courts 
the nth degree of totalitarianism, since 
everyone becomes Big Brother - the 
neighbors, the fellow workers, the 
comrades; all brother's keepers... Yes, 
but - That is not the way it works; that 
is not the way Russians act... The deep 
sense of community and of belonging - to 
the Russian earth, to the Russian 
people, to Rossiya, and to smaller 
divisions like the 'collective' and the 
family - that Russians enjoy does not 
bring with it eagerness to spy on others 
or intolerance of individual habits.32
Literaturnaya gazeta does not paint such a rosy picture 
of collectivism. Several contributions point to the 
atmosphere of suspicion and acrimony that stifles many a 
collective. Anonymous letters blackening colleagues or 
neighbours are still taken seriously by managers and 'public 
workers' who demand that the persons discredited prove their 
innocence.33 The practice is still alive and kicking because, 
as L. Zhukhovitskii sadly remarks, 'in social life, when you 
have been accused, it often means that you are already 
considered guilty!'34 Echoing Il'ina's previously mentioned 
piece, an article focusing on comrades' courts criticizes 
'public workers', - who often are 'well-intentioned 
pensioners' -, for their 'lack of tact 1 , 'vulgarity' and 
'shameless interference in other people's lives'; that fewer 
and fewer complaints are being made to these courts indicates
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the general public's declining faith in their ability to 
dispense justice.35
While I 1 'ina discusses cases where individuals have been 
the victims of supposedly collective decisions which, in 
fact, did not truly reflect the views of the majority, 
Aleksandr Borin goes one step further, showing that the 
individual can be unfairly treated as a result of a decision 
supported by the majority of the collective.
In an article entitled 'Memory 1 Borin relates the story
c
of an accountant who worked thirty-one years for the firm 
'Mednabor' in Moscow and lived throughout in two damp rooms 
with her mother and daughter.36 She was granted a flat for 
herself and her relatives only a few days before she died. 
The chairperson of the factory committee then decided that 
the flat should be reallocated to another employee on the 
grounds that the accountant's relatives had never worked for 
the firm themselves. Shocked by such a mean decision, the 
secretary of the factory party organization, together with a 
number of workers, demanded that a vote should be taken. 
Thirty-two employees voted against the chairperson's 
proposal, thirty-six supported it. The author argues that, 
although the decision had eventually been taken through the 
democratic process, it was still the wrong one because it was 
an expression of people's jealousy. Many could not accept 
that a young girl should enjoy good living conditions so 
early in life while they were still waiting for new flats. 
Not everything, Borin adds, can be blamed on the housing
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shortage as this particular firm has already built many flats 
for its employees and continues to do so. At that point he 
embarks upon a very interesting reflection on the democratic 
process:
The collective is, of course, a lofty 
and noble concept. Yet a single 
specific collective is also a living 
organism, which can be wrong, make 
mistakes, be unfair, grow, mature... 
Where, I wonder, is this golden mean, 
this precise, reliable mechanism 
which enables a democratic majority 
to express itself by voting and which 
can ahso stop evil, intellectual 
blindness and immorality if for some 
reason voters are, at that moment, 
incapable of being rational and fair?37
This is a remarkable statement if only because the case 
of injustice which has been reported hardly justifies such 
harsh words. If it was not for the unfortunate timing of the 
decision taken by the factory committee, it could have been 
argued, after all, that it was the responsibility of the city 
committee to provide the young girl and her grandmother with 
adequate accommodation. However, Soviet journalists 
frequently use a specific case as a pretext for holding forth 
on a broader issue. Borin's observation obviously does not 
concern the 'Mednabor' factory only, but refers to the nature 
of the democratic process in general as well as the history 
and the political system of the Soviet Union. Words like 
'evil 1 , 'intellectual blindness' and 'immorality' would 
certainly be more appropriate for describing the activities 
of all these 'collectives' under Stalin who, blinded by fear 
or fanaticism, sent some of their members to their deaths by
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unanimously and 'democratically' accusing them of betrayal. 
Borin is anxious to point out that decisions are not 
democratic only because they have been taken by the majority. 
The majority can be wrong and therefore it is essential that 
the collective should be obliged to obey certain principles 
so that the rights of the individual in particular should be 
protected.
5. The Individual's Evasion of His Responsibilities
c
I 1 ' ina does not only criticize people who use the 
collective as a way of pursuing their own interests. She 
blames her compatriots for letting them get away with it. Too 
afraid of being at loggerheads with what is presented as the 
will of the collective, individuals seem to have lost their 
ability to express their opinions. Thus they will not go to 
the rescue of a colleague who has been unfairly treated in 
their name, so to speak; neither will they openly criticize 
those responsible for the injustice.
In an article published in 1967 I 1 ' ina gives some 
examples of situations where individuals have refrained from 
publicly voicing their disapproval: a woman is shocked at 
seeing her friend happily shaking hands with a man well-known 
for giving and taking bribes, although her friend does not 
approve of such practices; a woman disparagingly speaks to 
her friends about a neighbour who has obtained her flat 
through a bit of string-pulling, but welcomes her with open 
arms when she comes to borrow a mixer.38 I 1 ' ina sees such
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hypocritical behaviour as a sign of cowardice, the refusal of 
the individual to take sides and responsibility for what 
happens in society. To 'brand someone in a meeting 1 , - 
she argues -, 'when feeling the support of the others is 
one thing. To fight with baseness (podlost') face to face is 
another'. And she entreats her fellow citizens to ostracize 
corrupt people whose behaviour they have so far condemned 
only in private.
I 1 ' ina's tone might appear somewhat self-righteous and
<•
her advice lacking in practicality. It could be argued, after 
all, that some attempt should be made to distinguish between 
systematic large—scale corruption and mere resourcefulness, 
however difficult that might be in a society crippled by 
shortages and bureaucracy. However, her argument highlights 
the existence of double standards and the division of the 
self. The public persona is a sham which feels that it has to 
protect the private self by keeping silent or following the 
pack. This phenomenon of split personalities has far-reaching 
consequences for the development of society. Soviet citizens, 
I 1 ' ina argues, have surrendered their right to make 
judgements to the law-enforcing agencies, in particular the 
police and the courts, or the press. She continues with 
vehement rhetorical questions:
Isn't it the case that many of us 
strive, even if only unconsciously, to 
attribute moral norms to agencies of 
government? That people have lost the 
habit of being guided solely by their 
own conscience when making judgements? 
Isn't it the case that they want others 
to decide, and if it is deemed
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necessary, condemn on their behalf? And 
if they do not condemn, what can I do 
about it anyway?39
As a result two basic types of social behaviour can be 
observed. Some citizens do their utmost to avoid 
participating in the life of the collective, passively 
accepting the decisions taken in its name and those made by 
various social agencies. Il'ina obviously sees great danger 
in this lack of civic responsibility as she drops broad hints 
about the failure of law-enforcing agencies to do their job
c
properly. After all, the examples she gives show that some 
people take bribes or jump the queue with impunity.
The other side of the coin is that people have become 
indifferent to their fellow citizens. In an article published 
in 1971 V. Kardin lists a whole series of offences, which, 
he believes, have occurred partly as a result of people's 
indifference to what happens in their community.*0 He 
concentrates in particular on the case of a sixty-two-year- 
old pensioner beaten to death by two young lads under the 
influence of alcohol. Kardin argues that not only the two 
lads, but the whole community is guilty. People are to be 
blamed for not publicly objecting to the illegal sale of wine 
in their health food shop; the chap who bought the 
pensioner's watch from the lads for not enquiring about its 
origins; the old man's neighbours for choosing not to notice 
the blood on his body and letting him lie in the corridor for 
several hours. People do not want to 'meddle'.
-124-
Il'ina's article, in particular, received a very big 
response from readers. While agreeing with her basic 
argument, many of them refuted her claims that they were 
cowards. It is, indeed, a well-known fact that those who 
speak the truth, those who 'meddle 1 do get into trouble. 
I 1 ' ina replies somewhat unconvincing 1y that one must follow 
the dictates of one's conscience whatever the difficulties, 
because in the end the truth will prevail.*i By examining the 
problem from a moral angle only, I 1 ' ina ends up burdening the
<•
individual with an immense, superhuman task. On the other 
hand, she forcibly attacks collectivism, or at least the form 
it has taken in her country, showing that it has produced 
passive citizens, reluctant to make any public judgement on 
what happens around them.
While some citizens have withdrawn from public life into 
the privacy of their homes, others go to the other extreme, 
appealing to the collective for help whenever they have 
personal problems. The issue was also tackled by Evgenii 
Dobrovo1'skii nearly a year after the publication of Il'ina's 
article, but this time in a humorous way.42 A woman demanded 
that her friend, who was having an affair with her husband, 
should be judged and punished by their work collective. The 
quarrel grew even more acrimonious and the local authorities 
(mestkom) were asked to intervene. Dobrovo1'skii finds it 
preposterous that two adults should make an exhibition of 
themselves and ask the collective or the authorities to sort 
out their private lives. The offended party claimed that the
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'defence of the family' was at stake, whereas, Dobrovo1'skii 
comments,
it was clear from the very beginning 
that it was merely about two forceful 
women (teten'ki ' ) settling scores. But 
why is it that a whole institution had 
to be drawn into this? Meetings took 
place. Minutes were typed. What for?*3
I 1 ' ina is not so much concerned with the time wasted by 
the police, the courts or other public bodies, as with these 
people's inability to 'distinguish between violation of legal 
norms and violations of ethical norms'. She sees this 
attitude as yet another way of evading one's personal 
responsibilities by relying on public organizations to solve 
private problems.
The discussion emphasizes the need to redefine the 
notion of privacy and the relationship between the private 
and public spheres. The idea of the supremacy of the 
collective over the individual has regrettably resulted 
either in an unacceptable intrusion on people's privacy or 
in the crippling belief that the individual cannot influence 
the collective. Consequently, whether it is the factory or 
the city committee, or - the reader may surmise - the central 
authorities, the representatives of the collective have been 
entrusted with an excessive degree of power, which, in the 
end, runs counter to the interests of the individual. The 
collective will stop becoming oppressive only when 
individuals will again assume their personal responsibilities 
both in the private and the public spheres.
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5.Cone 1usion
The debates which have been examined in this chapter 
tackle a variety of issues, all of which paint an 
unflattering picture of the collective as an oppressive unit 
which stifles and often harms the individual. Articles 
which sing the praises of collectives are occasionally 
published in Literaturnaya gazeta, but usually appear in 
the economic section of the paper, whether they publicize 
the outstanding performance of a specific work collective
<•
or the economic progress of a relatively backward region. 
No vindication of collectivism is to be found in the sections 
devoted to ethical issues and the relationship between the 
collective and the individual. Firstly, we shall sum up the 
main ideas which considerably undermine the official theory 
of collectivism either explicitly or implicitly in these 
articles. We shall then examine the limitations of the 
debates.
A. Criticism of Collectivism
1. While the values traditionally forming the basis of 
collectivism, - i.e. patriotism, love of work and social 
duty -, are not to be forsaken, their limitations must be
acknowledged. Indeed,these notions concern only one aspect of 
t
the relationship between the individual and the collective, 
emphasizing the duties of the citizens to the collective, 
rather than their rights. Soviet society needs to reassesss 
its moral code and ensure that the 'dignity and honour 1 of 
the individual be protected.
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2. Soviet society is depicted as a divided collective, 
riddled with individualism, suspicion and petty 
authoritarianism. The lofty goals which official propaganda 
never tires of promoting have failed to bind the Soviet 
community together. Individuals do not seem to share any 
common ideals. They have withdrawn into themselves, 
protecting their own interests. Ironically, the society which 
was intended to be a model of collectivism, has become a 
dangerously atomized community where the notion of civic
c
responsibility has lost its meaning in the eyes of too many 
of its members.
3. The notion of the collective has not been abandoned, 
but perverted and discredited by those who use it to pursue 
their own selfish interests. Injustices are constantly being 
committed in the name of the collective.
4. A decision democratically taken by the collective can 
be undemocratic if it does not obey certain principles aimed 
at protecting the interests and rights of the individual. 
Indirectly, the reader is encouraged to reflect upon the very 
nature of collectivism: what are the interests of the 
collective? Are they always to be placed above those of the 
individual? Are there any contradictions between the 
interests of various collectives, or do they harmonize 
with the interests of the supreme collective, i.e. the
whole nation?
5. There is a need to redefine the limits of the private 
and public spheres. Too much power has been entrusted to the
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collective; as a result, people's privacy can be intruded 
upon at any time, and individuals tend to evade their 
personal responsibilities either in their private or public 
1ives.
6. The inadequacies of the collective are not described 
as remnants of capitalism. For example, it is clearly pointed 
out, that the inability of the centralized economy to 
diversify, along with the bureaucratic system of management, 
contribute to the neglect of the individual. Furthermore, the
<•
debate on bad manners is permeated with nostalgia for pre- 
revo1utionary mores.
B. Limitations of the Debates
1. While the link between the nature of the socio- 
economic system and the neglect of the individual is clearly 
established, little emphasis is put on the bad living and 
working conditions which push people into individualistic 
behaviour. Brief references are made to shortages of goods 
and inadequate housing. At the same time, it is frequently 
hinted that people should behave better in spite of these 
hardships. Authors do not dwell upon these problems. It is as 
if they assumed that the Soviet economy was anyway incapable 
of solving them in a near future.
2. There is not a single article which investigates the 
history of the country and the economic and political 
upheavals which have destroyed the social fabric, making 
people suspicious of one another and thus to withdraw into 
the privacy of their homes. Only by reading between the lines
-129-
can we find some veiled references to Stalinism. Nowhere 
is there any mention of the repressive organs which largely 
contributed to the breaking up of the collective.
3. Neither is there any analysis of social inequalities, 
which have also contributed to the creation of disharmony in 
the collective, although there are some allusions to the 
importance of social status, as well as to inequalities 
resulting from bribery and corruption. Specific examples of 
abuse of power refer to low-ranking employees only.
c
4. It could be argued that these limitations stem from 
the fact that the debates belong to the section of the paper 
devoted to 'ethical issues'. However, 'ethical issues' are 
never discussed in purely moral terms. Although there is some 
vagueness as to what extent ordinary citizens should be held 
responsible for the inadequacies of the collective, 
contributors constantly search for explanations of people's 
behaviour in the organization of society.
While the economic system is openly and frequently 
criticized, .it is clear that political debates have 
remained taboo. As a result, a whole series of problems 
which are fundamentally political, such as the nature of 
democracy or the relationship between the private and the 
political (or the 'public'), are not examined in strictly 
political terms. The vagueness of the terminology is both 
helpful and restrictive. It allows authors to touch upon some 
highly controversial issues, yet it stops them from making 
any sophisticated analysis of the political mechanisms; nor
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can they direct specific criticisms at the leadership. The 
term 'collective 1 itself lacks precision; it can refer to the 
work team or the residents of a block of flats, as well as to 
various party and governmental bodies supposedly representing 
collective interests, or society at large.
Finally, the lack of positive suggestions is striking. 
As a rule, authors do not put forward any radical 
alternatives or any concrete solutions which would reduce the 
ubiquitous power of the collective or that of large
«•
organizations. Thus, the overall picture of Soviet society 
seems rather bleak.
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IV. ACADEMICS AND THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVISM
As a rule, academics did not participate in the debates 
on the relationship between the collective and the individual 
already examined. Most of the contributions were made by 
journalists, writers, officials, and readers commenting upon 
human interest stories. It has been shown that these articles 
and letters contain valuable information on Soviet social 
reality and Soviet people's perceptions of it. Harsh
c
criticisms are levelled at the forms which collectivism has 
taken in practice. There is, however, a series of quite 
different articles - approximately 35,000 words in all - in 
which academics specializing in various human sciences 
cha 1 1 enge the very theory of col lectivism. Seven of these 
articles are directly concerned with the theory itself. The 
other twenty or so constitute a lengthy debate on the need to 
develop a science of Man (che 1 ovek) . The study of Man has 
been neglected for years, partly as a result of the priority 
given to the collective over the individual, and the illusory 
assumption that individuals will not enter into conflicts 
with one another or with the group. The all-round study of 
Man which is felt to be urgently needed by these academics, 
would involve - in particular, but not exclusively - the 
development of psychology.
1. Collectivism: An Inadequate Theory
The theory of collectivism is openly rejected by V.
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Sukhomlinskii, member-correspondent of the RSFSR Academy of 
Pedagogical Sciences, introduced by Literaturnaya gazeta as 
'one of the most senior pedagogues' in the land, i.e., we are 
to understand, a highly commendable specialist whose ideas 
should be heard with the greatest respect.
In an article revealingly entitled 'It is the individual 
I see 1 , Sukhomlinskii insists that it is as vital to study 
the impact of the collective upon the individual as it is to 
define the role of the individual within the collective - he
c
speaks of the 'mutual relationship' between the group and 
each of its members.! He then questions two basic principles 
of collectivism which have been hammered into Soviet 
teachers' heads for decades.
Firstly, Sukhomlimskii deems the idea that 'the 
collective is the main educator of the personality 1 to be 
oversimp1istic. As a matter of fact, he argues, a whole 
series of factors and social agencies contribute to the 
shaping of a child's personality, including the family, 
books, peers, teachers (who are not all alike), as well as a 
growing sense of se1f-awareness which commonly - and quite 
normally - expresses itself by a desire to change what has 
been done by one's elders. This is hardly an original idea. 
Western readers would probably think that Sukhomlinskii is 
only stating the obvious. And of course he is. Soviet 
academics have been straitjacketed by incredibly primitive 
dogmas incapable of accommodating reality; hence the need to 
rediscover some basic concepts taken for granted by
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researchers, or even the general public, in societies where 
the progress of sciences has not been cramped by state 
ideology. Sukhomlinskii also stresses the importance of 
subjective factors in the shaping of an individual and 
legitimizes the rebellious spirit of the young.
Secondly, Sukhomlinskii vehemently revolts against the 
other, equally famous, collectivist motto, i.e., 'the 
collective is the first aim of education 1 , arguing that as a 
result of this erroneous belief the individual has
c
practically become invisible. To support his argument, 
Sukhomlinskii gives examples of cruel practices which have 
been introduced in the name of collectivism, such as, for 
instance, demanding that a child should discuss his or her 
misbehaviour in front of the collective. Such practice should 
be condemned not only because it unnecessarily humiliates 
children, but also because collectives usually show little 
compassion and understanding, thus failing to teach children 
to 1erance.
Sukhomlinskii elaborates on his thesis in a second 
article which appeared in Literaturnaya gazeta three years 
later.2 Drawing further lessons from his long teaching 
career, Sukhomlinskii humbly recognizes that all his attempts 
at organizing his school into a collective unfailingly 
resulted in what he calls 'the collective for the sake of the 
collective 1 , with a 'strong leadership' on one hand and 
'submissive 1 children on the other.
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The strength of his argument stems from both the honesty 
with which he takes stock of his own professional activity 
and his unequivocal criticism of Makarenko. While claiming to 
have retained a great admiration for the father of Soviet 
pedagogy, Sukhomlinskii urges readers to re-examine his 
theories with circumspection. He bluntly declares that 
Makarenko was undoubtedly wrong on one particular point, 
which, in fact, as O'De11 reminds us, is one of the 
fundamental principles of collectivism. In the event of a
*
conflict between the collective and the individual, 
Sukhomlinskii argues, the interests of the collective should 
not necessarily prevail. Makarenko 1 s advocacy of the 
supremacy of the collective over the individual can have 
disastrous effects as, indeed, Sukhomlinskii clearly explains 
in this extract from his article:
Such an attitude on the part of the 
pedagogue can only break the will of the 
growing individual, and I would like to 
think that nowadays only very few 
teachers adopt it in their teaching 
pract i ce.3
Sukhomlinskii traces back this method to the thirties 
when 'one somehow stopped seeing the child, the individual 
behind the collective 1 . The practice of public confessions 
has 'transformed public opinion into a means of punishing the 
child', thus producing passive and withdrawn individuals, 
afraid of the collective:
How shortsighted we are when we try to 
get a formal condemnation, for show, of 
a comrade by the collective! As a result 
he will be eaten away from within by the 
most terrible of curses - hypocrisy.*
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Finally, Sukhomlinskii reverses Makarenko's formula. 'I 
am deeply convinced 1 , he writes, 'that the aim of communist 
education is the individual while the collective is only the 
means to achieve this aim', assuming that the collective does 
not set about crushing the individual as it is still often 
the case, he is sorry to say, in schools nowadays.
Sukhomlinskii's writings seem to have provided a 
rallying point for liberal members of the teaching 
profession and specialists in pedagogy who wish to challenge
<•
the ideological monopoly of Makarenko. In fact, several 
contributors to the debate point out that Makarenko's ideas 
have been distorted by official ideologists and that many 
practices reputed to stem from his ideas must be making the 
master turn in his grave. For instance, Lyubov' Kabo whose 
principal goal, in her article, is to warn against the danger 
of relying upon one single dogma, mentions the discrepancy 
between Makarenko's theories and their application in Soviet 
schools:
What would Makarenko have said if he had 
visited a school in the forties or 
fifties, a school where ... everyone 
speaks of independence for the children 
while not a single pioneers' meeting can 
take place without the teachers.5
Yu. Azarov, a senior researcher at the Academy of 
pedagogical sciences, describes what is practised in Soviet 
schools as 'vulgar collectivism 1 . Whereas the educator should 
take a back seat and encourage the children to organize their 
own lives and settle conflicts between themselves, 'in
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practice', he argues, 'the teacher alone manages the entire 
life of the children'. Like Sukhomlinskii, Azarov is 
concerned about the disastrous consequences of such 
authoritarian methods on the personality of the child, who 
tends to become increasingly afraid of taking any 
initiatives. He advocates a return to genuine se1f-management 
amongst children to help them grow into confident and 
creative adults. He advises, however, to handle the concept 
of se1f-management with caution as it does not necessarily
c
lead to democracy. Left to their own devices, children can 
easily reproduce hierarchical structures with the elder 
dominating the younger or the stronger harassing the weaker.6
A. Levshin vehemently defends Sukhomlinskii against one 
of his opponents, B. Likhachev, who has written a very 
hostile review of his book Etyudy o kommunisticheskom 
vospi tani i in the professional journal Uchitel 'skaya gazeta. 
Levshin argues that contrary to what Likhachev thinks, 
Sukhomlinskii does not forsake the idea of collectivism, but 
rightly advocates a 'harmonious fusion 1 between the interests 
of the collective and those of the individual. It is 
Likhachev who betrays the ideas of Makarenko by overlooking 
the fact that children are not only objects, but also 
subjects. In no circumstances should the collective be used 
as a means of stifling the individual.7
Sukhomlinskii's argument in favour of a liberal 
educational environment conducive to the full development of 
the individual chimes in with the main criticisms frequently
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levelled at Soviet pedagogy in the more specific debate on 
teaching methods. Educationalists repeatedly argue that 
teachers ought to be equipped with some grounding in 
psychology in order to be able to vary their approach in 
accordance with the specific needs of each child. Schools are 
harshly criticized for their tendency to cram pupils' heads 
with ever more knowledge, deterring the children from being 
inquisitive and expressing their views. Nor do institutions 
of higher education make much effort to develop their
c
students' creative potential and ability to take initiatives. 
It is further argued that the failure to encourage 
independent and critical thinking among the young partly 
accounts for the intellectual apathy which can often be 
observed in academia and research institutes. 8
Sukhomlinskii's articles also echo Il'ina's and Borin's 
concerns about the victimization of the individual by the 
collective. As a matter of fact, they complete the picture 
painted by the above mentioned authors insofar as they relate 
the patterns of behaviour which I 1 ' ina and Borin have 
observed in adults to the type of education that children 
receive in schools. From early childhood Soviet citizens are 
faced with oppressive collectives which make them acutely 
aware of their vulnerability as individuals. Later on the 
children's collective is replaced by various adult versions 
of it, such as the work or tenants' collective, each having 
its own mechanisms to keep the individual in check, for 
example by means of the comrades' court.
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Sukhomlinskii's observation that children's way of 
coping with pressures from the collective is often to 
withdraw into themselves, thus becoming passive members of 
society, coincides with Il'ina's own conclusions. Like Il'ina 
too, Sukhomlinskii presents these practices as a product of 
the Stalin period, to which he discreetly refers as 'the 
thirties'. Sukhomlinskii's original contribution to the 
debate is to denounce the system of thought which has 
generated and legitimized this type of social relations. The
<•
official theory of collectivism is wrong.
Over the years 1967-1971 Literaturnaya gazeta published 
only a few articles which contain a systematic criticism of 
the theory of collectivism. However, in 1967, the paper 
presented its readers with an account of a philosophy 
conference which clearly indicates that such a debate was 
actually taking place amongst academics in various 
disciplines, particularly pedagogy, philosophy and 
psychology.9 The conference was organized in September 1967 
by the philosophy faculty of Tambov Pedagogical Institute on 
the theme 'Marxist-Leninist ethics'. Several contributors, we 
are told, presented papers discussing the relationship 
between the individual and the collective, and this is 
precisely the subject which R. Petropavlovskii, a researcher 
at the Institute of Philosophy of the RSFSR Academy of 
Sciences, decided to concentrate upon in his report for 
Li teraturnava gazeta.
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Having briefly pointed out that most participants 
supported the well-known thesis according to which 'communist 
morality demands the subordination of the interest of the 
individual to that of society 1 , Petropavlovskii embarks upon 
a lengthy account of a much less conformist position defended 
by a few individuals only and expounded by T. V. Samsonova, a 
reader from Moscow University. Samsonova calls upon The 
German Ideology to demonstrate that it has never been the 
goal of communists to subordinate the interests of a
c-
particular (chastnyi ) individual to those of a mythical 
universal (vseobshchyi) one; the 'common interest' ought to 
be the outcome of a consensus between concrete individuals. 
Samsonova concludes that
... from a theoretical point of view it 
is incorrect to want to solve 
contradictions between the private and 
the public by establishing a moral norm 
subordinating the former to the latter; 
... it would be more fruitful to speak 
of unity rather than subordination and 
then to look for the right concrete 
mechanism to realize this unity in 
various situations.1°
Samsonova champions the cause of the individual, but 
also lays a great deal of emphasis on the idea of unity. She 
merely hints at the inevitable emergence of conflicts between 
individuals trying to work out what the 'common interest 1 is; 
she calls for some kind of mechanism 'to realize unity 1 , in 
other words, to settle disagreements. Yet, while recognizing 
the potentially conflictual diversity of "concrete 
individuals'' aspirations, Samsonova seems to assume that
-143-
conflicts can be resolved and unity preserved. Whether her 
choice of words and emphasis stem from sheer idealism or the 
political constraints within which she is attempting to break 
the mould of the official collectivist dogma, her ideas 
certainly constitute a progressive, albeit timid, 
contribution to the debate; a debate which is really 
concerned with the nature of democracy.
Finally, a couple of contributors tackle the issue of 
collectivism while analysing American theories on social
c
conformism. I. Kon is particularly interested in the work of 
the American psychologist Solomon Ash, whose experiments have 
shown that many individuals find it extremely painful, if not 
impossible, to resist group pressure. Hence their conformism. 
With his own society in mind, Kon then advocates a greater 
degree of freedom for the individual within the collective on 
the grounds that the individual will be able to fulfil his 
creative potential , thus making a useful contribution to the 
collective, only if he enjoys a reasonable degree of 
autonomy. A disciplinarian collective turns its members into 
conformists incapable of taking initiatives.il
The second article, unlike all the other pieces so far 
examined, defends collectivism. Its author, A. Petrovskii, 
who is introduced as a ' we 1 1-known psychologist 1 by 
Literaturnaya gazeta, reports on the XIX International 
Congress of Psychologists, which he himself attended in 
London.12 Petrovskii gives a brief summary of what he refers 
to as the 'dominant theory 1 in American psychology, according
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to which one is either a conformist or a non-conformist. 
Petrovskii deems the theory simplistic. He argues, in 
particular, that conformists may merely pretend to agree with 
the rules of society, abiding by them solely in order to 
secure their career or because they cannot pluck up the 
courage to oppose them. It is not inconceivable that 
Petrovskii is here thinking about his own society. 
Nevertheless, he unequivocally rejects the Western theory 
which he contrasts with that of collectivism. One can see how
c
the American theory, however inoffensive it may appear to a 
Western audience, can alarm a conservative Soviet ideologist: 
conformism inevitably conveys a negative connotation whether 
because it implies allegiance to capitalism, in a Western 
context, or passivity, in an East-European one; non- 
conformists leads to rebellion. On the other hand collectivism 
means that the individual consciously and actively shares the 
aims and ideals of the collective, as is the case, Petrovskii 
insists, in Soviet society.
Petrovskii's somewhat uninspiring piece would probably 
be of little interest to Soviet readers were it not for the 
information it provides on one aspect of Western psychology. 
It is, indeed, unlikely that the paper's intention was to 
promote such a banal defence of collectivism. In fact, 
Literaturnaya gazeta clearly favours authors who call for a 
reappraisal of the role of the individual. Much publicity is 
given to Samsonova's contribution although her followers were 
in the minority at the conference, and Sukhomlinskii's second
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article - a lengthy one (2,400 words) - occupies a whole page 
together with a shorter one by the same author, in which ways 
of improving teaching methods are discussed. Finally, the 
relatively large number of articles on psychology, which will 
be examined next, confirms the paper's commitment to the 
deba te.
2 . Shift of Emphasis: From the Collective to the 
Individua1
c
Neither Sukhomlinskii nor Samsonova advocates 
individualism. Their concern is that the collective hampers 
the harmonious development of the individual, the assumption 
being that an association of uninhibited individuals would 
produce a better collective. That Literaturnaya gazeta should 
invite contributions from psychologists, psychiatrists and 
anthropologists shows further evidence of the growing demand 
for the recognition of the needs and potential of 
indivi dua1s.
Most of the articles which will be examined here address 
the question of whether an 'Institute of Man 1 (che1ovek) 
should be set up in order to develop and better organize the 
research work aimed at increasing scientific knowledge of the 
human mind. We shall see, however, that the question is not 
merely a technical one.
In an article, published shortly after this debate 
ended, L. Zemskov - a psychiatrist who does not seem to hold 
any prestigious position in the academic establishment -
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vividly demonstrates how the urgently needed development of 
psychology entails a drastic questioning of the conception of 
Man as promoted by the Stalinist vision of society and, to a 
lesser extent, the revolutionary imagery of the twenties.13
Zemskov argues that although it is now possible to treat 
practically any neurosis by means of medication - an 
unintentionally revealing statement testifying to the sorry 
state of Soviet psychology - it would be much better to 
tackle the roots of the problem and seek to prevent such
c
illnesses. Many neuroses, he continues, are diagnosed amongst 
'weak and impressionable people' who happen to have been 
roughly handled, like, for instance, this elderly professor 
who became insomniac and suicidal after he was forced to 
retire. Zemskov rejects the opinion, commonly shared by 
colleagues, that these 'weak and impressionable people' would 
have had to pull themselves together during the war and 
should not expect any special treatment in peacetime. He then 
recalls one of his lecturers in psychiatry explaining that:
. . . the social value of an individual 
is by no means determined by the fact 
that he has a so-called 'strong type of 
nervous activity', - i.e. he can be 
persistent, obstinate and always gets 
his way. On the contrary, it may be the 
case that someone who is weak, shy and 
unsure of himself is more useful to 
society because it is precisely the kind 
of person who is prepared to devote 
himself to people, to give everything 
he's got. And usually these people do 
have something to give as they are often 
talented and intelligent.* 4
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The scientific value of this observation as to the 
connection between psychological make-up, moral qualities and 
intellectual abilities is, to say the least, dubious. 
However, it is likely that the author is merely alluding to 
the fact that important positions are frequently occupied by 
incompetent careerists, while the talent of socially less 
ambitious or less confident people goes to waste. Perhaps 
more importantly, Zemskov questions the Stalinist obsession 
with moral endurance and physical strength which, for
c
example, permeates propagandist visual art and conformist 
literature - Chakovskii's hero, Andrei, is, indeed, 
'persistent and obstinate 1 and he does 'get his way 1 .15
The ideological justification for promoting such an 
image of Man was that psychological problems and mental 
disorders were caused by oppressive social relations and 
would therefore automatically disappear under socialism. 
Judging by the debate in Literaturnaya gazeta, this theory 
was at last being widely and publicly challenged even by 
professionals holding high-ranking positions; for instance, 
A. V. Snezhnevskii, director of the Institute of Psychiatry 
of the Academy of Medical Sciences, - whose major 
contribution to psychiatric repression has since been 
denounced -, argues that it has been a mistake to dismiss 
biological and hereditary factors.16
Zemskov's position, however, is much bolder. Firstly, he 
explicitly blames the academic establishment of the thirties
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for its slavish devotion to the Stalinist dogma. Those 
responsible for the backwardness of Soviet psychology are:
these bureaucrats of the scientific 
world who would consider any serious 
attempt to research into the origins of 
nervous and mental illnesses as slander 
on contemporary reality. And then the 
war broke out.* 7
Secondly, unlike Snezhnevskii, Zemskov clearly states 
that psychological problems and neuroses frequently stem from 
conflicts which take place within the work collective, the 
family or in communal flats. He welcomes the fact that an 
increasing number of people publicly, albeit timidly, express 
the opinion that this occurs 'even in the best possible 
society 1 . Zemskov's indictment of the Stalinist macho image 
of the perfect Soviet citizen is two-sided: the 
'psychologically weak' must be protected for humanitarian 
reasons, to alleviate their suffering, and also to achieve a 
better management of human resources, ensuring that all 
talents are put to good use.
Although Snezhnevskii is less outspoken than Zemskov 
when it comes to establishing a connection between social 
relations and psychological disorders, he is equally eager to 
stress the alarming extent and urgency of the problem. He 
argues, for instance, that nowadays people are more likely 
to suffer from nervous disorders - which must not be 
confused, however, with mental illnesses - than in the 
nineteenth century; many young children are psychologically 
disturbed; people should be taught to cope with conflicts and
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contradictions; as psychiatry is still taboo, patients are 
reluctant to seek professional help and are often entrusted 
to a psychiatrist's care when they are already beyond help.
What emerges from all the articles is that this part of 
people's lives has been neglected for so many years that even 
professionals have only a very hazy idea of the extent of the 
problem. Data are suspiciously absent. It is through their 
daily contacts with patients that general practitioners have 
realized how great the need for psychotherapy is. A short
c
article written by M. Markov on the basis of seven interviews 
with members of the medical profession shows how concerned 
many doctors are that because of their lack of training and 
facilities they are not in a position to give adequate help 
to their patients in need of psychotherapy. One interviewee 
claims that although the number of patients suffering from 
psychological or mental disorders is unknown, it is commonly 
believed to be considerable. Yet at present special 
psychotherapy units exist almost exclusively in the sanatoria 
of the health resorts. Another interviewee suggests that each 
polyclinic should be able to offer such a service. Markov 
heartily supports these doctors' appeal for the development 
of psychotherapy and the setting up of a research centre 
which would publicize and develop the work which has been 
achieved by the already existing teams, scattered all over 
the country.* 8
While no participant in the debate denies the urgent 
need to develop psychotherapy, opinions differ as to what the
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method of treatment should be. One week before the beginning 
of the debate on whether it is appropriate to set up an 
Institute of Man 1 , Literaturnaya gazeta devoted a whole page 
to a discussion on psychoanalysis in the science section. The 
author of the first article, Yu. Krelin, a doctor who, like 
Zemsvov, does not seem to occupy any high-ranking official 
post, advocates the use of psychoana1ysis.*9 The second piece 
signed by the already quoted director of the Institute of 
Psychiatry, A. Snezhnevskii, is a firm, albeit civil rebuttal
c
of Krelin's argument.20
Krelin argues that it is possible to use the system of 
treatment worked out by Freud the doctor, while disagreeing 
with the theories of Freud the philosopher. Many patients 
could have their suffering greatly relieved if the trauma 
that has caused the pain could be brought out of the 
unconscious into the conscious, which is what psychoanalysis 
is all about. True, Krelin advocates psychoanalysis with a 
noticeable degree of caution. He is careful not to call for a 
complete rehabilitation of 'freudism 1 - he regrets the 
negative connotation that the word has acquired - and admits 
that the time has not yet come to promote psychoanalysis as 
an independent form of treatment. At the same time he 
unabashedly declares that present Soviet psychotherapy has 
nothing to do with science, precisely the argument which has 
been used by official ideologists in order to discredit 
Freud's ideas. Also, he proposes that immediate action be 
taken to integrate some elements of psychoanalysis into
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general medical practice. All doctors, he believes, even 
general practitioners, should be familiar with 
psychoanalysis; all medical students should be introduced to 
it .
Snezhnevskii ' s response contains many predictable 
arguments. Freud ignored the 'bio-social' dimension of Man, 
reducing all mental disorders to sexual complexes. He wrongly 
believed that neuroses and psychoses were purely 
psychological illnesses, unlike Pavlov who clearly
c
demonstrated that they are always partly caused by 
physiological disorders. Snezhnevskii strongly opposes 
Krelin's suggestion that psychoanalysis should become part of 
general medical practice, arguing that, after all, Freud 
himself promoted psychoanalysis only as a means of treating 
neuroses, psychoses and hysteria. By making such a clear-cut 
distinction between those with neuroses and those without - 
i. e. between the sick and the healthy - Snezhnevskii reveals 
that he does not see the theory of the unconscious as 
providing any valuable clue to the workings of the human 
mind. Finally, he dismisses psychoanalysis as a thing of the 
past. It did have some followers in Russia before and after 
the Revolution, but those who tried to apply this method of 
treatment, including himself in the late twenties, found it
ineffect ive.
During the years 1967-71 Literaturnaya gazeta published 
only these two articles on psychoanalysis. No round tables or 
Discussion Club debates - which usually last several weeks -
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are to be found on the subject. Snezhnevsk i i ' s response to 
Krelin shows that the academic establishment is reluctant to 
reopen a file which for years has been considered closed for 
good. The publication of Krelin's article is all to the 
credit of Literaturnaya gazeta. The editorial board is 
obviously aware of treading a dangerous path as it tamely 
reminds readers in a short introduction to the two articles 
that psychoanalysis is a non-scientifica11y based 
psychotherapeutic method introduced by Freud and that the
c
interest it initially aroused has considerably dwindled both 
in the Soviet Union and in the West. It looks as if the price 
to pay for publishing Krelin's courageous piece was to pay 
lip service to the official dogma and give some room to one 
of its supporters.
The decision taken by Literaturnaya gazeta to publish 
Krelin's article is in itself indicative of a persistent, or 
perhaps renewed, interest in the theories of Freud. So is 
Snezhnevski i ' s suggestion that there may be a case for the 
publication of a critical analysis of Freud's theories, 
although he refutes the accusation made by Krelin that 
Freud's works have not been published in the Soviet Union. On 
the other hand, Snezhnevskii's articles shed some light on 
the degree of resistance which researchers in psychology are 
likely to encounter. His criticism of psychoanalysis is 
mainly defensive and fails to suggest any alternative. In his 
first contribution, he is keen to stress the great number of 
people in need of psychotherapy, yet his approach is often
-152-
strikingly unscientific. For instance, he attributes 
psychological disturbances in children to the fact that too 
much emphasis in their education has been placed on 
technology and science, at the expense of literature and the 
arts, which, he argues, nurture a sense of beauty and 
morality in people. The young generation should be given a 
good moral education which would make them confident in the 
future and less prone to disappointment. One understands why 
Krelin should accuse Soviet psychotherapy of having nothing
c
to do with science.
It seems that the debate on whether it is necessary to 
set up an 'Institute of Man' is a reflection of these 
conflicts between conservative academics, who, though not 
necessarily averse to the development of human sciences, are 
anxious to keep it within the already approved ideological 
framework, and researchers calling for a more radical 
questioning of the old theories. The debate is about finding 
a new academic structure which would give official 
recognition to the Cinderella subjects of Soviet academia, 
like psychology, as well as accommodate new developments in 
well established disciplines, such as philosophy, pedagogy 
and anthropology.
The debate which lasted approximately half a year was 
triggered off by a round table, an account of which, jointly 
written by Evg. Bogat and Yu. Timofeev, appeared in the 
autumn of 1967.21 The discussion begins with a certain amount 
of woolly philosophizing on the nature of Man, yet finishes
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on a more concrete note. The creation is proposed of an 
interdisciplinary research institute which would promote the 
study of Man and of the human mind, defining its own 
objectives and its own methodology. Academics and readers in 
general are invited to partake in the debate.
Only a third, approximately, of all participants in the 
debate support the idea of an interdisciplinary institute. 
However, many of those who oppose the idea agree that some 
kind of structure is needed in order to centralize, publicize
<•
and coordinate the research carried out in the various human 
sciences all over the country. B. G. Anan'ev, the head of a 
laboratory of psychology and anthropology at Leningrad 
University, forcefully defends this position. Rather than 
invest in a new research centre, he argues, it would be more 
judicious to 'strengthen the material and technical base 1 of 
already existing institutions. A small team of researchers 
would be sufficient to work out what the main issues are as 
well as gather information from the various research units. 
Only such a collaboration between different disciplines, 
including not only the human sciences but also physics, 
chemistry and mathematics, can help to solve social problems 
in the work place, education, social services etc...22
Those in favour of an 'Institute of Man' seem to be 
particularly concerned with the development of psychology. It 
is the case, for instance, of V. Myasishchev, doctor in 
medical sciences and corres ponding member O f the Academy of 
Pedagogical Sciences.23 Myasishchev draws lessons from
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history. He reminds readers of the famous Russian scientist 
V. M. Bekhterev who before the Revolution, set up an 
institute of psychoneuro1ogy and after the Revolution, with 
the approval of the young Soviet government - Myasishchev is 
anxious to point out - an institute specializing in the study 
of the human mind.24 Unfortunately, the latter had to merge 
with the physiology institute of the Academy of Sciences in 
1952, which had catastrophic repercussions on the development 
of psychology: only two tiny departments of psychology now
<
exist in the whole country. An 'Institute of Man' would 
involve several disciplines, in particular medicine, history 
and social sciences, but the core of its programme would be 
in psychology and pedagogy.
The debate can be somewhat confusing at times. Not all 
contributors share the same academic concerns or the same 
institutional interests. However, most of them agree on two 
major points. Firstly, it is essential to develop all human 
sciences in order to achieve a better social management of 
society. Secondly, - and this seems to be the crux of the 
debate — it is time to break away from the old thesis 
according to which Man is fundamentally a social being and 
therefore can only be the subject matter of the social 
sciences.
The overwhelming majority of contributors fiercely 
challenge the limitations of the official dogma and call for 
a collaboration between all the sciences concerned with the 
numerous aspects of the human condition. Myasishchev points
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out that the XXVIII International Congress of Psychology, 
which took place in Moscow in 1966, came to the conclusion 
that the study of Man is a matter for not only the social, 
but also the natural sciences, and that the aim of psychology 
should be to help understand the personality of an 
individual. A whole page is devoted to a debate between law 
professors discussing the part that psychology should play in 
criminology and the extent to which the personality of the 
offender is relevant in explaining and judging criminal
<•
behaviour, as social circumstances cannot account for 
everything.2 5
All these academics are anxious to depart from the 
determinist theories which have stemmed from the idea that 
the 'essence of Man is social'. Many authors insist that the 
individuality of each human being must be recognized. A 
philosophy professor, A. Zvorykin, actually establishes a 
link between the social determinism favoured by the official 
ideology and the failure to fully comprehend human nature. He 
argues that
[by] placing the emphasis on the 
social origin of the personality, we 
often ignore some of its important 
properties, such as individuality, 
uniqueness, origina1ity.26
Unlike Zvorykin, N. Chavcharadze, whose article is 
published on the same page, does not promote a 
piuridisciplinary approach to the study of Man. Yet he seems 
equally wary of determinist oversimplifications and the 
failure to recognize that Man is both object and subject. He
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calls for the development of Marxist philosophical 
anthropology, which by means of the dialectical method makes 
the synthesis between the objective and the subjective. 27
Although this debate does not deal directly with the 
theory of collectivism, it raises very similar issues to 
those tackled by Sukhoml inski i and Samsonova . The call for 
the development of psychology and psychotherapy echoes 
Sukhomlinskii ' s concern about the neglect and bullying of the 
individual which are enshrined in the collectivist ethos. The
c
more general discussion on the need to promote human sciences 
indicates a willingness to move away from determinist 
theories incapable of accounting for the complexity of human 
behaviour and social relations.
Both debates emphasize the need to rehabilitate the role 
of the individual within the collective. Firstly, it is wrong 
to believe that the interests of the collective should come 
before those of the individual. Secondly, the needs and 
aspirations of individuals must be catered for not only to 
ensure their well-being, but also because the personal 
development of each individual constitutes an asset for 
society. Collectivism is inadequate because it advocates the 
subordination of the individual to the group, thus hampering 
the development of both the individual and the group.
3. Cone 1usion
In many respects the human interest stories examined in 
the previous chapter made more interesting reading. They
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raised a much wider range of issues and generated criticisms, 
often far more biting than those contained in these 
theoretical debates. Some comments had obvious political 
implications. Recall, for instance, Borin's observations on 
the democratic process, Il'ina's concern with the lack of 
civic responsibility amongst her compatriots and, above all, 
the long debate on invalids, which explicitly established a 
link between the neglect of the individual and the 
bureaucratic system of management. As has already been
c
pointed out, the debates were never overtly political, yet 
politics was never far away.
As no political scientists or economists participate in 
this academic debate, none of the above mentioned issues are 
explored in purely political terms. Nevertheless, the call 
for a redefinition of the role of the individual in society 
is at the heart of the concerns expressed in the first series 
of articles. As a matter of fact, by questioning the theory 
of collectivism, these specialists in pedagogy, psychology, 
philosophy and anthropology challenge an essential part of 
the official ideology which legitimizes the political system.
Firstly, it is acknowledged that Soviet society has not 
done away with inherently oppressive social relationships. 
These oppressive relationships are seen as the outcome of so- 
called collectivist practices which force individuals into 
submission and encourage bullying. Collectivism has failed on 
two accounts: it has produced a society which is both
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uncaring - it neglects its weaker members -, and wasteful - 
it hinders the harmonious development of the individual.
Secondly, it is essential that the importance of the 
human factor should be recognized not only in order to 
acquire a more sophisticated understanding of social 
phenomena (see the case for the development of sociology), 
but also because good management depends as much on 
collective action as on individual talents. Individuals must 
be free to develop their abilities to the full, so they can
c
give all that they have to society. Clearly, the 'new 
thinking' promoted by Gorbachev in the mid-eighties, with its 
emphasis on individual initiatives and the competitive 
spirit, did not spring up from nowhere.
The conclusions reached in this debate may seem both 
obvious and simplistic to a Western observer. No one, for 
instance, discusses the oppression of the individual in 
relation to social classes or political groups. Ironically, 
the arguments put forward often belong to the liberal 
discourse. Many crucial issues are not given any attention at 
all': what effects will the freeing of the individual have on 
the collective? Where should the line be drawn between 
individual initiative and individualistic behaviour? The one- 
sided nature of the debate and its lack of sophistication are 
partly a reflection of the political restrictions of the 
time, partly a reaction against the ubiquity of the old 
collectivist dogma. The priority was to rehabilitate the 
notion of the individual.
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Yet, in spite of its limitations, the debate which 
Literaturnaya gazeta publicized and encouraged suggests that 
an important shift in thinking was occurring during the 
uninspiring Brezhnev years; a shift away from communist 
principles towards more liberal Western values. 28
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V. SEARCHING FOR NEW FORMS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS
Over the years 67-71 Literaturnaya gazeta published a 
series of articles which indicate that the world of academia 
was not alone in seeking new forms of relationships between 
individuals. The articles examined in this chapter have been 
written mostly by journalists, writers and members of the 
public, very occasionally by sociologists (approximately 
60,000 words in all). Whether they are concerned with finding
c
new ways of organizing 'free time' (some wonder if free time 
should be organized at all) or with the emergence of informal 
gatherings, most authors express their misgivings about the 
collectivist approach to social life. On the whole their 
articles make much more exciting reading than the rather 
gloomy accounts examined in the first chapter (see 
'Perceptions of the collective') as they do not confine 
themselves to recording the disastrous results of 
authoritarian collectivist practices. Alternatives are indeed 
suggested and discussed. Some articles even favourably 
consider new developments in Soviet society which show 
evidence of a spontaneous and active resistance to the type 
of stilted social relations dictated by the requirements of 
official organizations.
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1 . Popular Disaffection from Officially Organized 
Act ivi ties
The debate on the organization of leisure activities was 
triggered off by the journalist L. Zhukhovitskii whose 
article 'Boredom and Free Time 1 appeared in the very first 
issue of the new Literaturnaya gazeta.* The discussion was 
spread over a six-month period (approximately 9,000 words in 
all) and a review of Grushin's book, Free Time - Present 
Prob1 ems, was published in January 1968.2 Although
«•
contributors often seem to have the young in mind, the issue 
is generally thought to concern all Soviet citizens who now 
have more 'free time' on their hands as a result of the 
recently introduced five-day working week.
What is to be done, Zhukhovitskii asks, with this young 
lad who, like many others, ended up at the police station 
because he had drunk and started a fight out of sheer 
boredom? Zhukhovitskii disagrees with the still commonly held 
view that the only way to keep young people out of mischief 
is to set up more clubs and sports facilities. This, he 
argues, will not help to solve what is fundamentally a 
'problem of personality 1 . Society should be able to ensure 
the 'harmonious development of the individual', so that 
everyone can enjoy a 'rich spiritual life' and fully realize 
their talents. That clubs or sports and leisure facilities 
should play a role in the process is not to be ruled out, as 
long as the purpose of organizing activities is not to 
contain individuals, but rather to help their development.
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Zhukhovitskii's second main argument is that individuals 
can fully and 'harmoniously' develop only if they achieve a 
high level of communication with one another. People do not 
talk to each other, he complains. They even marry while they 
hardly know their future partners. He wishes that there were 
more clubs where young people could debate between 
themselves and learn to 'respect the opinions of others'. 
Zhukhovitskii does not specify whether these discussions 
should be supervised or not, yet he obviously fails to
c
mention the need for organizers very intentionally.
The lack of communication between individuals is a 
recurrent theme in Literaturnaya gazeta. It comes up, in 
particular, in the debate on materialism which will be later 
examined in this study. It is not unusual to come across the 
argument that Soviet people have unfortunately become more 
interested in accumulating consumer goods than in 
communicating with one another. This is not, however, the 
part of Zhukhovitskii's article which, in this debate, caught 
the attention of readers. Two opposite camps have emerged: on 
the one hand those who agree with Zhukhovi tsk i i that only 
individuals with poorly developed personalities find 
themselves at a loose end during their free time; on the 
other, those who criticize Zhukhovitskii for underestimating 
the need for more leisure amenities. A reader, A. 
Ka 1ashnikova, surmises that only someone who 'has never been 
beyond the bounds of the Sadovoe kol'tso in Moscow 1 can be 
ignorant of the acute shortage of leisure facilities
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throughout the country. A large section of the Soviet 
population lives in provincial towns and villages which do not 
have a single theatre or cinema, where the library closes at 
7.00 p.m. and where the only cafe is likely to have been 
taken over by drunkards carrying bottles of vodka in their 
pockets.3 The same argument is put forward in a later issue 
by another reader, V. Tairov from Baku.* Commenting upon an 
article by V. Or 1ov, a keen supporter of Zhukhovitskii in the 
discussion who pointed out that many young Muscovites spend
<•
their time drinking and never set foot in a theatre, Tairov 
sarcastically concedes that, indeed, it might be a 'question 
of personality 1 in Moscow; but the point is, however, that in 
the villages even theatre lovers never set foot in a theatre 
for reasons outside their control.
On reflection the two camps are, to some extent, at 
cross-purposes. Zhukhovitskii and Or 1ov do not argue against 
the need to increase the availability of leisure facilities, 
nor do the two above-mentioned readers deny that there is 
also a problem of attitude. As Tairov himself concludes, both 
issues are closely connected.
The real controversy lies in another line of argument 
which, in some articles, misleadingly gets mixed up with the 
debate on 'personality' versus 'facilities'. The major issue 
which genuinely divides the contributors to the debate is the 
question of whether clubs, where activities are 
'collectively' organized from above, should continue to 
exist. Zhukhovitskii does not make a clear distinction
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between sports and cultural activities on the one hand and 
clubs on the other. However, the reactions provoked by his 
article indicate that the distinction is, indeed, a crucial 
one. Kalashnikova deplores the lack of cultural entertainment 
and cafes, but does not even mention clubs.5 Meanwhile Tairov 
complains that the club, which very often is the only leisure 
facility in the village, completely fails to meet the needs 
of the public. Villagers, he argues, have had enough of these 
tedious talks on 'friendship and comradeship 1 which are
c
regularly and perfunctorily delivered solely in order to 
enable the authorities to claim that something has been done. 
Club organizers are badly trained and only succeed in 
alienating their young audiences who in the end prefer to 
hang around in the streets.6
None of the contributors denies that clubs have been 
shunned by young people, yet positions differ as to the best 
ways of addressing the problem. The journalist A. Protopopova 
firmly believes in organizing group activities and sees 
Zhukhovitskii's article as an insult to the thousands of 
well-meaning club organizers all over the country who have 
worked hard to entertain and educate children and teenagers. 
At the same time she recognizes that organizers ought to be 
better trained and made aware of young people's 
expectations. 7 This proposition, however, is vehemently 
rejected by V. Or 1 ov who detects in it a desire to mould 
children into uniform citizens. Or 1ov reiterates 
Zhukhovi tski i ' s argument that society need not set up more
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clubs, but rather educate Man, ensure the 'spiritual growth 1 
of each of its members, in particular, by nurturing what 
makes each individual unique.8 In an article published on 
the same page, the writer B. Anashenkov expresses his 
indignation at the heavy drinking, violence and general 
coarseness which he witnessed at a game of hockey, thus 
implicitly supporting Or 1ov's belief that group activities, 
sports and entertainment cannot make up for an insufficiently 
developed personality. 9
c
The last substantial contribution to the debate is a 
very orthodox article by the writer, M. Zlatogorov. 
Zlatogorov fiercely criticizes Or 1ov for advocating what he 
sees as an individualistic approach to the process of 
personal development. His criticisms are also levelled, 
albeit indirectly, at Protopopova inasmuch as he does not 
blame supposedly incompetent leaders for the popular 
disaffection of collectively organized activities, but the 
young themselves - at least those who show no interest in 
continuing the political 'struggle and serving the people'. 
Zlatogorov unimaginatively argues that the citizens of a 
socialist society can 'spiritually 1 develop only if they 
fulfill their social duty, and this entails the submission of 
the personal to the social. Finally, he urges his compatriots 
to spend their newly acquired free time working for the 
progress of science and technology as well as for the 
ideological struggle. It is regrettable that Zlatogorov's 
mirthless article should close the debate (Tairov's short
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letter was published a couple of months later), yet its angry 
tone can be interpreted as a reflection of the extent of 
popular alienation from the officially promoted patterns of 
social behaviour.10
The issue of leisure activities presents observers with 
the opportunity to reexamine the relationship existing 
between the individual and the collective as defined by the 
official ideology. While it is possible to overrate the 
achievements of a work collective for the simple reason that
c
no one can completely evade it, it is more difficult to 
ignore the mass disaffection with leisure activities or to 
control the way people spend their free time. Regardless of 
their positions as to the worth of officially promoted group 
activities, all contributors agree that they do not enjoy a 
great deal of popularity. Zlatogorov unwittingly provides us 
with the reasons why people stay away from official
t
organizations: they have grown tired of propaganda and can no 
longer stand being told what to do.
By publishing only one article by a hard-core 
ideologist, Literaturnaya yazeta shows its willingness to 
support the thesis that the individual should be encouraged 
to pursue his or her own interests, thus implicitly 
denouncing the ubiquity of the propaganda machine. However, 
the argument presented by Zhukhovitskii and Orlov is greatly 
weakened by their reluctance to tackle the issue of ideology 
openly - unlike their opponent, Zlatogorov. Although their 
emphasis on the need to preserve the uniqueness of each
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individual presupposes a mistrust of state ideology, they 
fail, for instance, to question the quality of cultural 
entertainments. After all, boredom can result as much from an 
inability to develop interests as from the ideological 
uniformity of the cultural entertainments available.
While state ideology is never openly challenged, 
criticisms of the didactic nature of the mass media can be 
found. For instance, the sociologist A. Petrov deplores the 
fact that his compatriots devote less time to reading as a
c
result of the development of the mass media, in particular, 
television. Yet he believes that reading has never before 
been so important in the development of an individual, 
because he sees it as the most direct way of perceiving 
reality. This extract from his article reveals his great 
mistrust of the state-controlled media:
Communication with the screen is 
deprived of this measure of 
individuality which is characteristic of 
the communication with a book... In fact 
the increasingly social nature of our 
life calls for the development of what 
i s uni que in everyone's persona 1i ty. . . 
By taking upon themselves some of the 
1 supra—individua1 ' functions of the 
book, the modern mass media have reduced 
the role of reading, yet, at the same 
time, it has strengthened its influence 
as the most personal of all the existing 
means of perceiving world culture.it
Yu. Levada points out that, according to Grushin's 
findings, some layers of the population already use the mass 
media with circumspection. Muscovites, he reports, watch less 
television than people in other large cities, which shows
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that they are becoming increasingly demanding as to the 
quality of the programmes. On the other hand more and more 
people read newspapers and journals.!2 Just looking at Soviet 
newspaper stands and bookshops, a Western observer may wonder 
why reading should be seen as an occupation less dominated by 
state ideology. Petrov's enthusiasm for reading makes more 
sense if we bear in mind that Soviet citizens have, in fact, 
several ways of finding interesting reading matter. They can 
subscribe to the most sought after Soviet publications, which
<•
are never to be seen in shops, purchase foreign or rare 
Soviet books on the black market or get hold of illegal 
1 i tera ture.
Levada's very positive review of Grushin's book - 
apparently the very first published study of leisure time in 
the Soviet Union - is certainly the least conventional 
contribution to the debate. To begin with, Grushin destroys 
the myth that Soviet people do not know what to do with their 
'free time 1 . The working week might have become shorter, yet 
a great deal of time is wasted on transport, housework and 
shopping. This, combined with the fact that people study in 
order- to improve their qualifications, means that, in fact, 
they need more 'free time', especially women, who, as a rule, 
spend more hours on domestic chores and shopping than men.
Furthermore, Levada and Grushin address the question of 
whether there is a need for uniform 'collectively' organized 
activities in a very radical manner. They favour variety and 
spontaneity. Grushin's research has revealed that, whether
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ideologists like it or not, different groups of people 
actually spend their free time differently and these groups 
fully coincide with neither socio-economic classes nor socio- 
professional categories. Both sociologists wholeheartedly 
welcome these developments as shown in this extract:
It is not so much a question of high or low 
levels of culture, rather of various 
types of culture. (A more specialized 
term to designate such phenomena is 
'subculture 1 : we speak of youth, urban, 
rural etc. . . subcultures within the 
framework of the same society and same 
culture/) It is wrong to see this 
diversity as a 'retreat' from some 
abstract ideal of a general cultural 
1 eve 1 1i ng ( 'uravnitel 'nosti ' ). It wou 1 d 
be even more absurd to demand that this 
diversity should be e1iminated.l3
In 1968 this was a remarkably unconventional line of 
argument to be publicized in an organ of the non-specialist 
press. Not only does Grushin brush aside the cumbersome 
tripartite vision of society traditionally promoted by 
official ideologists, he also openly welcomes the emergence 
of spontaneous social trends that, in the end, constitute a 
threat to the authoritarian centralism of the Soviet system.
Although the general public was still unfamiliar with 
the sociological concept of subculture, references to 
'informal 1 behaviour and groupings frequently crop up in the 
dozen or so articles that focus on youth (approximately 
25,000 words). Yet these phenomena are never discussed in 
positive terms.
A number of contributions, including many readers' 
letters both published and unpublished, vehemently denounce
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the non-conformity of the increasingly restless Soviet youth. 
Young people are criticized with equal vigourfor having the 
audacity to kiss in underground stations 'as people do in 
Paris', beating up defenceless senior citizens or enjoying 
the depraved Western sounds of jazz and rock music. No 
attempt is made to distinguish between delinquent behaviour 
and positive manifestations of a nascent youth culture. It is 
usually suggested that punitive measures be introduced to 
abate the allegedly high incidence of hooliganism, - a
*
conveniently vague and dangerously emotional term that, in 
the mind of these authors, encompasses a wide range of new 
attitudes that are developing amongst the young outside the 
framework of official organizations and beyond their 
control.i*
Such narrow-mindedness that stems from a glorified and 
self-righteous perception of the older generations' 
achievements, can be witnessed in any society. These pieces 
would be of little interest if Literaturnaya gazeta did not 
also expose their authors' priggishness and inability to face 
some of the evils affecting Soviet society, in particular the 
ubiquitous hypocrisy that feeds both the much debated 
cynicism of the young and the puritanical conservatism of 
some of their elders.
The writers who come to the rescue of Soviet youth turn 
the criticism back against the older generation, i.e. their 
own. The author G- Medynskii doubts whether it is fair to 
blame the young for their lack of enthusiasm, unambiguously
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hinting at past and present hardships. 'Is it really the 
case 1 , Medynskii rhetorically asks, 'that our life has been 
so perfect and that there was and is nothing in it that at 
times can undermine the spirit of dream and romanticism in 
which we ourselves grew up?'15 The playwright V. Rozov takes 
Medynskii's point one step further, aggressive1y arguing that 
the older generation's resentment towards their rebellious or 
distant children reflects their dissatisfaction with their 
own lives.16 TO those who attack the young for their lack of
<•
commitment at work, the jurist G. Min'kovskii retorts that 
they would be best advised to level their criticisms at the 
education system, which is geared towards higher education, 
thus leaving thousands of youngsters without adequate 
training for industry, - an issue that will be more scholarly 
discussed a few months later by the social scientist 
Perevedentsev. 1 7 All three authors agree that the 
'alienation 1 of the young - the word is actually used by 
Rozov ( ' o t chuzhdennos t ' ) - has been brought about by their 
elders' double standards, corruption and meaningless 
consumer i sm.l 8
However sympathetic towards the younger generation these 
authors may be, they nevertheless fail to acknowledge the 
positive function of a youth culture developing independently 
of any previously set pattern. Medynskii reaffirms his faith 
in Soviet youth's willingness and ability to carry on the 
good fight. Less optimistic, Rozov confesses to being 
confounded by the young's apparent lack of interest in
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conducting an ideological dialogue with their elders, whom 
they prefer to ignore.
The existence of informal youth groups (neforma1'nye 
Kruppy) is openly discussed in an article by a high-ranking 
academic from Leningrad, the sociologist A. Kharchev. His 
argument unwittingly highlights the ambiguous position of 
liberal-minded authors who understand why the young should be 
critical of their society, yet cannot accept their increasing 
reluctance to endorse their elders' thwarted dreams.
c
Kharchev, too, blames teachers and parents' double standards, 
the discrepancy between their private thoughts and their 
public statements, as well as society's general tendency to 
oppose natural changes in behaviour, tastes and aspirations, 
thus only succeeding in producing mysterious and 
uncontrollable clandestine groups:
Sociology and social psychology still 
know very little about the structure of 
these groups and about the way they 
influence their members. However the 
mere fact that these groups often figure 
in police records does not give cause 
for optimism. It is precisely in these 
youth groups that a youth subculture 
takes shape, - a subculture which at 
times contributes to the formation of a 
psychology alien to us and against 
which, therefore, one must seriously 
fight.19
It is clear from this extract that Kharchev perceives 
the burgeoning informal youth culture as a threat to 
socialist ideology as he understands it. Quite logically, he 
proposes a course of action, which will be suggested again 
nearly two decades later as informal groups were beginning to
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mushroom under Gorbachev, i.e. to acknowledge the existence 
of these groups in order to be able to contain their 
influence and set up officially vetted clubs that recreate 
the 'psychology of informal groups' while remaining within 
acceptable ideological boundaries.20
A few more articles in 1971 referred to long-haired 
youngsters clad in denim playing Western pop music or 
following exotic religions. Some observers advocate 
repressive measures ('The Army will teach them').21 Others
c
show a willingness to work towards some kind of rapprochement 
like, for example, the jurist A. Yakovlev who thinks that 
educators should be trained in such a way that they will 
not antagonize youngsters and will succeed in being accepted 
by them as 'informal leaders' ('neforma1'nye lidery'). Once 
at the heart of informal youth culture, educators will be 
able to 'propagandize socialist ethics, morality and law' . A 
good Stalinist trick to contain youth culture: socialist in 
its content, informal in its form!22
This short debate on youth brings Levada and Grushin's 
radicalism to the fore. By supporting the spontaneous 
emergence of various subcultures, they challenge timorous 
liberals as well as official ideologists who have always 
advocated policies aimed at controlling Soviet citizens 
whether at work or during their 'free time 1 . Their approach 
also greatly differs from that of Zhukhovi tsk i i and Or 1 ov 
inasmuch as they do not set out to educate Soviet people. 
They do not worry about the 'harmonious development of their
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personalities', nor do they speak of the 'need to educate 
Man 1 . One cannot help thinking that Or 1ov's and 
Zhukhovitskii's idea of well spent leisure time is to sit in 
a theatre or read the Russian classics. Unlike them, Levada 
and Grushin do not patronize their compatriots' tastes. They 
welcome the diversity of their choices and are gratified to 
see that they are capable of escaping official tutelage in 
this area of life.
2. The Emergence of Informal Gatherings
The sociologist A. Kharchev openly discusses the 
existence of 'informal youth groups', yet candidly recognizes 
his profession's ignorance on the subject. In his review of 
Grushin's book Levada explicitly comments upon the fact that 
Soviet people have devised ways of spending their 'free time 1 
independently of any official organization or supervision. 
However, it is not specified what exactly these leisure 
activities are. Some very valuable information, in this 
respect, can be found in a couple of articles which very 
openly and favourably discuss the existence of what has now 
become known as 'informal gatherings'.
It has already been mentioned that a frequent topic of 
discussion in Literaturnaya gazeta is the lack of 
communication between people. Official clubs do not encourage 
genuine exchanges of views and, as Evg. Bogat sadly points 
out, people do not visit each other anymore. Bogat quotes the 
French writer Georges Perec who in his famous novel, Les
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Choses, describes how capitalism has reduced the French to 
the state of mere consumers, incapable of having any 
meaningful relationships with one another. He then remarks 
that similar 'negative tendencies' can be observed in the 
Soviet Union in spite of the socialist nature of its system, 
and finally urges his compatriots to re-learn the art of 
conversat ion.2 3
Bogat's article is rather shallow inasmuch as he does 
not even make an attempt at analysing the reasons for this
c
sorry state of affairs. This is an indication of the limits 
of openness at the time: one just did not speak of the fear 
and suspicion aroused by a climate of political repression, 
nor was it deemed wise to dwe11 upon the shortage of consumer 
goods and the obsessive behaviour it can provoke. 
Nevertheless, Bogat was pointing to a real problem to which 
Soviet citizens were already trying to find some concrete 
solutions, judging by the two articles which will be examined 
here .
The issue had already been given some attention 
approximately a year earlier in a very unusual article by I. 
Prus whose approach was infinitely more challenging than that 
of Bogat.24 Rather than dwelling upon the unsociabi1ity of 
her compatriots, Prus focuses on the reawakening of the 
Soviet population and its efforts to re-establish new 
channels of communication.
Firstly, in this article revealingly entitled 'Thirst 
for Social Intercourse 1 , Prus explains why clubs have
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declined in popularity since the twenties, a period which 
Gorbachev!tes liked to refer to as well. Nowadays, she 
argues, clubs only generate boredom because they are aimed at 
that mythical figure 'the average citizen' - an argument 
often used by journalists and propagandists worried by the 
disaffection of their readership.25 People have different 
interests, she continues, and want to discuss what they are 
concerned about rather than what the club organizer sees fit 
to put on the agenda. This is why - and here is the most
c
interesting part of the article - alternative clubs have 
sprung up . These usually have a small membership of fifteen 
to twenty, who tend to be members of the scientific and 
technical intelligentsia, eager to discuss political events 
and economic issues together. This is how she describes these 
c1ubs:
The club does not try to attract a mass 
audience. It is difficult to talk and 
debate in the presence of a large crowd. 
And debating is precisely what the club 
is about. It invites interesting people, 
specialists. And a long discussion 
begins. It is not an evening of 
questions and answers. It is a 
discussion between people who have come 
prepared, who have their own views and 
know how to defend them. I want to 
emphasize this point: on the whole they 
all are equally prepared. They are not 
students and teachers, just thinking 
peop1e. 2 6
Prus does not specify the status of these clubs. The 
mere fact that she discusses their existence in Li teraturnaya 
gazeta indicates that, obviously, they are not illegal. In 
fact she mentions briefly that they often are attached to the
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district committee of the komsomo1 (Young Communist League). 
On the other hand she insists that the members organize 
themselves and do not need any plan or instructions from 
above.
Finally, Prus confidently argues that this phenomenon 
will keep developing until it becomes a normal part of Soviet 
people's social life. Reading her article more than twenty 
years after its publication, at a time when informal 
organizations have mushroomed under Gorbachev, one can only
c
be impressed by the perspicacity of her judgements:
With time these voluntary societies will 
probably become an integral part of our 
lives... Perhaps they will be societies 
with their own elected 'governments', 
and local sections; with their own funds 
made of membership fees; with their own 
statutes. But that already belongs to 
the realm of fantasy.27
Another article on the same theme appeared approximately 
a year later in the summer of 1968. The piece is actually an 
unusually long letter (1,800 words) from a reader, V. 
Rapoport, an engineer at a tractor factory in Pavlodar.28
Many of Rapoport's arguments are similar to those put 
forward by Prus. The general tone of the piece, however, is 
angrier, and perhaps more importantly, Rapoport does not 
present the emergence of 'informal gatherings' as a 
phenomenon characteristic of the scientific and technical 
intelligentsia only. Many young workers, he argues, have to 
do very simple manual jobs, yet they often are more educated 
and demanding than the older generation, and therefore cannot
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be satisfied with the activities organized by the factory 
clubs. As Prus previously did, Rapoport deems the activities 
devised by official clubs - lectures, readings etc... 
totally inadequate because they are based on the assumption 
that people do not mind taking on a passive role as mere 
listeners. This approach, he surmises, was justifiable at a 
time when workers were poorly educated and needed to be 
taught, but one—way communication from top to bottom is no 
longer acceptable. Here is his appreciation of his
«•
compatriots' mood:
More and more people wish they could not 
only take, but also give in the 
'cultural exchange'. At the least - this 
means an active, deeply critical use of 
cultural values, a craving to test them 
out with 'one's equals' ( ' sebe 
podobnye' ) , wh ich necessitates an 
exchange of views. At the most - it 
means an aspiration to self-expression 
in politics, culture, science, 
technology through one's own creative 
work.29
Sickened by the patronizing attitude of official club 
organizers, Soviet people have begun to meet on their own 
terms in the privacy of their homes. Rapoport openly 
discusses the emergence of these completely unsupervised 
gatherings. He very specifically refers to what he calls a 
'family club 1 that actually exists in his town. A group of 
ten to fifteen friends, he reports, meet every Wednesday in 
one of the members' flat. A whole series of topical issues 
are discussed ranging from poetry to sociology, from genetics 
to economic reforms. Unlike Prus, Rapoport is filled with
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scorn for the socio-political clubs attached to the district 
committee of the komsomo 1 . It might be the case that the 
degree of formal supervision of these clubs varies from one 
authority to the other. In Pavlodar, judging by Rapoport's 
account, the approach has remained the conventional one. 
Speakers are invited to give lectures on the understanding 
that the audience is there only to listen. Here is Rapoport's 
harsh comment:
This is not a club. It has to be clearly 
realized that only an organization where 
horizontal communication prevails, 
deserves to be called a 'club'; an 
organization where everyone has the 
opportunity to express their opinion and 
show their talents so that there can be 
an intensive discussion, a contest where 
not only the external, but also the 
internal qualities of everyone can 
become visible. Only then is it possible 
to find 'one's equals' ('sebe 
podobnye' ). 3 °
Rapoport highly values the function of these informal 
clubs inasmuch as they very positively influence the social 
life of the whole community in spite of their small 
membership. Ideas which have taken shape in the course of 
debates organized by the club are taken up and further 
discussed within the social circle of each member, with the 
result that they eventually spread all over town. Rapoport 
also suggests that this craving for a genuine exchange of 
views on socio-economic, political and cultural issues can be 
observed among various social and age groups all over the 
country. His perception of Soviet society strongly contrasts 
with, for example, I 1 ' ina's portrayal of a hopelessly
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lethargic community. This extract from Rapoport's article 
clearly shows his faith in his compatriots' ability to take 
ini t i at ives:
Serious social problems usually do not 
wait until clever people declare they 
exist and suggest ways of solving them 
in the pages of Literaturnaya gazeta. 
Practically as soon as a problem arises, 
a spontaneous search for its solution 
begins. The problem of social 
intercourse outside work is no 
exception. These last few years all 
kinds of youth cafe-clubs, literary 
clubs and associations, people's 
theatres etc... have emerged (and 
collapsed) with a growing intensity.31
Rapoport's lengthy letter is followed by a brief comment 
from the paper's editorial board. It is pointed out that 
Literaturnaya gazeta does not often receive such letters and 
that the crucial issue tackled by this reader ought to be 
seriously discussed even though it cannot be resolved 
overnight with a few concrete measures. It seems that the 
board felt the need to emphasize the importance of Rapoport's 
contribution as well as hint at its dangerously controversial 
nature. Unfortunately, Literaturnaya gazeta obviously decided 
to opt for caution as later on it practical ly dropped this 
thorny issue which begs so many questions about the lack of 
democratic debate. No systematic discussion or round tables 
were organized on the subject. If Rapoport's and Prus's 
articles generated any feedback, readers were not informed of 
it. Rapoport's letter was published nearly a year after 
Prus ' s article and is the last major contribution to the 
debate. Only a couple of references to it are to be found in
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1971. The sociologist M. Timashevskaya reports that a survey 
carried out at the famous Siberian think-tank, Akademgorodok, 
has revealed that educated people mostly socialize with 
friends or colleagues with whom they share common interests. 
We are, therefore, to understand that they shun 
'collectively 1 organized meetings at work or where they 
live.32 Six months later, a certain E. Do 1ov cagily 
questions the value of the ' co 1 1 ectivist' approach to 
socializing in a short article (600 words) from which this
<
extract has been taken:
Do not get me wrong. I do not want to 
belittle the significance of the well- 
known forms of social intercourse which 
have traditionally developed in our 
society, such as work collectives, 
social evenings in clubs, mass outdoor 
parties in parks. All this is right, 
necessary and sensible. But its seems 
that we also need other forms of social 
intercourse, more intimate ones 
(kamernye) if you want.33
Do 1ov's subdued treatment of the issue compares rather 
badly with Prus's and Rapoport's radical approach. It is 
nevertheless to the paper's credit that it should have 
published and supported two outspoken contributions which 
quite openly describe and welcome the reawakening of Soviet 
civil society outside the framework offered by the 
authori t i es.
Although very informative, Prus's and Rapoport's 
articles obviously leave many questions unanswered: when did 
Soviet people begin to organize informal gatherings? How 
widespread was this phenomenon at the end of the sixties? If
-184-
it was an outcome of the Khrushchev Thaw, could it become a 
permanent feature of Soviet society during the less liberal 
seventies? Accounts by Soviet emigres and Western visitors to 
the Soviet Union do, in fact, confirm that informal groups 
have become an important part of Soviet social life since the 
late fifties, especially in the larger cities.34 But the 
mere fact that Literaturnaya gazeta decided to publicize the 
issue gives us grounds for believing that the change in the 
political mood of the country had become sufficiently
c
profound to qualify as a social phenomenon to be reckoned 
wi th .
The decision made by Literaturnaya gazeta to publish 
these two pieces can be interpreted as an attempt to 
encourage a public, semi-official acknowledgement of a civil 
society which was quietly, yet determinedly developing 
halfway between the dissident world and the socio-political 
establishment; a kind of 'shadow civil society' which like 
the 'shadow economy' can coexist with the official system 
because it satisfies needs wh ich the official system is 
unab1e to meet.
Literaturnaya gazeta's 'liberalism 1 is reflected in its 
effort to bridge a gap between the spontaneous informal 
social life of the country and the official world to which it 
itself belongs. However, in the sixties and seventies, the 
official world had not changed enough to make the paper feel 
that it could publicize the discussions taking place in these 
informal gatherings with impunity.
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3. A Plea for Diversity and Freedom of Choice
The majority of the articles on leisure activities and 
informal gatherings call, to various degrees, for a greater 
respect for the individual's needs, talents and original 
contribution to the development of society. All individuals 
are different and, therefore, the recipes for living and 
blanket solutions offered by official organizations are felt 
to be, at best insufficient, at worst totally inadequate.
c
The children of the October Revolution, Soviet citizens have 
now reached adulthood and deem themselves quite capable of 
making up their own minds. Most of the above-mentioned 
articles are marked by a strong desire for diversity and 
freedom of choice.
These two fundamental principles are directly discussed 
and advocated by the sociologist V. Shlyapentokh - who has 
since emigrated to the West - in three articles, evocatively 
entitled 'Everyone Makes Their Own Decisions', 'On the 
Advantages of Diversity 1 and 'Forecast for Oneself'.35 
Unlike the previously mentioned authors, Shlyapentokh does 
not concern himself with one area of life only. His thesis, 
which is candidly and assertively put forward, constitutes a 
kind of blueprint for a new, modern Soviet society.
Shlyapentokh argues that it is in human nature to want 
diversity and freedom of choice, and the inability to satisfy 
this natural longing inevitably leads to anti-social 
behaviour and chaos. The basic needs of the Soviet people
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have now been met and their new, more sophisticated 
aspirations require both a diversification of the economy and 
a more flexible approach to economic planning.
Shlyapentokh's argument is based on the belief that 
people cannot be forced to do what they do not wish to do. 
Faced with authoritarian policies, people can always remove 
their support and cooperation. Why, for instance, should they 
be gratified to get higher wages when there is so little to 
buy in shops? The lack of diversity in consumer goods can
<
only undermine the efficiency of material incentives. 
Individuals can also make certain choices which the 
authorities cannot stop them from making. For example, 
thousands of Soviet people have decided to leave the 
countryside or to migrate to more prosperous parts of the 
country, thus creating immense economic problems for the 
government. On the other hand, it can be the case that 
decisions made by individuals make more sense that those 
which stem from central planning. Economists, like 
Perevedentsev, have frequently pointed to some positive 
aspects of unplanned migration and turnover in industry. 
After all, a dissatisfied workforce is unlikely to help in 
increasing productivity.
Shlyapentokh does not call for the end of the plan. His 
point is that economic planners who obstinately persist in 
disregarding the aspirations of individuals ironically help 
to create economic chaos. The social and economic life of the 
country could be managed infinitely more efficiently if the
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plan took into account processes which cannot be fully 
controlled. Shlyapentokh advocates a 'realistic plan', a plan 
which will retain its 'leading role' provided that it 
includes economic forecasts based on seriously undertaken 
sociological studies of spontaneous social phenomena. In the 
end, ignoring the will of the people is counterproductive.
Furthermore, when decision-makers actually know what 
individuals aspire to they find themselves in a better 
position to influence their choices. Shlyapentokh illustrates
c
his theory taking the example of birth control:
Viewpoints can differ as to the changes 
which have occurred in the birthrates 
over the past ten years, but whatever 
one's opinion one cannot deny that in 
this area, too, free choice for the 
individual is a good thing. It may be, 
indeed, necessary to take measures to 
encourage people to have more children. 
However, these measures can have an 
effect only if they can influence 
decisions which are taken by the couple 
with complete freedom. 36
Shlyapentokh does not speculate on the measures which
•
could influence people's choices in this domain. It is clear, 
however, that this is how his approach should be understood. 
If, for instance, research has revealed that women have only 
one child because of cramped accommodation or inadequate 
childcare facilities, measures aimed at improving living 
conditions and the quality of creches and kindergartens are 
likely to produce an increase in the birthrate.
Shlyapentokh's second main point is that true freedom of 
choice implies full access to information. At present, he
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argues, Soviet people are often in no position to make the 
best decisions because of the dearth of information in all 
areas of life, whether it is about deciding where to work and 
study, arranging an exchange of flats or simply buying 
consumer goods. In his article, 'Forecast for Oneself', 
Shlyapentokh calls for the setting up of special services 
which people would consult before they take important 
decisions. Society is changing at such a rapid pace that 
everyone needs fresh information in order to make plans for
c
the future and take decisions which will have a long term 
impact on their lives.
Literaturnaya gazeta published another article in the 
sociology section which focuses on the same issue, yet from a 
slightly different angle.37 its author. A. Mendeleev 
outspokenly discusses the disastrous effects of rumours which 
regularly spread in Soviet society as a result of 
insufficient or non-existent information. He openly blames 
the Soviet media for withholding information or even 
misinforming the public. When kept in the dark, people are 
seized with groundless fears or entertain unreasonable hopes. 
For example, as hardly any information had been given about 
the recent earthquake in Crimea, many people were alarmed out 
of all proportion by a rash comment made in a newspaper 
article, according to which Crimea might be submerged some 
time during the course of our geological era. Or, as the 
local paper did not make any comment on the new flats which 
are being built in the town, all sorts of wild rumours have
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spread as to who the beneficiaries of the housing project 
will be. Mendeleev clearly defines what information should 
be:
Firstly, objective information is 
essential. Secondly, it must be precise 
and transmitted in such a way that it 
can be assimilated as precisely as 
possible. Thirdly, it must be complete. 
And finally, information must be timely. 
Otherwise it can be forestalled by 
rumours, which always distort reality.38
Anxious to emphasize how damaging it is to mislead 
public opinion, Me'ndeleev does not hesitate to point out that 
Western propaganda intentionally spreads rumours in the USSR 
precisely because it has been recognized as one of the most 
efficient weapons in psychological warfare. (An interesting 
comparison which can lead to rather unorthodox theories as to 
the real intentions of the leadership.) Finally, Mendeleev 
unabashedly advises his compatriots to read the abundant 
literature which American sovietologists have written on the 
subj ec t.
Both authors seem to suggest that the leadership should 
be warned against misjudging the effects of denying Soviet 
citizens their right to full information. As Shlyapentokh 
puts it in one of his articles, 'in our century information 
is a powerful force which can be rather vindictive towards 
those who do not pay it the attention it deserves'.39
4. Cone 1usion
The articles which have been here examined greatly
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differ from those discussed in chapter 3 inasmuch as they 
draw a much more optimistic picture of Soviet society. The 
authors of these articles do not portray their compatriots as 
submissive and helpless citizens, hopelessly dominated by 
insensitive bureaucratic institutions. On the contrary, they 
are capable of evading authoritarian policies or practices, 
whether they make long-term decisions which run counter to 
the wishes of central planners or determinedly snub 
'collective 1 activities organized from above.
c
Furthermore, many of these authors do not only 
negatively criticize their society, but also put forward new, 
thought-provoking, often subversive ideas, which can be 
briefly summarized in this way:
Firstly, the idea of pluralism, which takes the 
criticism of collectivism examined in the second chapter one 
step further. The word 'pluralism' was not used at the time, 
yet the concept is a the centre of several arguments. 
Grushin, for example, opposes the advocacy of 'cultural 
levelling' and enthusiastically embraces the idea of 
'subcultures 1 . ShlyapentokK argues that only access to 
information, freedom of choice and diversity can help to 
bring some order into the presently chaotic socio-economic 
life of the country. Although he does not apply his ideas to 
the political sphere, it is clear that his thesis contains 
the germ of the idea of 'political pluralism'. Rapoport is 
the one who touches upon this issue in the most outspoken
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manner when he refers to his compatriots' growing 'aspiration 
to self-expression in polities'.
Secondly, there is an unanimous recognition of the 
population's disaffection from officially organized 
activities. There are two explicit accounts of its attempts 
to find alternatives. Most contributors welcome this 
development as official clubs do not encourage genuine 
debates or fulfil any popular expectations. The emerging 
informal youth culture obviously remains a puzzle for even
c
the liberal section of the older generation, yet on the whole 
the appearance of informal gatherings is seen as evidence of 
Soviet citizens' ability to take initiatives and think for 
themse1ves.
Most authors seem to urge the leadership, though 
indirectly, to recognize 'spontaneous social phenomena' and 
to reckon with them. Shlyapentokh calls for a 'realistic 
plan' which will take into account social phenomena which 
cannot be fully controlled. Grushin stresses the need to 
acknowledge subcultures.
This debate is a good example of how some radical ideas 
could be expressed at the time in a state-controlled 
newspaper. Firstly, it is noticeable that the most original 
ideas are often to be found in articles which are not part of 
a long debate or a round table. For instance, the discussion 
on leisure time which contains interesting, albeit moderate, 
arguments, dragged on for six months while Sh1yapentokh's 
articles and the two pieces on informal gatherings were not
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discussed further. Secondly, and more importantly, although 
harsh criticisms are levelled at Party policies and ideology, 
political responsibilities are never clearly established. 
Nowhere is there any criticism of the Party, although, for 
instance, it is well-known that 'collective 1 activities, as a 
rule, are organized or supervised by Party workers.
Finally, the element of continuity in the shaping of 
ideas between the late sixties and the mid-eighties is 
striking. Prus's and Rapoport's articles suggest that the
c
explosion of informal organizations following Gorbachev's 
accession to power was the outcome of a slow process of civic 
reawakening which might have begun under Khrushchev, yet 
somehow maintained itself throughout the seventies. Some of 
the radical ideas which were timidly advanced in the early 
seventies in certain official publications, such as 
Literaturnaya gazeta, were taken on board by Gorbachev and 
his advisers. At the same time it is interesting to see 
that some of the views which were completely taboo in the 
official press of the seventies remained difficult to defend 
under Gorbachev's perestroika. For example, while in the mid- 
eighties pluralism was officially promoted in civic society 
and within the ranks of the Party, the communist leadership 
jealously guarded its political monopoly until it was finally 
forced to give it up.
It is, nevertheless, clear that the substantial debate 
which took place in Literaturnaya gazeta, on the many aspects 
of the relationship between the collective and the
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individual, reflected and encouraged important changes in 
Soviet public opinion in the seventies, at least amongst the 
liberal middle-classes. It helped to make indefensible the 
old theory of collectivism which so conveniently justified 
the supremacy of the collective over the individual, as well 
as some authoritarian political practices which ensue from 
it.
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PART THREE
GROWTH OF CONSUMER AWARENESS
Over the years 67-71 Literaturnaya gazeta published an 
impressive number of articles which focus on the shortage of
<•
consumer goods and adequate services as well as housing 
problems both in towns and rural areas. (Approximately 
300,000 words) The majority of these articles appeared under 
the all-purpose headline 'Various Themes', others in the 
pages devoted to economic issues or in special sections on 
architecture and 'byt' ('everyday life'). They take up more 
than twice the space allocated to articles which deal with 
social relations.!
The purpose of the present study is not so much to 
identify the nature and extent of the practical problems 
which Soviet people have had to face in their everyday lives. 
Rather we shall examine the ways in which the issues have 
been tackled by the various contributors, with the view of 
assessing to what extent the debate reflects certain shifts 
in values and expectations.
For decades the Soviet population had been expected to 
show patience and understanding with regard to the slow 
improvement of its living conditions. The term "materialism 1 ,
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which designates a lofty concept only when it has the good 
fortune to be 'historical' or 'dialectic', had been otherwise 
constantly reviled and used to describe either what was seen 
as a negative tendency in the Soviet Union or the 
exploitative and utilitarian ethos of the contemptible West, 
in particular America. As pointed out by O'Dell in her study 
of Soviet children's literature, 'non-acquisitiveness' has 
traditionally been one of the virtues promoted by communist 
morality.2 The principle, which originally stemmed from the
c
socialist belief in the possibility of achieving equality 
between members of a community, had been conveniently used by 
Soviet ideologists as a moral justification for Stalin's 
economic choices. The emphasis on heavy industry and a 
reckless pace of industrialization at the expense of a steady 
increase in standards of living was accompanied by the 
advocacy of the subordination of personal gratification to 
what was presented as collective welfare.
However, the notion of collective welfare did not 
necessarily rule out concerns about the material welfare of 
individuals. In their study of the Soviet system Bauer and 
his colleagues argued that even under Stalin the regime was 
not altogether 'indifferent' to the welfare of the 
population, as a certain degree of popular support had to be 
secured in order to achieve rapid industria 1ization.3 Indeed, 
human resources played a crucial role in the pursuit of 
Stalin's economic and military goals. The extraordinarily 
rapid pace of capital accumulations required an extremely low
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level of consumption amongst the vast majority of the 
population. Individuals were mostly coerced, but also cajoled 
into making sacrifices.
The above-mentioned authors also pointed out that the 
leadership's economic and military programmes 'come first as 
long as the morale of the people does not become so low as to 
threaten these programmes'.* It seems that after Stalin's 
death the leadership began to recognize that Soviet citizens' 
endurance could not be tried any further and acknowledged the
<•
need to redress the balance between coercion and rewards. 
Malenkov's call for greater expenditure on consumer goods 
testified to this new realization. While in the thirties and 
forties it was argued that collective welfare meant, first of 
all, the development of a solid economic basis which would 
eventually lead to an improvement of living conditions, the 
notion was redefined by Stalin's successors, who could not do 
otherwise than acknowledge the limited human capacity for 
self-sacrifice.
However, Malenkov's policies designed to increase the 
output of consumer goods failed and his successors did not 
introduce any drastic economic reforms that could have 
resulted in a high rise in consumption 1 eve 1 s. 5 Even under 
Brezhnev, the leadership's awareness of the population's 
dissatisfaction with low standards of living did not result 
in the promotion of a radically new conception of social ism.6
In his book, Socialist Culture and Man, A.I. Arnoldov 
points out that one of the most important conclusions drawn
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by the XXV Congress of the CPSU was 'the growth of the "human 
factor" in society's affairs'. He then quotes two extracts 
from official documents which make it perfectly clear that 
the idea of the 'human factor' must not undermine the 
traditional communist virtues, such as discipline and love of 
work :
Socialism is a society of real humanism. 
Its chief value is the working man. 
Everything for the benefit of man, for 
the sake of man - this is the basic 
meaning of the new socialist way of 
1 ife.? c
Comrades, we are not building a land of 
idlers where rivers flow with milk and 
honey, but the most organized and 
industrious society in human history. 
And the people living in that society 
will be highly industrious, organized 
and politically conscious. 8
The new emphasis on the need to improve the population's 
well-being was not to imply either the abandonment of more 
'noble goals' or radical changes in economic priorities. The 
leadership's newly professed commitment to improve the 
population's material welfare was not to be seen as a 
concession to the inevitably divisive materialistic ethos. 
The Soviets were to remain a nation of producers and social 
activists fighting for the common cause.
The great number of articles on the lack of material 
comfort seems to indicate that in reality the need for a 
better standard of living figured high in the list of Soviet 
people's priorities. Were the participants in the debate 
simply showing a legitimate concern for the slow, yet steady,
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improvement of the situation? Or were such contributions to 
be interpreted as a reflection of 'negative materialistic 
tendencies'? What is materialism? The question is actually 
directly addressed in a series of articles (approximately 
38,000 words) which show that the officially sponsored 
contemptuous attitude toward what had been for years labelled 
'negative materialistic tendencies' was already at the time 
being regarded with increasing suspicion.
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VI. THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF MATERIALISM
The debate on materialism was triggered off by the 
account of a round table presided over by Evg. Bogat and Yu. 
Timofeev, which involved the participation of a number of 
writers, sociologists and philosophers on the subject of 
'Youth - Ethics - 30th Century'.l Accounts of round tables 
tend to lack concision, as the vagueness of the themes 
encourages participants to launch themselves on their pet
c
subjects with little regard for the concerns expressed by 
their colleagues. This account is no exception, yet two main 
points frequently recur in one form or another. Firstly, 
Soviet young people suffer from boredom and 'veshchi zm' (from 
the Russian word 'veshch'' meaning 'thing'), i.e. a 
compulsive desire to acquire consumer goods. Secondly, this 
behaviour stems from the older generation's failure to instil 
respect for human values, such as honesty, truth, kindness 
and justice, in their children. Sickened by the discrepancy 
between words and deeds, between what they read in books or 
hear from the media and what they see adults do, young people 
take refuge in crude and immoderate materialism. This 
discussion later develops into two main debates. The first 
pits those who champion 'disinterestedness 1 (beskoryst ie) 
against those who argue for a positive type of materialism 
('ratsiona1izm'). The second debate considers the pros and 
cons of consumerism. First of all, however, we shall look at 
the very few articles on bribery and theft of state property,
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which explicitly illustrate the discrepancy between words and
deeds mentioned in the introductory debate and give an
insight into one aspect of the discussion on materialism.
1. Widespread Corruption; The Dark Side of Materialism
Bribery and theft of state property did not receive a
great deal of attention in the pages of Literaturnaya gazeta
over the years 1967-71. A number of isolated cases are
discussed in the pages devoted to legal matters and court
c
cases. Very few articles, however, tackle these issues in 
broader terms. The three pieces on bribery to be examined 
here were published under the headline 'Various Themes', the 
article on theft property in the section 'The Individual, The 
Collective and Society'. They are not directly connected with 
the debate on materialism, yet unintentionally emphasize the 
highly materialistic nature of everyday Soviet life.
In her article on theft of state property, V. Eliseeva 
briefly reports back on a round table organized by 
Literaturnaya gazeta which involved lawyers and officials 
from the Ministry for the Protection of Social Order.2 While 
agreeing that the economic loss, which is already known to be 
great, needs to be precisely calculated - there are no 
national figures yet - she is herself more concerned with the 
'immeasurable' moral damage resulting from such practices. As 
theft of state property is tolerated by the general public, 
as well as by managers and judges, double moral standards 
have emerged, which have disastrous effects on the moral
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upbringing of the young. Take, for instance, this twelve- 
year-old girl who accuses her mother of hypocrisy as she 
teaches her to be honest while she herself does not mind 
feeding her family with stolen meat. And what about this 
teenager who cannot understand why her parents are so 
horrified by her stealing from a woman's handbag? After all, 
her mother regularly brings back food from the sto1ovaya 
(cheap restaurant) where she is employed and her father, a 
T.V. repair man, moonlights using material from work.
<•
Eliseeva's tone is not particularly self-righteous. She 
is anxious to present the twelve-year-old girl's mother as a 
good, hard—working academic and parent, who, regrettably, saw 
the arrangement about the meat as merely practical and failed 
to realize her daughter's confusion. Nor does Eliseeva 
advocate more repressive measures and harsher sentences. 
Rather she calls for better management of enterprises and, 
above all, an open discussion which would increase public 
awareness of the perverse effect of these practices on the 
socia1 c1imate.
The three articles on bribery also condemn the high 
level of complacency amongst the population. In the same way 
as theft of state property is often not perceived as 'real 
theft', what should be plainly called 'bribery 1 is still 
considered by many as a respectable way of thanking someone 
for a favour. The writer B. Rymar' sees in this attitude a 
modern version of the old Russian custom of 'podnoshenie' by 
which expensive presents were given to those whose help or
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protection was sought after.3 Besides, the bribe does not 
always take the form of money. In a short humorous piece, A. 
Sukontsev turns his attention to the sad fate of officials, 
supervisors and inspectors of all kinds who cannot do other 
than agree to be lavishly fed and entertained before they are 
allowed to get on with their inspections. The fact that they 
have accepted the hospitality of their hosts makes it all the 
more difficult to refuse them the favour they inevitably ask. 
It is a well rehearsed scenario, which some enjoy and others
<•
resent as it makes a mockery of their work. Sukontsev relates 
the case of a dedicated and determined official who, in order 
to evade any pressure, systematically presents a medical note 
falsely certifying that he suffers from a stomach ulcer, to 
those whose work he has come to inspect.*
All the contributors unambiguously describe corruption 
as a widespread phenomenon that can be observed amongst 
people from all walks of life. In some enterprises workers 
regularly grease the manager's palm to secure themselves 
substantial bonuses. Members of the public in need of some 
document resignedly help officials to supplement their 
incomes. Articles on corruption are few and far between, yet 
their authors cannot be accused of minimizing the extent of 
the problem. Not only do they vehemently voice their 
indignation at the high degree of corruption, but also, like 
Yurii Trifonov's characters, they seem weary of having to 
live in so insalubrious a social climate.
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However, the import of their criticism is considerably 
weakened by their failure to analyse the causes of 
corruption. Eliseeva does argue briefly that if enterprises 
were better managed, opportunities for theft of state 
property would be greatly reduced. Yet her approach remains 
predominantly moralistic, even though she appears more 
willing than Rymar', for example, to make allowances for the 
hardships of everyday life.
None of the contributors recognizes that people need to
c
resort to corrupt practices in order to obtain goods and 
services that they need. Studies have shown, Eliseeva is 
anxious to point out, that bad management rather than 'need' 
(nuzhda) accounts for the high level of theft in enterprises. 
Workers just pick up spare parts and material which happen to 
be lying about unattended. It is thus assumed, presumably, 
that workers do not "need 1 to moonlight.5 Similarly, Rymar 1 , 
who to begin with insists that 'podnoshenie' and bribery are 
practised by everyone, later unwittingly contradicts himself 
by arguing that bribes are more likely to be taken by high 
wage earners - yet more proof that need and corruption are 
unrelated. The reluctance to establish a link between 
corruption and the impossibility of meeting certain needs 
through the regular channels leads Rymar' and Sukontsev, in 
particular, to the somewhat surprising conclusion that the 
bribe-givers, rather than the bribe-takers, should be held 
responsible for the high degree of corruption.6
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Should we agree to confine the issue to a question of 
morality, the stance taken by these authors appears rather 
dubious. They are certainly correct in underlining that mass 
participation in the vicious circle of corruption ensures its 
continuation. But it is debatable whether it is 'morally 
right' to disregard the different forms and levels of 
corruption. The debate over how to define the notions of 
'need 1 and 'greed' has always been a controversial one. When 
does 'need 1 become 'greed'? Answers can differ widely
c
depending on the socio-economic development of the society, 
its cultural ethos or the moral values of particular 
individuals. It seems, however, a shocking injustice that 
those who resort to corrupt practices to feed their families 
should be lumped together with those who handle large sums of 
illicit roubles. Furthermore, a blanket condemnation of 
corruption fails to distinguish between individual and 
collective responsibility with the result that organizations, 
ministries, and in the end, the political leadership are let 
off the hook.
It is, however, unlikely that redistributing the blame 
according to the nature or extent of the corruption will help 
finding ways of putting an end to it. The major weakness of 
these contributions lies in their authors' failure to analyse 
the socio-economic and political reasons for the ubiquity of 
corruption. Does Rymar 1 really believe that 'ideological 
work 1 amongst the masses will remove the problem while food 
shortages continue to be acute and administrative methods of
-208-
management take the place of viable economic mechanisms? 
Furthermore, these authors' moralizing approach seems to 
imply a refusal to acknowledge the legitimate desire of 
Soviet citizens to improve their conditions of living. All in 
al 1 , notwithstanding the open and harsh criticism of 
widespread corruption, these contributions belong to a 
conservative discourse.
2 . Materi a 1i sm and Soci a 1i sm; A Contradi ct ion in Terms?
<•
The limited scope of the articles on corruption partly 
stems from the fact that they were isolated contributions. 
The paper made no attempt to organize a real debate, which, 
in itself, is indicative of the restraints to which it was 
subjected. On the other hand, the broader issue of 
materialism, i.e. the attitude of mind of those who place a 
great deal of importance on financial rewards, possessions 
and material comforts, was continuously discussed in one form 
or another during the five years examined in this study. The 
first debate spread over a period of ten months from March 
1967 to January 1968 with a couple of loosely related 
contributions in 1971. It consists of a dozen or so articles 
which highlight a clearly polarized controversy between those 
who consider materialism to be an objectionable petty 
bourgeois attitude (meshchanstvo) and those who see in it a 
legitimate aspiration, as well as a 'rational 1 way of 
organizing - or rather re-organizing - Soviet society.
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The terms of the debate are laid down by Evg. Bogat in 
an introductory article published under the headline 
'Discussion Club' in the section 'The Individual, the 
Collective and Society 1 .7 Bogat comments upon a letter from 
a worker correspondent whose story about a joiner who refused 
payment for toys he had made for a nursery shoo 1 was turned 
down by the factory newspaper. He was told by the editor that 
workers were not in the least interested in hearing about the 
merits of unpaid work, and was advised to direct his
c
attention instead to employees whose performance had improved 
as a result of higher material incentives. While not 
disputing that good work ought to be generously rewarded, the 
worker correspondent disagrees that everything can be 
measured in financial terms and calls for the promotion of 
such values as 'disinterestedness' (beskoryst ie).
Bogat places this letter within the framework of a more 
general debate which was obviously taking place in other 
publications and outside the media world. The editor of the 
factory newspaper, Bogat surmises, would certainly enjoy the 
support of the 'rationalists', like this young sociologist 
who, little impressed by the joiner's good deed, declared 
that the country did not need noble sentiments so much as 
good policies aimed at solving its economic problems; and, 
after all, material comforts make life so much nicer. Bogat 
also refers to a recently published book, Ekonomika morali i 
moral' ekonomiki, in which its author, N. Alekseev, argues 
that in a socialist society moral incentives can have an
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impact 'only in connection with material ones'. Bogat objects 
to the word 'only'.
On the whole his position is a moderate one. Indeed he 
calls for a more 'rationally 1 organized society, capable, 
nevertheless, of accommodating such values as 
'disinterestedness'. Most people, he continues, are neither 
complete rationalists nor complete romantics. They aspire to 
a more comfortable standard of living while knowing perfectly 
well that money is not everything. Interestingly enough,
c
Bogat seems anxious to dissociate himself from diehard 
Stalinist propagandists as he makes it clear that 
'disinterestedness' does not necessarily imply an 'ascetic' 
life style nor 'self-sacrifice 1 . Yet a rationally organized 
socialist society must remain humane and compassionate. 
Marxists know that happiness lies in 'the harmony of the 
spiritual, the material and the moral'.
The debate is greatly radicalized by the next two 
contributions made by A. Yanov and L. Zhukhovitskii.8 Yanov 
criticizes Bogat for setting economics against ethics. 
Economic rationalism does not lead to selfishness and greed, 
but rather ensures an 'honest', 'anti-dogmatic', 'truthful' 
and 'democratic 1 approach to the organization of society. He 
substantiates his argument with two examples. The first one, 
which amusingly enough is drawn from a novel, illustrates 
what is happening, yet should not be happening, although it 
is the attitude promoted by official ideology and numerous 
works of fiction. The heroine of I. Lavrov's short novel,
-211-
Ocharovannaya, in her capacity as chairperson of a sovkhoz 
(state farm), decides to take on 217 young people on the only 
basis that they cannot find work anywhere else in the 
village. As in reality the sovkhoz is in no position to 
provide them with steady, qualified and well paid jobs, the 
chairperson's decision, Yanov argues, only makes 'parasites' 
out of these young people. And 'this is indeed', he 
whimsically ponders, 'totally disinterested parasitism, yet 
the sovkhoz is none the better for it' . Neither are the 217
f
young people in question. The seemingly noble deed performed 
by the chairperson of the sovkhoz turned out to be 
counterproductive and, in the end, unethical.
Yanov compares this fictional case with that of the 
chairman of a real ko1khoz (collective farm) who, in order to 
stop young people from leaving the village, has concluded 
formal agreements with school leavers by which they are 
guaranteed attractive salaries, comfortable accommodation in 
hostels and adequate services in return for their genuinely 
needed work. Yanov draws the conclusion that rational 
decisions, which must be dictated by concrete social and 
economic demands, are bound to be humane as they benefit both 
the enterprise or the farm and the employees. Good economics 
is ethical. Thus Yanov has redefined the terms of the debate 
by demonstrating that the choice is not to be made between 
'rationalism' and 'disinterestedness', but rather between 
'rationalism' and 'demagogy', between 'realism 1 and 
'scho1ast icism' .
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Yanov discusses the issue of materialism in the 
framework of a broader debate on the country's economy and 
questions several principles on which the system is based. 
Obviously the article does not contain all the answers (Does 
the rationalization of the economy imply tolerating a certain 
level of unemployment?), nor does it ask all the questions. 
However, on the issue of materialism Yanov's message comes 
out loud and clear. He displays no nostalgia for the 
supposedly revolutionary romanticism of the Stalin era when
c
non-acquisitiveness and 'disinterestedness' were regarded as 
socialist virtues and the willingness to sacrifice one's 
material comfort as a measure of one's commitment to the 
cause. Yanov plainly recognizes workers' legitimate 
materialistic concerns and aspirations to a more prosperous 
life. In fact, he fiercely denounces managers who call 
workers dissatisfied with their wages 'self-seekers' 
('rvach'') or scroungers (khapuga). These managers are 
hypocrites who use outmoded propaganda in order to conceal 
their own incompetence and inability to secure decent wages 
for their workforce.
Yanov clearly rejects the principle of ega1itarianism 
which inspired several measures taken by the Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev administrations in order to reduce wide wage 
differentials which had been inherited from the Stalin era. 
Referring back to the joiner of Bogat's article, Yanov 
remarks that 'social production is no kindergarten. It is
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based on the principle: from each according to his abilities, 
to each according to his work 1 . 9
This position is taken one step further by L. 
Zhukhovitskii, a supporter of Yanov in the debate, who 
forcefully defends the privately hired teams of construction 
workers, known in Russian as 'shabashniki' and other 
lucrative individual initiatives.i0 The shabashniki are one 
of the favourite targets of the 'anti-meshchanin' (or anti- 
petty bourgeois) lobby, which presents them as unprincipled
c
individualists whose only concern is to earn 'easy money 1 . On 
the contrary, Zhukhovitskii pays tribute to their high 
quality work and dedication. They do not mind putting in a 
fourteen—hour day's work, unlike state enterprise workers, 
who spend their long smoking breaks, Zhukhovitskii 
sarcastically comments, criticizing these 'petty bourgeois' 
who are prepared to do anything for a rouble, even work hard.
Not only does Zhukhovitskii unambiguously support the 
principle of performance-related wages, but he implies very 
heavily that workers who sell their labour on the private 
market are more likely to work well than state employees. 
Although he does not go so far as to advocate a market 
economy, he makes no secret of his attachment to the kolkhoz 
market. He recalls how a few years ago old age pensioners who 
sold their fruit and vegetables at the market were accused of 
petty bourgeois tendencies. Why should we be opposed to their 
selling the 'fruit of their labour', Zhukhovitskii wonders, 
when it is in the interests of both the government and the
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people that more food should be produced? It might be, 
indeed, preferable that their produce be brought to a 
cooperative rather than straight to the ko1khoz market, but, 
after all, the market is not a 'shameful place'.
Zhukhovitskii seems to think that the political and
moral condemnation of individual commercial enterprise and
financial gratification has only served to make people
'contemptuous of work 1 . In the end, he turns back the
criticisms of the ' ant i —shabashniki ' lobby upon passive, lazy
c
workers who, he argues, are those lacking in a sense of civic 
responsibility. He also argues that the notion of 
'meshchanstvo' has become redundant in the debate on negative 
social tendencies. Those who hinder the development of 
society are bureaucrats, careerists, time-servers, swindlers 
and work—shy workers.
The shabashniki are once again wholeheartedly supported 
in the course of the debate, this time by Yurii Sotnik in an 
article directed at Larisa Kryachko, who had sharply 
criticized Zhukhovitskii's ideas."
Kryachko's contribution is a rather clumsy and 
inconsistent attempt to examine the question of the 
shabashniki from a Marxist-Leninist point of view. Refuting 
Zhukhovitskii's assertion that the notion of 'petty bourgeois 
tendencies' has become irrelevant in analysing contemporary 
Soviet society, she warns readers against the growing 
tendency to judge people according to moral standards 
irrespective of socio-economic criteria, thus failing to
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acknowledge the existence of class or ideological 
contradictions. The ethical code of a society, she reminds 
us, is determined by the nature of its economic system and 
property relations. For a socialist, for instance, 
capitalists cannot be good or bad. They are exploiters, 
therefore bad. Her portrait of the meshchanin in Soviet 
society turns out to be very similar to that of the 'petty 
bourgeois' who in a competitive capitalist environment, she 
argues, has no alternative but to fend for himself at the
<•
expense of others. He is a cynical and intolerant individual, 
obsessed with consumer goods and unaware of his 
responsibilities towards society. Are we, then, to understand 
that Soviet workers who sell their labour outside the state- 
controlled channel are to be automatically accused of petty 
bourgeois tendencies?
As a matter of fact, when it comes to assessing the 
social role of the shabashniki, Kryachko no longer finds 
economic criteria sufficient. On the one hand she obviously 
disapproves of a free labour market and its advantages for 
certain categories of workers. On the other, she recognizes 
that state enterprises genuinely need to hire labour outside 
the official channel. In the end, she herself resorts to 
moral criteria and differentiates between bad and good 
shabashniki. The bad ones are those who sell their labour not 
so much to satisfy a need as their greed. She does not give 
any indication, however, as to where to draw the line between 
need and greed.
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Sotnik harshly criticizes Kryachko's attempt to 
distinguish between different types of shabashniki according 
to what he sees as spurious moral criteria. Leaving aside the 
question of greed, he wonders, in particular, what is so 
'principled' about those workers who travel long distances to 
earn a living for the simple reason that they cannot do so in 
their own areas. In fact need is at the root of their 
ini t i at ive.
Sotnik rejects Kryachko's arguments on both moral and
c
economic grounds. Material incentives, he argues, should 
cease to be regarded as immoral . After all, is it not the 
case that the economic reform advocates a combination of 
moral and material incentives in order to increase 
productivity and workers' commitment to their work? 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that shabashnik i play a 
positive role in the economy as they help fulfil the plan on 
time. This argument echoes Yanov's belief that good economics 
is ethi ca1 .
At the economic and political levels Sotnik disagrees 
that any comparison can be drawn between the phenomenon of 
the shabashni k i and capitalist economic mechanisms as these 
workers do not own the means of production or the product of 
their labour, nor do they exploit anyone else's work.
The last contribution in the debate was published nearly 
five months later as if Literaturnaya gazeta toyed with the 
idea of leaving the last word to Sotkin. F. Kuznetsov's 
moderately conservative piece contains a conventional
-217-
analysis of 'petty bourgeois tendencies' in a socialist 
society.12 Like Kryachko, he believes that there is a need 
to carry on the fight against these negative tendencies, 
which he sees, however, as a normal phenomenon in the process 
of the building of socialism. Firstly, he argues, it would be 
unreasonable to expect that the 'petty bourgeois 
psycho 1oIgy', which the young Russian working class has 
inherited from pre-Revo1utionary Russia, could have been 
eradicated in only five docades. Secondly, petty bourgeois
c
tendencies will continue to exist as long as socialism will 
not be able to guarantee full equality between all Soviet 
c i t i zens.
Kuznetsov does not discuss the role of the shabashni k i 
in particular. Yet, it seems to follow from his analysis that 
they should be regarded as an inevitable phenomenon which 
ideological work alone will not help to eradicate. Perhaps 
are we even to understand that these workers might be 
fulfilling a useful role at this stage in the development of 
socialism. After all, not only does not he adopt Kryachko's 
moralistic approach, but agrees that Zhukhovitskii and Sotkin 
are right in thinking that 'good people 1 are too often 
wrongly accused of showing 'petty bourgeois tendencies'.
It could be argued that this debate remains within the 
conventional bounds of the official dogma. As Shlapentokh 
remarks in his study of Soviet ideology, the Party has always 
recognized the importance of both material and moral 
incentives in order to encourage diligent work, even though
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the leaders have favoured one approach over the other to 
different degrees.13 But, in fact, the discussion on 'petty 
bourgeois tendencies' and the more specific question of the 
shabashniki highlights the convenient inconsistency of the 
official dogma and polarizes the debate by explicitly 
opposing two notions which official ideology has tried very 
hard to describe as complementary.
The debate has far reaching implications for how 
socialism should be defined. Two very different attitudes of
c
mind have emerged from it. On the one hand, those who could 
be called the 'traditionalists' cling to the notions of 
'disinterestedness' and non-acquisitiveness, which they see 
as unquestionable socialist values. On the other, the 
'rationalists' refute the belief that materialistic 
aspirations and self-interest are necessarily divisive, 
therefore un-socia 1ist. The 'rationalists' clearly state that 
the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of materialistic 
aspirations has resulted in a lack of commitment on the part 
of the workforce. It is also heavily hinted that the 
promotion of 'disinterestedness' can conceal the exploitation 
of labour by the state. Not only do these authors highlight 
the discrepancy between high popular expectations and low 
standards of living, but they openly argue that the whole of 
society could benefit from initiatives taken by 
individualists out of self-interest.
The rationalists vehemently reject the criticism of 
their opponents who indirectly suspect them of leaning
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towards capitalism. The shabashniki, they argue, contribute 
to the smooth running of the socialist economy and do not 
exploit anyone else's labour. It is clear, however, that the 
rationalists do put forward ideas which challenge the extreme 
centralization of the system. From a more Western 
perspective, it could be argued that some statements made by 
the rationalists smack of right-wing politics. Western trade- 
unionists and socialists, for instance, might not share 
Zhukhovitskii's enthusiasm for workers who are prepared to
c
put in a f ourteen-hour day's work. The theme of 'greed' is 
cautiously avoided and the rationalists' stance against 
ega1itarianism is never balanced by the advocacy of policies 
aimed at containing wage differentials.
The purpose of these remarks is not to question the 
socialist convictions of these authors, but rather to point 
out that all contributors, both traditionalists and 
rationalists, suffer from the narrow constraints of the 
official dogma. Traditionalists, whether they are cynics 
interested in maintaining the status quo or puritanical 
socialists sincerely committed to the collectivist ethos, 
seem incapable of changing their way of thinking to 
accommodate the evidently growing materialistic concerns of 
their compatriots. Rationalists are so eager to demonstrate 
how materialistic aspirations can play a positive role in the 
life of the country that they show little concern for the 
potentially divisive consequences of an unqualified promotion 
of self-interest. Their approach is reminiscent of those who
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are so preoccupied with the idea of defending the individual 
against the collective that they do not ask themselves where 
the line should be drawn between individual initiative and 
individualistic behaviour. Yet the rationalists have made a 
breach in the official line by challenging the equation 
between materialism and capitalism.
Yanov's plea for a more rationalist approach to the 
organization of society triggered off another type of 
reaction from a couple of observers interested in the moral
c
rather than the economic implications of his argument. While 
agreeing with Yanov's basic idea that the economic life of 
the country needs rationalizing, these authors are anxious to 
express their misgivings about an already existing form of 
rationalism which tends to vindicate the superiority of 
'reason 1 over 'feelings'. The critic Izabella So 1ov'eva, for 
instance, complains that these rationalists, the young Turks 
of the technical intelligentsia, are relentless workaholics 
(not to be compared with careerists, though), incapable of 
'love, kindness, sensitivity, civic spirit' and, in the end, 
'happiness 1 .!* The writer Sergei Bondarin returns to the 
attack a few weeks later, adding a jingoistic note to the 
argument as he declares that all the high technology of 
soul 1 ess America can be no substitute for the traditionally 
rich cultural and spiritual life of the Russian people.15
Bondarin's readiness to play down the importance of the 
country's technological backwardness is somewhat suspicious. 
Not all contributors, however, appear to be guided by
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ulterior motives when expressing their concern for the 
aridity of the social climate. A round table of writers 
organized in 1971 around the theme 'Are our feelings becoming 
impoverished?' shows that a clearly more progressive section 
of Soviet public opinion was aware of the limitations and, 
perhaps, danger of too much rationalism and materia1ism.i6
The participants in the round table were asked to 
comment upon a letter from an engineer who seems to fit 
So 1ov'eva's portrait of the typical "rationalist 1 perfectly,
c
as shown by the following extract:
Man is the product of his time. Our 
epoch requires, above all, efficiency of 
us. So there is no point in moaning 
about people being more rational and 
dryer than their fathers and 
grandfathers. There is nothing to gain 
in being emotional. In fact, emotions 
are costly not only for ourselves, but 
for all those around us.* 7
It is difficult for a foreign observer to pin down what 
exactly is being discussed here. Is this reluctance to get 
emotionally involved in the affairs of the country a reaction 
against the ill-fated effects of the alleged enthusiasm of 
the twenties and thirties, or is it the aftermath of the 
Thaw, which has rekindled new hopes, yet left them 
unfulfilled*? Several contributions point to the low morale of 
the population. Another reader deplores the now fashionable 
'ironic' approach to life and wishes for a better balance 
between 'reason' and 'fee1 ings' .18 A participant in the 
round table speaks of 'spiritual inertia'. Many others, 
however, seem to believe that the cynicistn which is often
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associated with rationalism tends to be exaggerated and that 
society will benefit from a more materialistic approach. It 
is, perhaps, the writer Vasilii Aksenov who defines the 
problem with the greatest clarity when he argues that however 
needed logic and rationalism are, they are no substitutes for 
'moral values and a sense of dignity'.I 9 This fear that 
material values might be wrongly expected to fill the moral 
vacuum can also be observed in the more specific debate on 
consumerism, which will be examined next.
3 'What Do We Need Transistors For?'
Obviously the issue of consumerism is an integral part 
of the more general debate on materialism and, therefore, is 
frequently referred to in most of the contributions examined 
in this chapter. There are, however, half a dozen articles 
(approximately 12,000 words) which concentrate on this 
particular aspect of materialism.
This short debate was triggered off by Evg. Bogat's 
article, 'Feelings and Things', already mentioned in the 
section on the emergence of informal gatherings.20 The gist 
of Bogat's argument is that in spite of the socialist nature 
of the economic system and, in particular, the absence of 
private property, Soviet citizens have become obsessed with 
consumer goods and lost interest in communicating with one 
another. It seems that not only 'reason' and 'rationalism', 
but also 'things' have pushed 'feelings' away, thus 
contributing to the degradation of social relations.
-223-
Not all contributors, however, share Bogat's pessimistic 
view of Soviet society, nor do they necessarily disapprove of 
its growing consumerist tendencies. Three articles deserve 
particular attention inasmuch as they highlight three clearly 
different positions on the pros and cons of consumerism. The 
most orthodox argument is put forward by G. Volkov, a reader 
at the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central 
Committee of the CPSU.2l
Volkov does not partake in the discussion directly.
c
Published approximately six months after Bogat set off the 
debate, his contribution is, in fact, a shortened version of 
a theoretical article meant for the journal Voprosy 
f i1osof i i , in which he analyses the contrasting functions of 
consumer goods in socialist and capitalist societies.
In socialist society, Volkov argues, production of 
goods is an end in itself, while Man is seen merely as a 
means to increase material wealth. On the other hand, the aim 
of socialist society is to achieve the all-round 
development of Man, while material production constitutes 
only one aspect of society's wealth. Volkov's argument 
reaches embarrassing levels of sophistry when he argues 1) 
that only in socialist society does science aim at 
increasing not only the production of goods, but also the 
quality of services, education, economic management, of all 
that makes up a society; 2) that only in socialist 
society is Man's creativity allowed to thrive as work 
requires an increasingly high level of theoretical knowledge.
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Volkov's crude piece of propaganda, which not 
surprisingly combines an oversimplistic portrayal of 
capitalist society with an idealized vision of socialism, 
fails to tackle the central issue in the debate on 
consumerism. Nowhere is it even hinted that the Soviet 
population might have become unreasonably preoccupied with 
the acquisition of consumer goods. Yet Volkov's article is 
not completely devoid of interest as it opportunely 
highlights the great importance attached to economic growth
^
and material welfare by official ideologists. Successive 
leaders have repeatedly asserted that socialism would catch 
up with the West and eventually overtake it in its pursuit of 
economic and technical progress, the assumption being that 
ma
divisive. Neither can it corrupt, as in the socialist 
society, Volkov reminds us, material wealth is only one 
aspect of Man's development.
It is possible that Volkov's reluctance to address the 
issue of consumerism might have stemmed, at least partly, 
from the ambiguity of the official position on the question 
of material wealth. On the one hand, the Soviet population 
has always been urged to show patience and restraint not only 
because the economy cannot deliver the goods, but, equally 
importantly, because the materialistic ethos, inevitably 
divisive in a society still riddled with inequalities, cannot 
be allowed to replace more noble goals which are expected to 
mobilize the whole of society around its unifying force,
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:ono
iterial abundance coupled with equality cannot be socially
namely the Party. On the other hand, great emphasis has 
always been placed on material welfare not only because the 
leadership needs to secure some degree of popular support, 
but also because the idea itself is, indeed, part and parcel 
of the socialist dream.
It is in the light of the official dogma that the 
subversiveness of I. Klyamkin's contribution can be fully 
apprecia ted.22 Like Bogat, the journalist Klyamkin 
disapproves of veshchi sm' , deplores the 'petty bourgeois 1
c
mentality of his compatriots who see the acquisition of 
consumer goods as an end in itself, or even worse, as a way 
of showing off their social status and the advantages which 
go with it. This is not, however, the most provocative part 
of Klyamkin's reasoning. Indeed, it is not unusual to come 
across the argument that socio-economic inequalities are to 
be expected at this early stage in the development of 
socialism. Klyamkin drastically departs from the official 
dogma when he argues that the rampant materialism of Soviet 
society is, in fact, the outcome of an excessive faith in the 
benefits of economic growth:
We are somewhow used to thinking that 
economic progress and growth of material 
welfare will inevitably lead to moral 
progress... But it's not that simple. 
There isn't a direct cause and effect 
link [between economic and moral 
progress!. There might even be 
contradictions between the two.23
Articles whose authors complain about the moral and 
intellectual inferiority of their fellow citizens are not a
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rare occurrence in the pages of Literaturnaya gazeta. It is a 
concern which figures prominently in the debate on leisure 
activities. Or 1ov and Zhukhovitskii, for example, do not 
believe that an increase in the number of clubs is likely to 
enhance the quality of their compatriots' leisure time. It is 
a 'problem of personality 1 , they argue, and the right 
conditions should be created in order to ensure the 
'harmonious development of the individual', so everyone can 
enjoy a 'rich spiritual life 1 . In another article published
c
in the pedagogy section, the same Zhukhovitskii points out 
that economic prosperity is not a guarantee of happiness as 
shown by the high suicide rate in Sweeden and the ever 
increasing incidence of crime in the USA. Only a serious 
'aesthetic education 1 , he continues, can lead to the full 
moral and intellectual development of the individual. The key 
to 'spiritual wealth' lies in the arts and the teaching of 
the humanities, a principle which, sadly, no longer governs 
the country's education system.24
On the surface these authors' aversion to materialism 
echoes official ideologists' regular attacks against 
capitalism. In this respect it is unclear whether the 
occasional publication by Literaturnaya gazeta of Western 
left-wing authors critical of the consumer society should be 
seen only as part of a propaganda exercise. At the same time, 
it would be a mistake to dismiss the subversiveness of these 
authors altogether as they do not confine their criticism of 
materialism to the capitalist world. On the contrary, they
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denounce the existence of similar tendencies in their own 
society and blame the Soviet system for not honouring its 
pledge to create the 'New Man 1 . The official dogma's 
insistence on economic growth has produced the same 
materialistic tendencies as in the West.
It is ironic that economic growth should be perceived as 
an obstacle in the way of the moral, spiritual and 
intellectual development of the population both in affluent 
societies and in a country where economic prosperity has
c
remained a mere promise. The anti-consumer society movement 
was evidence of a socio-political and moral malaise in both 
types of societies. The fact remains that, applied to the 
Soviet Union, the argument has the disadvantage of 
conveniently overlooking the harsh realities of everyday life 
caused by acute shortages of the very consumer goods which 
the population is allegedly obsessed with.
The most refreshing contribution on consumerism is an 
article entitled 'What do we need transistors for? 1 by a 
woman whose occupation is not specified.25 Possibly a 
journalist, L. Zhilina begins by appearing to pay lip service 
to official ideology, reiterating Volkov's argument that the 
role of consumer goods in the socialist society drastically 
differs from the role they play in a capitalist environment. 
In the socialist society 'things' do not enslave individuals, 
nor do they serve as a yardstick to measure their worth. 'The 
same level of consumption', she cautiously reasserts, 'has 
completely different social, ideological and psychological
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consequences for the individual under socialism and under 
capitalism 1 . However, unlike Volkov, she does not bury the 
issue in a broader ideological debate, but instead lays a 
great deal of emphasis on the idea that socialism 'seeks to 
make available an abundance of goods'. This is not in itself 
a controversial view. Yet, by referring in some detail to a 
sociological survey on attitudes towards consumer goods, 
Zhilina seems anxious to impress upon her readers that the 
problem needs immediate attention.
c
Zhilina's article is really intended for those who 
question the merits of economic growth and deplores the 
materialistic aspirations of their compatriots. Unlike 
Klyamkin, Zhilina does not set economic affluence against 
'spiritual' growth. Her purpose is to rehabilitate the value 
of 'things' and destroy the myth according to which Soviet 
people would be unhealthily concerned with their 
acquisition. She agrees that the majority of people do care 
about consumer goods. Only 17 out of the 1740 families 
interviewed in Chelyabinsk said they had no interest in them. 
But consumer goods contribute to the 'spiritual' and 
intellectual growth of the population. More than 50% of the 
families interviewed said that the acquisition of domestic 
appliances, such as washing machines, had led to an increase 
in their leisure time, while other items, such as television, 
radio and books, had been instrumental in broadening their 
horizons by providing them with essential information and 
good quality entertainment. Zhilina even approves, albeit
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timidly, of more frivolous concerns, like having fashionable 
clothes and a beautifully furnished flat.
Finally, she admits that some people, though a minority, 
do see consumer goods as ends in themselves. However, she 
does not think that the solution to the eradication of 'petty 
bourgeois materialism' ('meshchanstvo') lies in the rejection 
of 'things', the merits of which must be acknowledged. What 
is needed is a serious, open and honest debate on the 
function of consumer goods.
c
This attitude is also shared by the poetess Maya 
Borisova, who in the course of the already mentioned round 
table on the theme 'Are our feelings becoming impoverished?', 
takes the defence of the supposedly materialistic younger 
generation. Borisova does not find young people 'more 
mercenary than their parents were at their age 1 , and does not 
consider their greater interest in consumer goods as 
necessarily a bad thing:
It is often the case that these 
purchases are not a sign of their 
affluence, but rather a reflection of 
their inner needs. I know people who 
possess only one suit, yet own a car 
because they like travelling and 
therefore a car is more useful to them 
than a sui t ... 2 6
The idea of enjoying owning an object for the sake of it 
is still anathema! Yet Zhilina and Borisova's appeal for a 
more consumer-oriented society constitutes a major departure 
from both orthodox and unorthodox cri t icisms of material ism.
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4. Cone 1usion
Whereas the debate on collectivism reveals a clear bias 
against the official dogma, there seems to be less of a 
consensus of opinions on the question of materialism. The 
issue, obviously, is a trickier one.
According to the standard theory, economic growth and 
material welfare constitute an integral part of socialism, 
yet the level of material wealth and its distribution amongst 
the population are determined and controlled by the state.
c
Individual initiatives and self-interest are associated with 
greed and capitalism. It is fine to enjoy the consumer goods 
made available by the socialist economy, but acquisitiveness 
is frowned upon.
The 'rationalist 1 argument, which is given a fair amount 
of publicity in Literaturnaya gazeta, champions some of the 
very principles traditionally associated with capitalism. It 
is true that Marxism-Leninism has always been flexible enough 
to reconcile the need for anti-egalitarian economic policies 
during the 'transition period 1 towards communism with the 
promotion of non-acquisitiveness, thus conveniently 
legitimizing the subordination of individual aspirations to 
collective economic priorities as defined by the political 
leadership. But the proponents of the 'rationalist 1 argument 
do not quite remain within the conventional Marxist-Leninist 
boundaries. The need for performance-related wages and 
financial incentives is not advocated as a mere economic
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expedient. It is perceived as being dictated by human nature, 
with self-interest at the root of the motivation process.
These ideas are subversive for two reasons. Firstly, 
they involve an outspoken criticism of current practices and 
the promotion of certain principles, such as 
'disinterestedness 1 , which, it is argued, often conceal bad 
management and exploitation of the labour force. Secondly, 
these ideas go against principles and practices traditionally 
seen as being part and parcel of socialism. In the same way
<•
as the defence of the individual against the collective 
questions the validity of the collectivist ethos, the 
'rationalist' argument contains the seeds of a debate on the 
nature of socialism.
Some contributors, however, seem to be reluctant 
'rationalists'. While agreeing with the economic necessity of 
introducing material incentives, they shudder to think what 
it might do to the moral health of the nation; hence, for 
example, a desperate and clumsy attempt to distinguish 
between good and bad shabashniki , and more generally, an 
underlying suspicion that, while all this 'rationalism' might 
be necessary, it is likely to reinforce the already existing 
tendency towards selfish materialism.
While placing a great deal of emphasis on self-interest,
individual initiative and financial incentives, the
'rationalists' do not seem particularly interested in a
consumer-oriented society. Zhukhovitskii, for instance,
vehemently defends the shabashniki whose high incomes, he
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argues, are fully justified by the high quality of their 
work. On the other hand, he is critical of the materialistic 
West and laments the 'spiritual' poverty of his compatriots, 
warning them against the danger of an excessive concern with 
consumer goods.
It is tempting to argue that those who so eagerly 
criticize what they label 'petty bourgeois 1 materialism, are 
playing into the hands of a government which cannot deliver 
the goods. But it is not so simple. The leadership has, in
<•
fact, permitted a public discussion to take place on the need 
for more and better consumer goods since the early fifties. 
In her case study on Novyi mir (1952-1958) E. R. Franke 1 
speaks of the 'economic thaw' which began in the summer of 
1953 when articles demanding more and better consumer goods 
appeared both in Novyi mir and Literaturnaya gazeta. In 
October of the same year the USSR Council of Ministers and 
the Central Committee of the CPSU pledged, in a joint 
statement, to speed up the development of light industry.27
One would expect the 'rationalists' , who do not hesitate 
to promote self-interest and financial incentives, to attach 
greater importance to consumer goods. Obviously, the call for 
a rational economy and performance-related wages does not 
necessarily lead to the advocacy of a consumer society 
governed by a purely materialistic ethos. It is odd, however, 
that those authors preoccupied with the 'petty bourgeois 
materialism' of their compatriots should make so little 
allowance for their harsh conditions of living. They fail, in
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particular, to establish a link between obsessive materialism 
and shortage of goods. L. Kuznetsova is one of the very few 
authors who relate the phenomenon of 'veshchi zm' to the 
shortages (def i tsi t) , arguing that frustration breeds 
obsession.28 AS a result, little attempt is made to 
distinguish between the sordid materialism of Soviet society 
riddled by corruption and a more constructive use of material 
affluence as promoted by Zhilina.
Might it be the case that these authors have inherited
<•
the taste of a section of the Russian intelligentsia for a 
brand of Tolstoian ascetism? Or is it the contempt for 
material wealth which figures prominently in the socialist 
tradition of the nineteenth century? It is interesting to 
note that in The Origin of Russian Communism, N. Berdyaev 
points to a strong ascetic leaning both in writers whose work 
is 'coloured by re 1igion' , such as Gogo1 , To 1stoi and 
Dostoevsky, and in materialist thinkers such as Belinsky, 
Bakunin and Chernyshevsky, these very different authors 
sharing a common aversion to capitalism and the 
bourgeoi si e.2 9
On the other hand, Zhilina and Borisova's more positive 
appreciation of material affluence - women tend to be quick 
at understanding the merits of washing machines - is echoed 
by the great number of articles on ' byt ' , which will be 
examined in the following two chapters.
-234-
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Evg. Bogat and Yu. Timofeev, ' Pu t eshes tvi e v gluby 
odnogo spora', LG, 1967, No.10, p.12.
2 . V. Eliseeva, ' I stor i i neskhozhie, no... 1 , LG, 1968, 
No.21, p.12.
3. B. Rymar 1 , 'Padenie', LG, 1971, No.39, p.12.
4. A. Sukontsev, 'A byl li barashek?', LG, 1968, No.37, 
p. 12 .
5. Eliseeva, 1oc. c i t.
6. Rymar 1 and Sukontsev, 1oc. c i t.
7. Evg . Bogat, 'O chudakakh i ratsiona1istakh' , LG, 
1967, No.14, p.13.
8. A. Yanov, 'Ratsiona1ist podnimaet perchatku 1 , LG, 
1967, No . 1 6 , p. 11; and L. Zhukhovitskii, 'Real'nyi protivnik 
ili kozel otpushcheniya?', LG, 1967, No.23, p.10.
9. About the wage reforms which reduced wage 
differentials after 1953, see, in particular, M. McAuley, 
Politics and the Soviet Union, Penguin Books, 1984, p.247; 
Uravni1ovka (wage-1 eve 1 1 ing) is frequently criticized in LG 
in articles deploring the low status of engineers. It is 
commonly argued that only performance-related wage policies 
and wider wage differentials between technicians and 
engineers will succeed in enhancing the prestige of the 
profession; see, for example, 'Diplom i dolzhnost'', 
Discussion Club, 1969, No.34, p.10, and Yan Kotkovskii, 
'Inzhenernyi trud: spory i sravneniya', 1969, No.37, p.10.
10. Zhukhovitskii, 1oc. c i t.
11. L. Kryachko, 'Ne kozel otpushcheniya, a real'nyi 
protivnik', LG, 1967, No.27, p. 12; Yu. Sotnik, 'Neuzheli i 
Onegin meshchanin? 1 , LG, 1967, No.37, p.12.
12. F. Kuznetsov, 'A byl li ma 1 'chik?. . . ' , LG, 1968, 
No.3, p. 12 .
13. V. Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology, 
New York: Praeger, 1986, p.93: the need for material 
incentives was particularly emphasized by Khrushchev and 
Gorbachev.
14. I. Solov'eva, 'V ostatke - che 1 ovechnos t ' ' , LG, 
1967, No.24, p.13.
15. S. Bondarin, 'Milyi chudak i ego protivniki', LG,
1967. No.33, p.11.
16. 'Bedneyut li nashi chuvstva? 1 , LG, 1971, No.31 , 
p. 1 1 .
17. Ibid.
18. 'Prorab i go 1ub' , LG, 1971, No.38, p. 11.
19. V. Aksenov, 'Bedneyut li nashi chuvstva?', LG, 1971,
No.31 , p. 1 1 .
20. Evg. Bogat, 'Chuvstva i veshchi', LG, 1968, No.24,
pp. 10-11 .
21. G. Volkov, 'Chelovek d 1 ya veshchi ili veshch' d 1 ya 
cheloveka? 1 , LG, 1969, No.1, p.10.
22. I. Klyamkin, 'Obyazate1'no li khodit' v gosti? 1 , LG,
1968. No.26, p.10.
-235-
23. Ibid
24. L. Zhukhovitskii, 'Vospitanie chuvstv 1 , LG, 1970, 
No.12, p.11; for Zhukhovitskii and Orlov's articles on 
leisure activities see Chapter 5, section 1.
25. L. Zhilina, 'Zachem nuzhen transistor?', LG, 1969, 
No.34, p.12.
26. 'Bedneyut li nashi chuvstva?', 1967, No.31, p.11.
27. E. R. Frankel, Novyi Mir - A Case Study in the 
Politics of Literature - 1952-58, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, pp.20-49.
28. L. Kuznetsova, 'Mini, midi, maksi... 1 , LG, 1971, 
No.5, p.12.
29. N. Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism, 
London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 1937, p.50, 
pp.70-3, p.88 and p.145; in fact many nihilists of the 1860s 
were trained as seminarists, for example, Chernyshevsky and 
Dobrolyubov; see a.1 so R. Belknap, 'On Quantifying Quality 1 in 
H. Herlemann, ed. , Quality of Life in the Soviet Union, 
Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987, pp.7-12: Belknap 
defines three ideological trends that might account for this 
reluctance to promote utilitarian concerns: 1) 'pastoral 
minimalism' dating back from the Slavophiles and perpetuated 
by Tolstoi, Solzhenitsyn and the Soviet village writers; 2) 
1 pervers ity', i.e. 'less is better 1 , a theory to be found in 
Dostoevsky; 3) 'delayed gratification 1 in the form of 
religious, but also secular asceticism. Ascetics sacrifice 
the quality of their lives for the sake of a glowing future 
they will not see. This current can be observed in many 
Russian literary works (see, for instance, Chernyshevsky) and 
in Soviet official ideology.
-236-
VII. FRUSTRATION WITH STATE-RUN SERVICES
It is unlikely that the disinclination of a section of 
the Soviet intelligentsia to acknowledge the importance of 
consumer goods can alone account for the fact that the great 
number of articles on conditions of living focus 
overwhelmingly on the inadequacies of public services. It 
seems that, in this matter, Literaturnaya gazeta shied away 
from challenging T the political leadership whose pledge to 
increase investments significantly in light industry has 
never been honoured. The few contributors who discuss the 
negative effects of the shortages refrain from openly 
relating the problem to the lack of commitment on the part of 
the authorities to reconsider their economic priorities.
It is ironic that the first issue of the new format 
should have advertised the construction in Zaporozh'e of a 
dom byta, a complex the conception of which is reminiscent of 
Western shopping centres. The photo, showing a tower
i
surrounded by other modern buildings, is accompanied by a 
short article which describes the range of amenities - shops, 
cafes, services - and proudly announces the opening of the 
complex for the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution.* In 
fact, with very few exceptions, the articles on conditions of 
living are extremely critical of the existing facilities and 
structures. The litany of outspoken grievances mostly 
concerns the following services: the postal and telephone 
services, libraries and bookshops, repair shops, transport
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and roads, the health service and housing - approximately a 
quarter of the material deals with housing.
Many contributors openly make out a case for a more 
consumer-oriented society. They put forward specific 
suggestions frequently inspired by the Western experience. 
However, first of all, we shall examine articles by authors 
who are chiefly interested in denouncing the managerial 
incompetence of large organizations and ministries in charge 
of providing services and their contempt for the general
c
pub lie.
1. Rubinov's Crusades against Managerial Incompetence 
Contributions on inadequately run services vary in form 
and content. There is a number of usually short articles from 
readers or local reporters who express their dissatisfaction 
with specific services. During the years 1967-71 the 
favourite targets of this kind of criticism seem to have been 
libraries and bookshops, chemist shops, as well as a number 
of mail services. Particular grievances can occasionally 
prompt broader criticisms. For example, at one point, the 
frequent complaints about the dearth of good reading matter 
in both bookshops and libraries, which is partly accounted 
for by a shortage of paper, were followed up by a longer 
article which blames the large administrations for wasting 
paper out of sheer inertia by printing enormous quantities of 
obsolete or useless forms, leaflets and posters.2
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The most provocative contributions, however, come from 
the journalists of Literaturnaya gazeta, whose criticisms are 
levelled at the whole bureaucratic machinery. They 
unabashedly take stock of the blatant and numerous 
shortcomings of public services and make no secret of their 
complete lack of faith in the managerial competence of the 
ministries and the large organizations under their 
jurisdiction. The uncompromising tone of Zhukhovitskii's 
article on train services and railway stations is typical of
c
the attitude of the whole newspaper. After denouncing the 
inability or unwillingness of station staff to help sort out 
problems with tickets (he, himself, had to wave his 
journalist card at them in order to obtain the ticket he 
needed), Zhukhovitskii then turns his attention to the 
services available in the station. This is the conclusion he 
draws:
. . . it is shameful that a great number 
of our railway stations should remind us 
of coaching inns at the time of early 
Feudalism. And no sign of the 
Renaissance yet!3
That it was the editorial policy of the paper to 
orchestrate a systematic campaign against bureaucratic 
incompetence is corroborated by the series of 'experiments' 
carried out by Rubinov and his colleagues. Rubinov and his 
team set out to expose the inadequacies of essential public 
services, namely the mail and telephone services, the various 
means of public transport (i.e. buses, trams, trolleybuses as 
well as the rail and air ways), repairs of consumer goods and
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home deliveries. The articles were based on so-called 
'experiments' as reporters checked the different services for 
themselves. Most of the time Rubinov himself would then 
publish extremely detailed accounts of their experiences, 
which invariably prompted him to level damning criticism at 
the officials in charge.
The informative value of such an exercise seems rather 
dubious, and not only because criticism of public services 
was nothing particularly new in the Soviet press. The point
c
is that this is a type of investigative journalism that all 
Soviet citizens unwittingly practise every day of their 
lives. Who needed reminding of the difficulties in obtaining 
plane or train tickets or of the excruciatingly slow pace of 
all administrative transactions as employees have to fill 
numerous forms by hand? (The need to computerize the services 
is frequently pointed out. ) Every Soviet citizen had had to 
put up with uncooperative and ill-informed staff, incapable 
of telling them whether their flight has been cancelled or 
not. Every Soviet citizen had had to argue with repair men 
who damage rather than repair, or perform unnecessary and 
expensive repairs in order to fulfil their plans.
Soviet readers probably enjoyed finding in these 
accounts an expression of their own daily frustrations. 
Rubinov and his colleagues seem to take a malicious pleasure 
in emphasizing the infuriating absurdities of many aspects of 
Soviet everyday life. It is clear, however, that the real 
interest of the series lies not so much in the information it
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provides as in the paper's emphatic condemnation of 
managerial incompetence.
Yet again the procedure adopted by Rubinov is a well 
established one in Soviet journalism. Misgivings about the 
supposedly democratic and reforming function of the practice 
have already been voiced in this study with regards to the 
debate on invalids. Rubinov and his reporters do not break 
any fresh ground by taking officials to task. According to 
Soviet law ministries and other institutions are required to
c
reply to criticisms addressed to them through the medium of 
the press within a month. What, then, makes Rubinov's series 
of 'experiments' so different? Why did it become, as Dzirkals 
and her colleagues pointed out in their case study, 'one of 
the second section's most popular specialities'?*
The authors of the above-mentioned short study of 
Literaturnaya gazeta suggest that criticism of inadequate 
public services was 'unusually persistent and broad' in 
Rubinov's series. It is, indeed, the case that reporters do 
not focus on one particular fault. Their criticism 
encompasses the whole service under scrutiny. And they 
certainly are persistent as they carry out a second 
experiment later on in order to check whether the promises 
made by the officials have been fulfilled. This unusual 
practice is indicative of Rubinov's blatantly irreverent 
attitude towards bureaucracies. It is worth examining one of 
the 'experiments' in more detail in order to appreciate the 
tone of his attacks.
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Operation 'Labelled Atoms', aimed at exposing the 
inefficiency of the postal service, was launched in February 
1970 with a second 'experiment' carried out exactly a year 
later.5 The operation was not, however, Rubinov's first 
attack on this public service. He had already pointed out in 
an article published in 1967 that thousands of letters get 
thrown away every year as hotels and the poste restante often 
do not take the trouble to return the uncollected mail. He 
had also complained about the unacceptable slowness of the
c
delivery system. Why does it take a letter three days to 
travel from Moscow to Leningrad when the train journey lasts 
only six hours?
Rubinov is anxious to emphasize that the predominantly 
female post office staff, who have to work in unenviable 
conditions (bad roads, inadequate transport facilities, low 
pay) must not be held responsible for the poor performance of 
the service. Management are at fault as they have failed to 
bring about the long overdue changes that would have 
transformed a particularly 'primitive' service into one 
belonging to the twentieth century-6
The 'experiment 1 which Rubinov and his reporters carried 
out three years later led them to the same conclusions. 
Letters were sent to local correspondents of Li teraturnaya 
gazeta in various cities of the country at exactly the same 
time. Not all of them arrived swiftly and some never reached 
their destinations at all. Rubinov describes the operation in 
great detail - his account occupies a whole page of the
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paper, which is indicative of the great support enjoyed by 
Rubinov's initiative amongst the board of editors. His main 
conclusion, that the speed of delivery has little to do with 
the distance covered and that it is both slow and unreliable, 
could hardly be news to anyone. But the great number of 
details supporting his claim, as well as accounts of 
similarly incriminating letters from readers published a few 
weeks later, were likely to create maximum embarrassment for 
management and the ministry of communications. (A reader
<
gives the comical example of a letter which travelled 61 
days from one area of Kiev to another.) The sheer quantity 
and precision of the information made it all the more 
difficult to dismiss the issue as a minor problem.7
The originality of Rubinov's style lies also in his 
uninhibited desire to engage in controversies with the 
officials under attack. In several of his articles on the 
postal service Rubinov introduces criteria of comparison 
which were bound to be resented by the ministry of 
communications. Indeed, he argues that the Soviet mail 
service compares badly with those of pre-Revolutionary Russia 
and contemporary Western Europe, where it is being 
modernized. The minister could hardly ignore such a 
provocative statement, which was both humiliating and 
ideologically unsound. The tsarist postal service, the 
minister bravely replies, existed for the convenience of a 
small privileged class. As to Western countries, they do not 
face the same difficulties given the small size of their
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territories. Not impressed by the minister's counter-attack, 
Rubinov stands his ground. True, nowadays the post-office has 
to meet the needs of a large public. Yet has the minister not 
overlooked a few important factors, such as 
industrialization, the scientific and technical revolution or 
the existence of modern means of transport? As for the 
comparison with the Western nations, Literaturnaya gazeta did 
take into account their small size when comparing their 
achievements with those of the USSR.8
c
It is a measure of Rubinov's unsettling influence that 
the minister, N. D. Psurtsev, should have felt that it was 
appropriate for him to reply himself rather than pass on the 
task to his deputy, which is common practice. However, 
Psurtsev's personal intervention has not stopped Rubinov from 
exposing the limitations of the measures taken by the 
ministry. He greets, though without undue enthusiasm, 
Psurtsev's belated decision to introduce post codes, an 
automated sorting system, night shifts and special letter 
boxes for local mail in order to help speed up delivery. At 
the same time he is quick to point out that the minister has 
conveniently avoided addressing fundamental issues, such as 
the need to improve transport facilities and premises as well 
as to reduce the high turn over of staff by significantly 
increasing wages. 9
Perhaps more important of all is Rubinov's blatant lack 
of respect for officials. He does not trust them and 
frequently implies that they make a habit of lying to the
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public. After all, he reminds them with calculated 
indelicacy, it is not the first time Literaturnaya gazeta has 
drawn the unsatisfactory performance of the post office to 
the ministry's attention. Take, for instance, his own article 
published in 1967 where he was already arguing for the 
introduction of an automated sorting out system as in West 
Germany. Nothing came of it.* 0 Rubinov's unambiguous message 
to officials is that they are not trustworthy because they 
have repeatedly failed to keep their promises. He makes no
c
apology for the angry tone which permeates most of his 
articles. Soviet citizens, he seems to imply, are entitled to 
show signs of impatience as these desperately needed reforms 
should have been implemented years ago.
Rubinov seems to take great relish in challenging high- 
ranking officials, and sarcasm is one of his favourite 
weapons. Remarking that the Literaturnaya gazeta has not yet 
received a reply from the ministry a month after the 
incriminating article was published, he wickedly suggests 
that the letter has probably been posted, but we all know 
about the unreliabilty of the mail service!**. Warning the 
minister that a second 'experiment 1 will be carried out in a 
year's time, he argues no less sarcastically that this will 
give the paper and its readership:
... the opportunity to compare the work 
of the post office not with the distant 
past or the foreign experience, but with 
the situation as it was in the country a 
year ago.* 2
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By hammering the performance of ministries and 
officials, Rubinov achieves two complementary gaols. Firstly, 
he clearly establishes with whom the responsibility lies and 
questions the bureaucratic structures which produce so much 
incompetence. Secondly, he helps destroy the myth of the 
supposedly corrective function of the press. The report on 
the second 'experiment', which again occupies a whole page of 
the paper, is overwhelmingly negative. Both the reporters' 
second investigation and readers' accounts have shown that
<•
little improvement has been taking place, except perhaps in 
Leningrad and Tbilisi. Rubinov welcomes the introduction of 
special letter boxes for local mail, yet, never missing an 
opportunity to doubt officials' honesty and commitment, he 
publishes the letter of a reader who claims to have seen a 
post office employee diligently throwing letters from local 
and intercity mail boxes into the same bagM3
Rubinov 1 s series succeeds in upsetting the cosy 
relationship which tends to exist between the media and 
officialdom. It demonstrates that the practice of public 
criticism is often nothing more than a perfunctory and 
cynical exercise in public relations which rarely produces 
any practical results. And Rubinov tells officials that he is 
aware of it and that he is not prepared to play the game:
We do not want to receive yet another 
communication from the ministry which 
focuses mainly on successes already 
achieved, leaving virtually no space for 
a discussion of what matters.!*
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On the surface Rubinov seems to be using the same old
method. Yet he drastically changes its nature by the way he
relates to officialdom. The press and officials no longer
belong to the same side. Officials are no longer loyal
partners in the process of constructive criticism aimed at
improving a supposedly basically sound system. Rubinov 1 s
series of articles, a fictional title of which could be
'J'accuse', breaks up the complicity by forcefully suggesting
that officials will not help solve the problem because they
c
are part of it.
2. Bureaucratic Contempt for the Public
Large organizations are harshly criticized not only for 
their lack of managerial competence but also for their 
failure to comprehend their specific mission as providers of 
services. Indeed, the way they carry out their business 
reveals utter contempt for the general public. They do not 
deem it necessary, for instance, to publicize their 
activities, so that the population is only vaguely aware of 
the services available. No warning is given when changes are 
introduced, no apologies are made when things go wrong.
Rubinov, like many other contributors, touches upon the 
issue, in an article in which he relates a whole series of 
cases where various organizations neglected to keep the 
public informed, thus putting great numbers of people to 
considerable inconvenience. A train broke down, leaving its 
passengers stranded in the middle of nowhere without a single
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word of explanation or reassurance for nearly two hours. 
Housing authorities have not informed tenants of the date 
when their dilapidated house will be repaired. Rumours have 
spread and no one dares to go for a holiday for fear of being 
evacuated during their absence. Public transport management 
did not bother to announce a temporary, yet drastic, 
reduction in the bus service, caused by the need to transport 
children to summer camps, with the result that regular users 
have arrived latec at work. Rubinov speaks of 'departmental 
(vedomstvennyi) "secret"' mania amongst institutions and 
speculates how much more comfortable Soviet people's lives 
would be if they were kept adequately informed by the 
organizations whose services they have to resort to. They 
could finally be in control of their lives.is Rubinov's 
grievance echoes Sh1yapentokh's argument that freedom of 
choice goes hand in hand with full access to information.! 6
Administrative bodies show no more interest in finding 
out what people need or want than in publicizing their 
activities. An excellent example of this total lack of 
communication and the conflicts it can cause is given by N. 
Il'ina, a writer who has frequently proved to be a very 
reliable critic of Soviet social reality. The incident upon 
which she comments concerns housing, an area which, as will 
be shown later on in this study, has been extensively used by 
Literaturnaya yazeta to demonstrate the evils of bureaucratic 
management.
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As an increasing number of Muscovites, I 1 ' ina relates, 
grow flowers around their blocks of flats and put up fences 
to protect them against inconsiderate fellow citizens, the 
city council decided to replace the makeshift fences with 
proper ones. I 1 ' ina fully approves of this decision, yet is 
indignant at the way it was carried out in the Pervomaiskii 
ra ion (district). Tenants in this area were not informed of 
the council's decision and, therefore, were understandably 
outraged when they saw their fences being pulled down and 
burnt right in front of their blocks. Furthermore, the 
promised new fences never materialized. When the official 
responsible for such an ill-considered and insensitive 
measure came to talk to the tenants whose angry letters had 
been passed on to him by Li tera turnaya gazeta, he addressed 
them as if they were 'criminals', guilty of 'individualism 1 
(Why were they so determined to 'fence themselves off 1 ?), 
which leads I 1 ' ina to conclude that some people are 
'incapable of explaining, advising or persuading. They are 
only capable of taking and giving orders'.l 7
It is interesting to see how the official uses the 
collectivist ethos to discredit the tenants' initiative. 
Obviously it did not cross his mind that the rebellious 
tenants could be considered as a collective whose claims 
deserve serious consideration. This is yet again a clear case 
of 'collectivism from above'.
Ironically, officials involved in the organization of 
public services tend to consider the voice of the public as
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an interference in their affairs. Rubinov, who is never 
afraid of switching from the particular to the general, very 
appropriately remarks:
All of us - not only passengers but 
also clients, customers, tenants - are 
at times treated as if we were a not 
particularly pleasant, or even 
importunate addition to the important 
business which people occupying . . . 
[highly] responsible posts are entrusted 
with...18
Many other contributions confirm that such a cavalier 
attitude towards fche public is widespread and can be observed 
amongst well-meaning, as well as unscrupulous, officials. The 
bureaucratic approach to running the services means that the 
allegiance of officials is principally to their 
organizations. Therefore, the most dedicated of them are 
likely to make decisions dictated by a kind of 
administrative logic which might be in complete contradiction 
with the needs of the population. Take, for instance, the 
USSR Deputy Minister of Health, A. Burnazyan, who, in his 
reply to a disgruntled reader, publicly and ingenuously 
argues that it does not make sense to sell medicines in small 
demand in every chemist shop. Burnazyan's bureaucratic 
rationalization prevents him from even considering the 
inconvenience such an arrangement creates for a patient in 
regular need of such a drug who happens to live far away from 
the only shop where it is available.19
Any attempt to put the public first would be thwarted by 
the administrative mechanisms which regulate the organizati
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of the services. Several contributions highlight the fact 
that state planning, frequently subjected to criticism in the 
economics section of the paper, can have particularly 
ludicrous results when applied to the service sector. Why, 
for instance, is it so difficult to borrow literary works 
from libraries? The problem is, B. Finnasov irritably 
reports, libraries are obliged to lend a certain percentage 
of, say, technical, scientific or atheist literature. And as 
many more readers are interested in fiction and poetry,
c
libraries have had to set a limit to the number of literary 
works which can be taken out, in order to maintain the 
required quotas. As a result, a great number of existing 
copies of novels and poetry books are not made available to 
the public. The state's erroneous belief that it can shape 
people's reading habits leads to rather comical situations. 
Finnasov quotes the case of a library where it has become 
practically impossible to borrow And Quiet Flows the Don 
unless members are willing to read Sholokhov in the German or 
English language.20 The inadequacies of the library loan 
system are the more frustrating because of the paucity of 
books in shops, another cause for complaint in numerous 
contribut ions.
It is occasionally pointed out that the wage system, 
which is closely linked with the requirements of the plan, 
also contributes to producing the most irrational results. 
I 1 ' ina wrote an article on the subject which might be 
described as extremely funny were it not for the predicament
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of the victims. Her target is the construction board in 
charge of restoring decrepit buildings. Here are the two 
outrageous cases on which she bases her criticism.
A group of tenants has applied for major repairs for 
three years without success. To their great surprise, 
however, it was arranged for them to have their sanitary 
equipment replaced. It did not worry any of the builders or 
officials that one of the lavatory pans fell through the 
unrepaired floor.
<•
Central heating has been installed in a block of flats 
that has been declared beyond repair by the housing 
authorities and is, therefore, awaiting demolition. To cap it 
all, the tenants are not even able to enjoy so unexpected a 
luxury as the radiators have been left in the courtyard and 
the fitters have shown no sign of wanting to come back to 
finish the job.21
Negligence and unscrupu1ousness are encouraged by an 
absurd system of wages. Salaries and bonuses vary depending 
on how well the plan has been fulfilled. The degree of 
success in fulfilling the plan depends on the amount of money 
spent on the repairs, which includes the cost of the material 
used. The more material has been used, the more money has 
been spent and the higher the wages are. Consequently, more 
money can be made from replacing bathroom installations than 
from repairing walls and ceilings. And what is the point of 
putting in the radiators when it is sufficient to sell them
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to the housing authorities and bring them in in order to 
secure wages*?22
Finally, it is pointed out that public services greatly 
suffer from the atomization of responsibilities. On the 
occasion of the opening session of the V All-Union Congress 
of architects, Literaturnaya yazeta provocatively published 
an article by L. Zhukhovitskii containing a damning criticism 
of the poor quality of housing, as well as the corruption of 
the repair services. First of all, Zhukhovitskii lists a
«•
whole series of shortcomings commonly observed in new flats 
(paper-thin walls, bad plumbing etc...). He also underlines 
the absurdity of standardization taken to its extreme, 
remarking that usually the first thing the new tenants have 
to do is to change the locks as all the flats in the block, 
sometimes in the whole estate, have been equipped with 
identical ones. He then argues that many problems arise from 
the fact that different organizations are in charge of the 
various stages in the construction and decoration of the 
flats. There is little coordination between them and little 
concern about the quality of the end product, i.e. little 
concern about the future occupiers.23
It would be pointless to list all the articles 
denouncing the lack of consideration shown by state-run 
organizations for the public they are supposed to serve. The 
above-mentioned articles have been selected because they 
contain most of the recurrent arguments and their authors 
have expounded them in a particularly forceful manner. It
-253-
seems, however, appropriate to finish off with A. Markusha's 
unusual and virulent attack on the cynicism and corruption of 
the funeral services in Moscow.24
Markusha relates the case of an elderly woman who was 
unceremoniously instructed by the authorities to have her 
family grave moved somewhere else in order to make room for a 
public convenience. As a rule, he continues, the staff are 
rude and corrupt. You have to dip in your pocket all the time 
if only to make sure that you will obtain a space or that the
c
grave will be dug. Markusha calls upon the authorities to do 
away with complacency towards vandalism in cemeteries and the 
ubiquitous corruption in both cemeteries and funeral 
par 1 ours.
Markusha's contribution is important in its own right. 
As he himself points out, he is touching upon a taboo 
subject. In the framework of the more general discussion on 
public services his article does not really add anything new 
to the substance of the debate, except, perhaps, that he 
places a greater emphasis on corruption than other authors. 
But Markusha's article vividly evokes the humiliation 
suffered by Soviet people even at the most distressing 
moments of their lives and their depressing helplessness in 
the face of state organizations which have no understanding 
of the very concept of public service.
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3. Bureaucratic Management and Lack of Professionalism: 
The Case of Housing
Articles on housing, town-planning, communications and 
transport account for more than half of all the material 
dealing with living conditions (approximately 160,000 words). 
A variety of issues are discussed. There is, for instance, 
the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of small and 
medium-size towns compared with those of large cities. The 
economist Perevedentsev, a frequent participant in the debate
c
and a fierce advocate of urban growth, argues that large 
cities are better for the welfare of their inhabitants as 
well as for the economy of the country at large (well 
developed infrastructure, highly qualified and, therefore, 
better paid labour force, wider range of services etc...).25
Also worth mentioning is the fairly substantial debate 
on the insufficient network of roads. The blame is usually 
placed on the central planning authorities, which are 
criticized for considerably reducing budget allocations for 
the construction of roads and for relying on the generosity 
or resourcefulness of collective farms and enterprises far 
too much. The problem is reported to be particularly acute in 
the countryside, where many villages cannot successfully 
develop their economy as a result of their physical isolation 
from neighbouring villages or larger urban centres.26 The 
need to motorize Soviet society is also discussed. There is a 
general feeling in favour of mass production of private cars 
even though reservations are occasionally voiced as to the
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possibly negative effects of such a development on the 
quality of urban life.27
The debate on housing (approximately 70,000 words) does 
not so much highlight controversies over economic policies 
and priorities as expose the workings of bureaucratic 
management. Harsh criticisms are levelled at the extreme 
centralization of the system and the bureaucratization of the 
professions, in this case, architecture. The debate is, 
however, limited insofar as it focuses on the poor quality of
c
new blocks of flats. There is the odd angry article 
denouncing the shortages. I. Pachogin and V. Pussov, for 
instance, indignantly remind those at the top that more than 
half of the population of Leningrad is still living in 
communal flats, often without central heating or bathtubs. 
They cal1 for urgent measures aimed at speeding up the 
modernization of the old districts.28 But, on the whole, the 
problem of the shortages is taken for granted rather than 
discussed. As in the case of consumer goods, there is no 
attempt to question the government's overall housing policy, 
which, it could be argued, is itself instrumental in 
producing the shortages.29
The lack of debate on the very issue of shortages can be 
interpreted as a tacit recognition of the fact that the 
present government should not be held entirely responsible 
for them. The Khrushchev and Brezhnev administrations 
inherited the situation from Stalin, who invested 
predominantly in heavy industry and spent vast amounts of
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money on ostentatious building projects while most people 
lived in cramped and squalid accommodation. However intensive 
they were, the housing programmes implemented by his 
successors failed to keep up with increasing population 
numbers and people's rising expectations.3o
It is nevertheless true that a historical perspective 
does not necessarily rule out a discussion of, say, the 
allocation system and the corruption it often produces, the 
illegal housing market, the principle of heavily subsidized 
rents or even the very notion of state monopoly. None of 
these fundamental issues are tackled. On the other hand the 
paper does not publicize enthusiastic reports on the number 
of housing units built every year. The overall picture is 
rather negative. While the idea of state monopoly is nowhere 
questioned, the manner in which state organizations manage 
the housing sector and town—p1anning is harshly criticized.
A few articles, though not very many, expose the extreme 
centralization of the system. Decisions are taken in Moscow 
or Leningrad by teams of architects, unaware of local needs, 
which can have disastrous consequences on the welfare of the 
local population. For example, Literaturnaya gazeta's special 
correspondent in Novosibirsk reports that housing in Siberia 
is not adapted to the harsh climate of the region.31 The 
problem can be an aesthetic one. VI. Ishimov, the paper's 
special correspondent in Bukhara, reports that the local team 
of architects was not allowed to modify the plans for the new
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town of Navoi, sent from Leningrad, which take no account of 
the cultural and architectural characteristics of the area. 32 
The question is most openly tackled in the second issue 
of the new format. A school teacher from a small town in the 
Urals wrote to complain that her town is developing in the 
most irrational fashion. The latest plans, which, again, have 
been drawn up in Leningrad, foresee the construction of a 
hostel for the town's garment factory workers miles away from 
their place of work, as well as a second cinema, even though
c
the existing one is rarely full and there is a shortage of 
schools. The reader questions the way these decisions are 
made :
We are indignant, but there 1 s nothing 
we can do. We are not asked for our 
opinion. But what surprises me even more 
is that we're told that the construction 
plans have been drawn up in Leningrad.33
The author of the short article following the reader's 
letter develops her argument further, relating the issue to 
the broader question of grass root democracy. Isn't it the 
case, he argues, that the Party programme emphasizes the 
'need to improve and develop socialist democracy', that Lenin 
believed that the masses must be involved in the running of 
society? He then calls for a greater degree of independence 
from the centre and the democratization of local organs of
power:
Why can't the regional, town, district
and village Soviets submit their plans
for the following year to the electors
for discussion? 3 *
-258-
As usual, however, this outspoken appeal for the 
democratization of political life is not taken any further. 
Most of the material on housing concentrates on the inability 
or unwillingness of the authorities to include experts in the 
decision-making process, hence their lack of professionalism 
in running this vast public service.
It is clear that dissatisfaction with housing stems 
primarily from the shortages. Yet, as Literaturnaya gazeta 
failed to generate a debate on the possible ways of reducing
«•
them drastically, the discussion focuses on the authorities' 
inadequate management of the service. For example, a short 
debate took place in 1968 on whether the criterion for the 
allocation of housing should be the number of square metres 
or the quantity of rooms. A. Ladinskii, a construction 
engineer working for the Siberian section of the USSR Academy 
of Sciences, thinks that people usually prefer having several 
small rooms rather than one or two large ones.35 B. 
Svetlichnyi, an architect, disagrees, arguing that these 
rooms would be ridiculously tiny and uncomfortable as the 
surface area permitted for each individual is unlikely to 
increase in the near future. Criticizing the low quality of 
the new buildings, partly caused by the high pace of 
construction imposed by official quotas, Svetlichnyi surmises 
that the majority of his compatriots would be prepared to 
wait even a little longer if they could be certain to get a 
better quality flat. Finally he closes the debate, suggesting 
that architects and construction organizations should strive
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to find out the future occupiers' preferences, and calling 
upon sociologists to provide them with the information. 36
It is perfectly obvious why organizations in charge of 
construction and housing should be reluctant to consult 
sociologists. A survey carried out in Akademgorodok on the 
question of 'more rooms' versus 'bigger ones' has shown that, 
ideally, people would like more rooms in bigger flats!37 But 
even though construction organizations are not expected to 
solve the housing shortage overnight, they are not deemed
c
justified in ignoring the latest social trends which 
determine the nature of the population's needs. A few months 
before the above-mentioned debate, Zhukhovitskii was already 
remarking that in Moscow architects keep on building three- 
room flats designed for families of five - usually a young 
couple with child sharing with the parents of one of them - 
while it has become a we 1 1—known fact that the older and 
younger generations would rather live separately. Like many 
other contributors, Zhukhovitskii holds the view that 
builders, architects and planning organizations should work 
together with sociologists and economists.38
It is commonly argued that sociologists should be 
encouraged to give architects and planning committees the 
information they need to diversify housing provisions 
depending on the sizes of the families and people's personal 
tastes. The question of accommodation for single tenants 
should also be adequately addressed. The Soviet population
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can no longer be satisfied by 'more'. It also has to be 
'better'.
A. Baranov describes sociologists as intermediaries 
between architects and the population. 39 In a society where 
individuals cannot order their own blueprints or choose from 
a wide range of already completed buildings, sociologists 
have been commissioned, so to speak, to articulate people's 
needs and aspirations and champion their cause against the 
power of bureaucracy.
c
In the above-mentioned debate architects are frequently 
presented as the accomplices of officialdom and bureaucracy. 
On the other hand, Literaturnaya gazeta gave architects a 
fair amount of space to voice their own dissatisfaction with 
the narrow constraints within which they have to work. 
Interestingly enough, architects occasionally came into 
conflict with sociologists, as was the case in the discussion 
of the new type of housing project, known as the DNB (Pom 
novogo byta) project, a complex combining housing units with 
collectivized amenities, run by professionals. Dining rooms 
on each floor in each block of flats were to solve the food 
problem for the residents.* 0
Literaturnaya gazeta, although quite clearly in favour 
of this new housing project, published an article by two 
sociologists, Ya . Zhuchok and E. Zuikova, reveal ingly 
entitled 'Housing with privileges?'.** While approving of the 
architects' attempt to reduce time spent on domestic chores, 
they deem the idea unrealistic as the socialization of
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housework has remained costly. Food made available in the DNB 
dining-rooms would cost 16 per cent more than food prepared 
at home, with the result that only high-income households 
could afford to live there. The fact that the collective 
facilities would not be open to the general public and that 
the construction costs are above average add, in their view, 
to the socially unfair nature of the project. To this, N. 
Osterman, the architect in charge of the new project, replies 
that an element of inequality is inevitable in the process of
c
solving the housing crisis, and reminds his opponents that 
the same criticism was levelled at him and his team when they 
built the Cheremushki estates, as it meant that some 
Muscovites would be provided with separate flats while others 
would still be living in communal accommodation. 42
This difference of opinion between architects and 
sociologists highlights the financial and ideological 
constraints within which Soviet architects have to work. It 
should not be regarded, however, as a sign of deep and 
constant antagonism between the two professions. It is clear 
that architects believe in the value of debate and 
cooperation with social scientists. What concerns them, 
rather, is the ossification of their profession.
Half a dozen contributions from architects focus on this 
issue, the most comprehensive one being that of Feliks 
Novikov introduced by Literaturnava gazeta as a 'famous 
architect'.*3 Novikov claims that the recent decree jointly 
issued by the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government
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'concerning measures aimed at improving the quality of 
housing construction 1 has been welcomed by many architects in 
the land. Indeed, widespread dissatisfaction can be observed 
in the profession, which badly needs to be revitalized along 
these 1ines:
This task entails the individua1ization 
of the architectural creation. In my 
view, this is not in contradiction with 
the industrial method of construction, 
provided that industry is seen as a 
means to realize the architect's idea. 
The architect must not be the slave of 
the construction industry, but its 
master.* *
Architects should not feel straitjacketed, Novikov 
continues, either by building organizations or clients, 
whether they are enterprises, collective farms or the local 
authorities. They should not have to agree to include in 
their project the use of some material just because the 
enterprise manager happens to have laid his hand on it.*5 
They should not have to cooperate with local bureaucracies or 
construction organizations which show no concern for the 
preservation of old monuments.*6
Furthermore, most contributors, including Novikov, 
believe that there is a need to democratize the profession in 
order to unleash the creativity of its members. It is 
important to note that the ossification of intellectual 
thought was perceived as a crucial issue by all 
professionals. It is a concern frequently voiced in another 
debate publicized by Literaturnaya gazeta which tackles the 
broader issue of academic and scientific research. It is
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repeatedly argued that not only is the work of researchers 
constantly slowed down by red-tape, irregular supplies and 
inadequate equipment, it is further hamstrung by the 
prevalence of seniority over performance, the general climate 
of intellectual intolerance and the lack of communication 
between researchers as well as between institutes.* 7
The power 1essness of individual architects silenced by 
the hierarchical structure of their institutions is deplored 
by several contributors to the debate on architecture. N.
<•
Sokolov, a rank and file architect it would seem, argues that 
the lack of debate between colleagues dates back from the 
period of industrialization, when the profession underwent a 
process of extreme centralization. Since then only 
institutions have had the right to publicize their 
criticisms, while architects without management 
responsibilities have not even been allowed to discuss their 
own work in the press. The much criticized uniformity of 
housing blocks, he concludes, results as much from the 
inflexibility of the architecture establishment as from 
economic restraints.* 8
A. Izoitko, an architect from Leningrad, compares the 
city planning organization (GlavAPU) with a tribunal:
There is practically no discussion, no 
attempt to understand the author's idea. 
The court is always categorical and 
right... It is often the case that 
architects are not even given a single 
opportunity to defend or explain their 
project . * 9
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Novikov is aware that the process of renewing the 
profession will take time. Many architects whose creative 
work is hampered, among other things, by administrative tasks 
have lost their confidence. The short debate publicized by 
Literaturnaya gazeta shows, however, that there is an 
increasing number of frustrated and angry architects waiting 
for the opportunity to use their talents to the full.so
The debates on housing contain an explicit condemnation 
of the bureaucratic and overcentra1ized type of management,
c
which inevitably results in a deplorable waste of skills and 
talents. The implicit conclusion seems to be that unless 
drastic changes take place in the management of public 
services, their quality is unlikely to improve.
4. Cone 1 us ion
Several fundamental issues are overlooked in the debates 
on state-run services. There is no attempt, for example, to 
question the leadership's economic priorities and investment 
policies in the areas of light industry, the housing sector 
and other public services.51 The relatively low degree of 
attention given to the corruption caused by the present 
system is equally disappointing. Finally, the basic 
principles regulating the organization of the services, such 
as, in the case of housing, state monopoly and the system of 
heavily subsidized rents, are never discussed.52
On the other hand, the administrative method of 
management is systematically discredited. While some
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difference of opinions could be detected in the debate on 
materialism, the bureaucratic approach to the management of 
the services is unanimously condemned. No effort is made to 
provide readers with a reasonably balanced account of the 
activities of the large organizations (ministries and various 
other institutions). The backwardness and inefficiency of the 
services are documented with ruthless determination. The 
bureaucracies, allegedly concerned primarily with 
'institutional (vedomstvennye) interests' are openly held
<•
responsible for the incredible waste of human resources and 
talents. They prevent the professions from working 
efficiently and, therefore, from serving the public well. The 
bureaucratization of the professions has led to their 
ossification and a widespread lack of professionalism.
The incompatibility between bureaucracy and science, a 
theme which was bound to figure prominently in the list of 
concerns shared by the readers of Literaturnaya gazeta, was 
already very popular in the literature of the Thaw.53 The 
question also frequently recurs in the pages of Literaturnaya 
gazeta at the end of the sixties, in particular in the large 
section devoted to economic issues where it is commonly 
argued that engineers need better financial incentives and 
more professional freedom.
The debate does not seem to have been taken much further 
by Literaturnaya gazeta, as comprehensive alternatives to the 
administrative type of management are never discussed.54 Yet 
it is important that the paper of the technical and
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scientific intelligentsia should have carried on campaigning 
against bureaucratic power. Ministries and planning 
organizations are harshly criticized whenever the opportunity 
arises, particularly in the economic section in which they 
are frequently blamed for the unsatisfactory results (a 
euphemism for failure) of the economic reform. It is an idea 
which has obviously gained ground all through the seventies. 
Gorbachev's decision to shut down entire ministries was 
certainly in tune with it.
f
This consensus of opinions against officialdom and 
bureaucracies is reminiscent of the debates questioning the 
validity of the theory of collectivism. In fact, there is a 
close connection between the two debates. It is revealing, 
for instance, that Il'ina's authoritarian official should 
have called upon the collectivist ethos to discredit the 
tenants' initiative, which he deems individualistic. In the 
debates on public services, the oppressive collectives are 
the large organizations whose policies show little concern 
for the public's diverse needs and aspirations. Their 
bureaucratic nature greatly undermines their ability to 
understand their mission as providers of services.
The Scandinavian sociologist S. Johansson defines 
welfare as being 'the individual's command over resources 
such as money, possesssions, knowledge, mental and physical 
energy, social relations, security etc..., with which the 
individual can control and consciously direct his living 
conditions'.55 This definition provides a useful explanatory
-267-
key to understanding the predicament of Soviet consumers and 
users of services. Not only are they increasingly as much 
concerned with quality as with quantity, they also aspire to 
be in a position where they can control their lives rather 
than be at the mercy of anonymous and all-powerful 
bureaucracies. The articles which will be examined in the 
next chapter articulate certain consumers' demands which 
point precisely in this direction.
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VIII. IN DEFENCE OF THE CONSUMER
No debate on the pros and cons of the consumer society 
is to be found in the pages of Li tera turnaya gazeta at the 
end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. The 
expression itself remained entirely derogatory. The word 
'consumer 1 , however, was cropping up with increasing 
regularity and with a clearly positive connotation. Referring 
to Zhukhovitskii's article, 'Invitation to the samovar', O.
c
Yanitskii, chairman of a research committee at the Soviet 
Association of Sociologists, argues that town-dwellers have 
become much more demanding because their basic housing needs 
have been met. 'The tenant (poluchi te1 ' )' , he continues, 'has 
become a consumer' whose rising demands need to be studied 
and taken into consideration.* In all the articles examined 
in this chapter the underlying idea is that Soviet citizens 
no longer wish to be considered only as producers. They are 
eager to make their consumer needs known and to find 
mechanisms enabling them to defend their consumer rights.
Firstly, a great number of contributions call for a 
drastic expansion of the leisure and tourist industries. The 
introduction of the five-day working week, as well as the 
weakening role of ideological mobilization in the post-Stalin 
era, have increased Soviet people's amount of leisure time, 
especially in urban areas. It will be argued that the nature 
of their demands concerning this area of their lives
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illustrates the connection between the move away from 
collectivism and the growth of consumer awareness.
Secondly, this chapter will examine the articles in 
which various practical measures are suggested in order to 
improve the quality of service in shops, cafes, restaurants 
and also the health service. Several ideas have been 
explicitly or implicitly borrowed from capitalistic 
pract i ces.
Finally, an analysis of the contributions focusing on 
consumer rights will shed light on the contradictions 
existing between consumers' demands and the Soviet economic 
system.
1. The Case for the Leisure and Tourist Industries 
One of the recurrent themes in the material concerning 
leisure and tourism (approximately 50,000 words) is the 
urgent need to achieve a considerable increase in the number 
of leisure-oriented public places, such as cafes and 
restaurants, and to develop the tourist industry.
The discussion on tourism concentrates on the inadequate 
way the industry is being managed as well as the authorities' 
timid investment policy in this area of economic activity. 
While various high-ranking officials representing state 
organizations in charge of different aspects of the industry 
(communications, culture etc...) report on past achievements 
and future plans, it is frequently argued that this 
atomization of responsibilities is precisely what hampers the
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development of the industry. A single organization should be 
in charge, as is now the case in Vilnius. The Lithuanian 
experiment has demonstrated, in particular, that with the new 
arrangement decision-makers enjoy more leeway in allocating 
money.2 it is usually thought that the construction of 
hotels and catering facilities must be the responsibility of 
a separate organization.
The low priority given by the planning authorities to 
the development o/ tourism is deemed misjudged. Given the 
high demand for various forms of holiday-making already 
existing in the country and the great potential of foreign 
tourism, should international standards of quality be met, 
the industry could be a very profitable one. The authorities 
are urged to imitate Western governments in their commitment 
to a consistent investment policy, which should be geared 
towards providing the country with a comprehensive tourist 
infrastructure.3
The idea of a well developed tourist industry is never 
opposed, probably because it goes hand in hand with the 
belief in the inalienable right of the Soviet worker to a 
yearly paid holiday. On the other hand not everyone seems to 
be keen on increasing the number of cafes and restaurants, 
thus encouraging the population to spend time in them on a 
more regular basis. Several contributions attack a clearly 
well entrenched puritanical attitude shared by a section of 
the general public as well as officialdom. L. Libedinskaya, 
one of the writers complaining about the acute lack of
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restaurants, which, she argues, has made itself particularly 
felt since the introduction of the five-day working week, 
seems to have anticipated a frown of disapproval on some of 
her readers' faces when writing these lines:
At first sight it would seem that what 
we're talking about here is trivial. But 
our life is made up of these 
'trivialities'. Our serenity, and, 
therefore, our health and capacity for 
work depend on them. After all, doctors 
have long established that nearly all 
the illnesses of the twentieth century 
are of nervous origin.*
c
Rubinov and Chernetskii do not take the precaution of 
justifying the need for more cafes and restaurants by 
emphasizing that they provide a form of relaxation which 
enhances people's capacity for work. Returning from a trip to 
Budapest, they put forward a passionate plea for the leisure 
industry. Time to leave our prejudices behind, they declare. 
Why is it that going to the theatre or partaking in amateur 
shows are considered as the only 'civilized' way of spending 
one's free time? Let's stop listening to these 'puritans' who 
argue that working people have to get up early in the morning 
and , therefore, do not need restaurants which stay open late 
at night. What about actors or workers working shifts, 
tourists and holiday makers? What about the week-ends?5
Obviously dazzled by the experience of Budapest by 
night, Rubinov and Chernetskii seem to have come back with an 
increased dislike of the austere work ethics promoted by 
official propaganda and the long-standing tendency to
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automatically associate cafes and restaurants with heavy 
drinking and debauchery. In a previous article Rubinov had 
mentioned the case of an official who told him that dining- 
rooms in his ministry closed early in the evenings not so 
much for economic reasons as moral ones. The ministry did not 
want to be seen as encouraging drinking. Most participants in 
the debate believe, like Rubinov, that such a policy does not 
help to fight alcoholism. Inveterate alcoholics keep on 
drinking anyway, often in the streets, 'borrowing 1 glasses
«•
from the fizzy water vending machines.6 A. Minchkovskii 
remarks that since many bars were closed down, good 
restaurants have been taken over by drunkards.7 G.V. 
Yurchik, a taxi driver in Gorki, who enthusiastically 
supports Rubinov 1 s views, argues that dry laws only succeed 
in boosting the black market, a fact he should be well aware 
of as many transactions of this kind take place around taxi 
ranks.8
The couple of official responses published on the 
subject are lukewarm, yet not hostile. (Efforts should be 
made to provide better facilities for the evenings, rather 
than the nights; the transport organizations must cooperate 
etc...)9 Only one short article reiterates the puritanical 
views criticized earlier. It is followed by extracts from 
readers' letters commenting upon the need to have restaurants 
and cafes open late at night. Four are against the idea, 
eight are in favour. 10
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Not only do most contributors believe that the 
restrictive measures supposedly aimed at curbing alcoholism 
are ill-advised and counterproductive, they also see in them 
a reflection of the authoritarian nature of Soviet society 
whose citizens tend to be treated as irresponsible children. 
Why, Yurchik wonders, should decisions concerning the entire 
population be taken with only alcoholics in mind? Equally 
annoyed by the patronizing attitude of the authorities, 
Rubinov and Chernetskii remark that only good behaviour and
<•
'civilized' drinking could be observed in the restaurants of 
Budapest, thus implying that the Soviets are quite capable of 
similar self-control.
On that subject, there is an amusing satirical piece by 
L. Likhodeev, mocking the quasi—mi 1itary regime imposed upon 
holiday-makers in 'rest homes' (dom otdykha). As soon as you 
arrive, Likhodeev relates, you are told that the home closes 
at 11.00 p.m. and warned by the manager that, should you fail 
to abide by the rules of the establishment, you will be 
expelled, and your family and employer will be informed of 
your reprehensible behaviour; all this, Likhodeev continues, 
in the name of morality: 'All those who go to bed at 11.00 
p.m. are morally clean. All those who go to bed after 11.00 
p.m. are morally dirty 1 . On a more serious note, Likhodeev 
deems humiliating the assumption that all Soviet citizens are 
potential hooligans. 'After all', he sarcastically reminds 
'rest home' managers, 'the majority of our country's 
population know it is wrong to break windows, turn trams
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upside down, hang colleagues or wake up those who sleep'. He 
also objects to the personnel's systematic lack of 
sensitivity. 'The fiercest criminal', he argues, 'must be 
punished, yet not offended. But you offend the first person 
you happen to meet, considering this attitude as being the 
norm in dealing with people*.11
There is much evidence that Soviet people are less and 
less willing to let themselves be bossed around by self- 
appointed guardians of morality during their holidays. The
c
popularity of sanatoria and 'rest homes', built by 
enterprises which heavily subsidize their employees' holidays 
in them, has significantly decreased. L. Pavlov quotes a 
survey indicating that only 15 per cent of Soviet people 
enjoy staying in sanatoria. According to a survey carried out 
by Literaturnaya gazeta, sanatoria and 'rest homes' are 
appreciated by only 30 per cent of the technical and 
scientific inte11igentsia.12
That these places tend to be run in an authoritarian 
manner inspired by the collectivist ethos, does not alone 
account for their increasing unpopularity. There are several 
contributing factors; the fact, for instance, that they do 
not cater for couples and families.13 Also, they offer a 
sedentary and health-oriented type of relaxation which cannot 
be to everyone's liking. Younger people, in particular, seem 
to favour more active holidays, such as camping, sight- 
seeing, hiking. There is also the fact, of course, that 
sanatoria and 'rest homes' cannot accommodate everyone.
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Pavlov argues, however, that the growing number of 
'dikari' , i.e., people who go on holidays without holiday 
vouchers (putevki), reflects the public's desire for variety 
and independence. In the two surveys already mentioned, 40 
per cent of the interviewees said they preferred holidaying 
without vouchers. Furthermore, the survey organized by 
Literaturnaya gazeta indicates that 29 per cent choose a 
semi-independent type of holiday using the facilities of the 
turbazy (tourism centres). On the whole, it follows from the
c
various contributions that the Soviet public does not want 
more sanatoria and 'rest homes', but rather a better tourist 
infrastructure - camp sites (at the moment they meet only 20 
per cent of the demand), hotels, better and more roads, as 
well as car services to cater for both group and individual 
motoring holidays.
The individua1ization of leisure time is also reflected 
in the frequent demand for small, more intimate cafes and 
restaurants. In his book Life in Russia , the journalist 
Michael Binyon advises visitors to the Soviet Union to try 
the restaurants in groups. 'Soviet restaurants', he remarks, 
'seem happiest with groups, whereas individuals are usually 
left sitting forlornly in a corner for hours before being 
served.'l* Judging by Literaturnaya gazeta, not all Soviet 
people seem to be keen on these large restaurants with dance 
floors and live orchestras, which, indeed, seem to be 
designed for groups. The general feeling is that there is a 
need for variety. There should be small restaurants where one
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can spend a quiet evening with a friend or two, expensive 
ones for special occasions, snack-bars for those in a hurry. 
Opening hours could be different, too.15
Writing about leisure in the Soviet Union in the early 
1980s, M. Binyon argued:
The collective consciousness, strongly 
reinforced by the ideological approach 
of the kollektiv and distrust of 
individualism ... also determines the 
pattern of Soviet leisure: organised 
excursions, groups and clubs ... rest- 
homes and sanatoria where millions of 
workers 'join their colleagues from work 
for the annual holiday in the sun. l 6
Binyon's comment, written at the beginning of the 1980s, 
concisely summarizes the approach to leisure which 
Literaturnaya gazeta was already criticizing in the late 
sixties and early seventies. There is, indeed, a close 
connection between the theory of collectivism and the pattern 
of Soviet leisure, and Literaturnaya gazeta questioned both 
in two separate, yet interconnected, series of debates. 
Collectivism implies that identical criteria are identified 
for all members of society or entire groups, hence its 
authoritarian nature as it ignores the diversity and 
complexity of the needs of individuals. The rejection of 
collectivism and the promotion of a more consumer-oriented 
society where individuals are in a better position to 
identify and satisfy their own needs, are consistent with one
another.
Binyon's remark reminds us that the collectivist 
approach to the leisure industry remained the dominant one
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all through the seventies. Indirectly, it also highlights the 
fact that Literaturnaya gazeta was publicizing unorthodox 
ideas, which had to wait until Gorbachev came to power to be 
implemented, if not systematically, at least by some 
individuals, for instance, in the co-operative movement.
2. The Case for a Consumer —Friend 1y Environment 
Echoing the systematic criticism of the large 
organizations' contempt for the public, many contributions
f
suggest the adoption of practices which would make the 
service and retail industry more consumer-friendly. Most of 
these articles concentrate on the need for opening hours more 
in tune with the life of the population and for better 
training of personnel dealing with the general public. The 
arguments put forward by the various contributors, mainly 
journalists, are rather repetitive and straightforward, and, 
therefore, will be briefly examined.
As a result of the introduction of the five-day working 
week, a great number of shops and public services are now 
closed during the week-ends, including Saturdays. The issue 
is not treated as a mere technical matter. It is perceived as 
the logical result of a social policy which fails to 
recognize Soviet citizens as consumers whose needs must come 
before any other consideration. This comment by A. Likhachev
i s typi ca1 :
It must not be decided for them Ctown- 
dwellers] when they have to go to the 
baths or the museum. One has to find out
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when they go and determine opening hours 
according 1 y . 1 7
This implies that some people have to work while others 
rest or shop and, therefore, the principle of the five-day 
working week must be applied with greater f1exibi1ity.* 8 It 
is sometimes pointed out that more realistic opening hours 
would considerably help women to cope with their double 
burden.l9
Many of the articles examined in chapter 3, 'Perceptions
c
of the Collective 1 , contain complaints about the rudeness or 
even cruelty of staff in contact with the general public. The 
issue is occasionally discussed from a more practical angle. 
Il'ina argues that shop assistants and waiters should be 
better trained. They should be taught to address customers in 
a business-like manner and respect their privacy.20 Rubinov 
criticizes the atmosphere of distrust prevailing in self- 
service shops where customers are treated as if they were 
potential shoplifters. (Some shops still hang portraits of 
thieves, a practice he deems both immoral and illegal.) 
Rather than make everyone uncomfortable, Rubinov suggests 
that managers follow the example of their Western 
counterparts who include the expected small loss caused by 
shoplifting in their overhead expenses.21 In a previous 
article, Rubinov argued there was a general need to promote 
the presently low status enjoyed by staff working in the 
retail trade.22 it is an area of the economic life which
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should attract better educated personnel, capable of 
improving the cultural level of the tertiary sector. 23
The sheer recurrence of these arguments is evidence of 
the growing consumer awareness of the Soviet population. 
Literaturnaya gazeta unhesitatingly and forcefully underlines 
the gap between increasingly sophisticated popular 
expectations and the primitive nature of what the system has 
to offer. Yet, while the authors of these contributions 
explicitly publicize consumer demands, they stop short of
c
suggesting radical alternatives which would drastically 
transform the service and retail industries. They fall back 
on asking the large organizations to change their ways, 
which, judging by the articles exposing their managerial 
incompetence, they are not deemed capable of doing.
Only a very few articles suggest practices which are at 
variance with official ideology, like, for instance, the 
short debate on whether the practice of tipping waiters 
should be reinstated. L. Yunina argues that it is 
hypocritical to keep professing that tipping waiters is wrong 
while it is well known that the practice has, in fact, 
persisted in the form of bribery. She proposes cleaning up 
the catering trade by rehabilitating the practice of tipping 
the staff. Tips should be regarded as rewards to which 
waiters are entitled if the work has been well done in the 
same way as factory workers receive bonuses if the plan has 
been fulfilled. The idea, however, is overwhelmingly rejected 
by officials, readers as well as the editorial board of
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Literaturnaya gazeta, who all associate it with an 
unregretted past. S. Okun, manager of a food kombinat in 
Moscow, supports the new scheme according to which all 
waiters receive the additional five per cent that customers 
pay for the service, a practice commonly used in the West. A 
reader objects, though, that this new measure has failed to 
guarantee an improvement in the quality of the service and 
why give an extra five per cent to a waiter who has been rude 
to you? 2 *
c
The national health service is another area where it is 
suggested that a direct financial transaction between 
customers and providers of services might help to improve the 
quality of the service. Contributions on the health service 
(approximately 20,000 words) do not tell the whole truth, yet 
expose a number of serious failings, in particular, the 
shortage of hospital beds and medications, the poor 
conditions in which country doctors, mainly women, have to 
work (they are often not provided with transport to visit 
patients in remote villages), and the inadequacy of the 
ambulance service. 25
More striking, however, is the harsh criticism levelled 
at the medical profession itself. Doctors and surgeons are 
frequently accused of being tactless, callous and corrupt. 
Shortcomings in the training of medical students, low wages 
and the tyrannies of the plan are occasionally presented as 
contributing factors. 26 But the main concern is that medical 
doctors are all-powerful, yet unaccountable to the public. It
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is suggested by B. Volodin that doctors' salaries should vary 
according to the reputation they enjoy amongst patients.27 
More commonly, however, it is argued that the existence of a 
small 'private 1 sector in certain areas of medicine could 
help enhance the professionalism of the medical staff as well 
as reestablish the trust of the public towards doctors.
The writer Yu. Shcherbak relates the case of a relative 
in her early sixties who died of an appendicitis as a result 
of what might have been a professional mistake. The two
<•
surgeons in charge at the hospital did not see eye to eye as 
to whether a second operation should be performed, yet 
refused to ask for a third opinion. As patients do not have 
the right to consult specialists on a private basis, there 
was nothing that the family could do. Shcherbak concludes 
that it it is wrong to think there are only two alternatives; 
on the one hand, a socialized and free medical service, on 
the other, private medicine as in capitalist countries. 
Shcherbak does not dispute the fact that the Soviet health 
service has been a wonderful achievement, yet ways must be 
found, he argues, to improve it:
What if, for instance, payments for 
private (pr ivatnye) consultations with 
prominent specialists (consultations 
which, I repeat, would take place 
outside their working hours) were to be 
effected through the services of 
hospitals or clinics? What's wrong with 
that?28
A. Vishnevskii, a member of the Academy of Sciences, 
raises the issue of clinics which refuse to keep or admit
-286-
terminally ill patients because exceeding 'death quotas' is 
seen as a sign of poor performance and clinics which do so 
are investigated.29 AS indignant as its readers at the 
extreme bureaucratization of the service and its inhumanity, 
Literaturnaya gazeta suggests a rather unorthodox way out:
One of the most important achievements 
of our health service is the free 
treatment of patients. But there are 
cases where it is expedient to have a 
medical service that is not free, as 
well. It concerns, in the first 
instances the care of chronic invalids 
and elderly patients.30
The question of whether everyone could afford it is 
conveniently left aside. There is evidence, however, that 
some people are not opposed to the idea of paying for medical 
care. The few already existing clinics where treatment has to 
be paid for are very popular indeed. Complaining that since 
the introduction of the five—day working week polyclinics no 
longer work on Saturdays, M. Yanovskaya remarks that on that 
day the number of patients visiting one of the 'paying' 
(pi atnaya) polyclinics in Moscow has increased by thirty per 
cent.31 A pensioner thanks Literaturnaya gazeta for having 
been instrumental in persuading the authorities to build new 
premises for the very popular 'paying' clinic No.1 on Kirov 
street. The pensioner reminds readers of the argument used by 
V. Karbovskaya who wrote an article published by 
Literaturnaya gazeta in 1965 (No. 121) in which she 
publicized the clinic's need for a new building:
If thousands of people ask to be 
respected and given the opportunity, on
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top of free treatment, of paying for 
comfort and help, it has to be done.32
The importance of these contributions should not be 
overestimated. They are isolated articles, easily missed in 
the course of a more cursory reading of the paper. The idea 
of medical doctors taking money from patients is not 
unanimously supported. I. Tager, for example, in his reply to 
Shcherbak agrees that patients should be allowed to consult 
physicians outside the hospital or clinic where they are 
treated, yet it should be a free service.33 Furthermore, it
<•
is clear that no one questions the principle of free 
socialized medicine. It is interesting, however, to see the 
power of money and the purchase of certain medical services 
being reconsidered as an alternative, albeit partial, to the 
bureaucratization of the national health service.
Finally, a few words should be said about a couple of 
articles whose authors unabashedly marvel at the American 
advertising industry, which they regard as predominantly 
beneficial to the consumer. V. Tereshchenko, in particular, 
describes in great detail the basic principles of American 
advertising, as well as some of the techniques, emphasizing 
the wide range of skill it involves. While not denying its 
manipulative and exploitative nature, Tereshchenko argues it 
is caused by the fierce competition existing between 
producers in capitalist society. The Soviet social and 
economic system, the author claims, will safeguard Soviet 
consumers against this danger. Calling upon Lenin who advised
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borrowing from capitalist practices which could be useful for 
the building of communism, Tereshchenko suggests that Soviet 
enterprises learn from the great 'technical and 
organizational experience 1 of the American advertising 
industry, leaving behind the 'unscrupulousness of business 1 :
While in the conditions of the USA 
advertising serves, above all, the cause 
of profit, in our country it must become 
the educator of consumers, inculcating 
rational tastes in them, and participate 
in the fight for better quality goods.34
This contribution is not altogether unorthodox. It must 
be pointed out that there was a revival of Soviet advertising 
in the 1960s which went unopposed by the central authorities 
on the grounds that advertising helps to shift excess stocks 
of goods and introduce unfamiliar new products. Official 
ideologists also underlined the educational virtues of 
advertising for both consumers and the retail trade, 
precisely the type of arguments put forward by 
Tereshchenko.3 5
However, while Soviet advertising is predominantly used 
by distributors, in Tereshchenko's article a great deal of 
attention is paid to market research, which is regarded as 
evidence of the producer's willingness to take the opinions 
of consumers into account. The marketing of new products is 
seen as a means of developing tastes, and there is nothing 
wrong with 'creating a demand'.
Furthermore, although the author is careful to reassert 
the exploitative nature of Western advertising, which is
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commonly accused by official ideologists of playing on the 
basest instincts of consumers, the clarity of his ideological 
position is somewhat muddied by his unconcealed enthusiasm 
for the highly sophisticated techniques of American 
advert i s ing.
It is not clear how Tereshchenko proposes to apply a 
technique issuing from the competitive world of capitalism to 
the centrally planned economy of the Soviet Union. Yet the 
author's somewhat romantic view of advertising reveals a
t
preoccupation, shared by many contributors to Literaturnaya 
gazeta, with making Soviet producers responsive to consumers' 
demands.3 6
3. In Defence of Consumer Rights
All the material examined in chapters 7 and 8 
relentlessly exposes Soviet consumers' great dissatisfaction 
with the retail and service industries, as well as their 
feelings of helplessness in the face of the state 
organizations which manage them. Taking the issue one step 
further, Literaturnaya gazeta publicized a short, yet 
outspoken, debate on the issue of consumers' rights. The 
question is examined from a legal point of view by some 
contributors, while others investigate ways of articulating 
consumer demands and establishing a constructive dialogue 
between producers, or providers of services, and the public.
L. Libedinskaya argues that Soviet citizens ought to be 
made aware of the numerous laws and regulations, already in
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existence, which protect their interests. For instance, 
customers should know that shops are not allowed to force 
unwanted goods upon them, which they often do when selling 
two different items together. Tenants should know that in 
theory housing authorities are obliged to compensate tenants 
whose hot water has been cut off for more than two weeks. If 
the law were enforced, tenants would recover only a few 
kopecks, but the point is that housing authorities would 
waste a great deal of time and money refunding them, and then
c
would have an incentive to ensure that the repair be 
completed within two weeks. Libedinskaya concludes:
If we know the laws and defend our 
rights, not only shall we guard 
ourselves against many small (and 
sometimes not so small) inconveniences, 
but also we will stop indulging idlers 
and bureaucrats.3 7
Analysing the results of a survey carried out by 
Li teraturnaya gazeta during one of its 'experiments' on the 
railway services, L. Velikanova remarks that the overwhelming 
majority of those who filled in the questionnaires are 
extremely angry at train conductors who refuse to issue 
tickets, even though the compartments are not full. Are they 
actually allowed to do this? Is there any recourse against 
their decisions? Velikanova argues that passengers must be 
informed of their rights, as well as of the duties of 
conductors, so that they know where they stand. 38
While both Libedinskaya and Velikanova seem to expect 
the management of shops and organizations providing services
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to inform the public of its rights, Rubinov, as sceptical as 
ever about the ability of officials to change their attitude, 
argues for the need to introduce laws binding them to look 
after their customers. At the moment, he complains in an 
article entitled 'Unequal partner' , an enormous amount of 
time is wasted because of the low quality of the services, at 
the expense of both individuals and the national economy. It 
is the customer who serves the shop, the passenger who serves 
the transport organizations, and not the other way round. It 
is time, he continues, to take strong measures aimed at 
'establishing an equal relationship between the individual 
and those enterprises whose job it is to serve him' . A law 
should be introduced which obliges organizations to pay 
customers compensation in case they fail to fulfil their 
obligations to them:
If the management of Aeroflot know that 
the passenger who has been held up must 
be fed at their expense, it is likely 
that the fog will clear more quickly and 
that they won't even contemplate 
combining two flights into one.39
After all, Rubinov impatiently reminds those in charge, 
the raison d'etre of the Soviet service industry is not to 
make profits, but rather to serve the public. There is no 
inkling that Rubinov might think that it is precisely why 
officials are not particularly anxious to improve the 
services, but it is clear that he has no illusions as to 
their willingness to do so without the threat of financial 
reprisals. Furthermore, he considers his proposal perfectly
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in tune with the officially promoted policies of 
'intensifying the democratization' of Soviet society and 
increasing economic incentives in order to obtain better 
results.
Another series of articles suggests that appropriate 
channels be set up for consumers to articulate their 
criticisms and demands. The short debate, which took place in 
the second half of 1969, was triggered off by the editors of 
Literaturnaya gazeta. who invited experts, officials and 
readers to voice their opinions about three proposals: the 
setting up of an institute where sociologists would study the 
views of consumers, the formation of a consumers' 
association, and, finally, the publication of a consumer 
magazine, judging by the description given, something very 
similar to the Wh i c h ? ma g a z i n e published in Britain. It is 
hoped by Literaturnaya gazeta that these measures will help 
persuade manufacturers that the 'buyer is always right' and 
reduce the unacceptable amount of low quality, or even dud 
goods in shops. Quality control inspectors cannot be relied 
upon. There are only two hundred of them for the whole 
country and, what's more, goods which have been banned in one 
republic can be sold in another.* 0
Practically all the responses published by Literaturnaya 
gazeta support the basic argument put forward in the 
introductory article. K. V. Bol'shakov, RSFSR Deputy Minister 
of Trade, hopes that the setting up by the ministry of a 
commission made up of sociologists and psychologists whose
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job it will be to study the opinions of consumers will help 
increase pressure on manufacturers.*! V. V. Boitsovym, 
chairman of the committee for standards, measures and 
measuring devices attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, 
welcomes the idea of a consumers' association. Not only is 
the number of quality control inspectors ridiculously low, 
but inspectors belong to a variety of organizations the 
'institutional interests' of which tend to prevail over those 
of the consumers. The primary function of the committee
<•
Boitsovym chairs is to defend the interests of industrial 
consumers (enterprises purchasing raw material or equipment), 
yet it is presently working out new standards of quality and 
new methods of enforcement for consumer goods. Nevertheless, 
Boitsovym concludes, a direct link needs to be established 
between manufacturers and consumers.*2 it is argued in a 
collectively written contribution from economists and 
engineers that this consumers' association should be allowed 
to publicize its work in the media.*3
The discussion is clearly one-sided. Out of the five 
readers' letters closing the debate, only one disagrees with 
the idea of a consumers' association. More importantly, 
manufacturers are conspicuously absent from a debate which 
concerns them directly. It makes sense that representatives 
of the Ministry of Trade should support the formation of 
consumers' associations. As the economic system favours 
producers, trade and quality control bodies are likely to 
welcome grass root pressure in the hope it will undermine the
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power of their rivals. The naive argument, advanced by the 
only dissenting reader, that in a socialist society the 
interests of consumers are defended by the state, has clearly 
lost ground amongst both the general public and officials, 
well aware of the institutional interests of their 
organizat ions.
However, the case for the consumers' associations should 
not be examined exclusively in the narrow context of 
conflicting institutional interests. Echoing the briefly
*
suggested idea of an association of invalids and the positive 
publicity given to informal gatherings, this debate confirms 
the move towards the affirmation of the need for a civil 
society, which does not contradict the officially promoted 
call for the ' democra t i za t i on of Soviet life' , yet goes far 
beyond it.**
4. Conclusion: Consumers' Demands in the Light of the 
Economic Debates
It is clear from the articles analysed in this chapter 
that Literaturnaya gazeta supported the case for a consumer- 
oriented society. The debate on the need to develop the 
tourist and leisure industries highlights the correlation 
between central planning and certain authoritarian aspects of 
Soviet society, thus lending some more weight to the argument 
in favour of a decentralization of the economy in order to 
meet increasingly individualized consumer demands.* 5 On the 
other hand, the measures, suggested by some contributors,
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aimed at protecting the interests of consumers and creating a 
more consumer-friendly environment, are rather limited. While 
testifying to the growth of consumer awareness amongst the 
population, they clearly offer inadequate solutions for an 
efficient promotion of consumer demands in the framework of 
the centrally planned economy.
This is a fact which is emphasized by several authors. 
It has already been shown in chapter 7 that it is commonly 
argued that the services suffer greatly from the tyrannies of
«•
the plan, the wage system, the bureaucratization of the 
professions and the atomization of responsibilities between 
organizations as well as their conflicting interests. Some 
articles, though not many, focus on the contradiction between 
the principle of central planning and the need to meet 
consumer demands in the retail trade. For instance, 
Literaturnaya gazeta published an interview of N. N. 
Mirotvortsev, deputy chairman of Gosp1 an (USSR), the interest 
of which does not lie so much in the official's answers as in 
the journalist's questions. Little impressed by the deputy 
chairman's announcement that investments in light industry 
for the period 1971-75 will be twice the amount allocated to 
heavy industry for the same period, A. Levikov asks several 
questions which obviously sum up the concerns of Soviet 
consumers: How can enterprises be stopped from producing low 
quality, old-fashioned or dud goods? Will consumer demand be 
better studied in the future? Can a greater degree of 
flexibility in planning and production be expected? How can
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enterprises be encouraged to produce goods in smaller 
quantities as. consumers hanker for variety?** Mirotvortsev 
concedes that there is a need to study consumer demand, yet 
on the whole his replies are nebulous.*?
Another high-ranking official working for Gosplan, the 
economist N. Buzlyakov, defines the responsibilities of the 
planning organizations in more outspoken terms. He very 
simply shifts the blame for planning errors on to the 
industrial ministries and the enterprises, as well as on the 
USSR Ministry of Trade, thus revealing a conservative belief 
in the ability of the retail organizations to know what 
consumers want and to resist the pressure put on them to 
accept unwanted goods.* 8
Buzlyakov's contribution is followed by an article, 
entitled 'Choice', in which the reform-minded economist G. 
Lisichkin argues that discussing who is to blame for 
'planning errors' is beside the point. The crux of the matter 
is that planning is bound to be inefficient as long as it is 
not based on a thorough analysis of the market:
... the individual has the opportunity 
to come 'out of himself', to look for 
ways of developing his personality. The 
variety of needs is such that it is 
quite natural that uniformity should 
give way to individual requirements and 
differences more and more often. In 
these conditions it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to plan the 
production of goods on the basis of 
standardized norms, which presuppose 
that all individuals purchase the same 
amount of books, fruit and mincing- 
machines . * 9
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Another economic principle advocated by a number of 
writers is that supply should exceed demand. Shortages give 
rise to all sorts of negative practices. How can employees in 
the retail trade be forced to follow the rules protecting the 
interests of consumers, I 1 ' ina argues, when they know 
perfectly well that customers have no alternative but to buy 
what is available in the shops?50 On the other hand, 
Kuznetsova points out, when commenting upon the uniformity 
and dullness of Soviet clothing, many refuse to purchase
c
goods they do not care for and buy fashionable clothes 'from 
under the counter" for great sums of money.51
This idea is extensively developed by Prof. E. Liberman 
in an article analysing the reasons for queues in shops.52 
Liberman claims that nobody believes any more that in the 
socialist society demand should exceed supply, a theory used 
in the past to justify the shortages. Only if supply exceeds 
demand, Liberman argues, and the consumer has the right to 
choose, will the quality of goods and services improve 
drastically. What's more, this principle must not be 
considered alien to socialism:
Some are disturbed by the analogy with 
capitalist competition (konkurentsiya). 
But in this case it is purely a 
terminological scarecrow. Our type of 
competition (sorevnovanie), which aims 
to achieve the best standards of service 
for Soviet consumers, will not lead to 
the ruin or bankruptcy of enterprises, 
nor will it lead to their being bought 
up by monopolists... In the same way as 
profit (pribyl') in our conditions does 
not clear the way for capitalist profit 
(nazhiva), competition (sostyazanie) 
between our enterprises will not lead to
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anything even remotely conforming to the 
essence and results of capitalist 
compe t i t i on. 5 3
Contributions from reform-minded economists, such as 
Liberman and Lisichkin do not make up the bulk of the 
material on consumer issues. However, the views expounded in 
their articles belong to a broader discussion which concerns 
the whole economic system. Therefore it is necessary to 
examine briefly the main themes recurring in the economic 
section of the paper in order to assess to what extent
<•
Li tera turnaya gazeta was committed to the idea of a more 
consumer-oriented economy.
The economic section of the paper is very large 
(approximately 530,000 words).54 it occupies slightly more 
than twice the space allocated to the articles examined in 
parts II and III combined. A fair amount of publicity is 
given to extremely harsh criticisms of the development 
policies implemented in the Far North and Siberia (appalling 
living conditions, wasteful exploitation of raw material, 
pollution etc...) Yet the overwhelming majority of the 
material deals with the nature of the economic system and the 
1965 economic reform. No separate debate on the consumer 
sector is to be found, which is perhaps not so surprising. M. 
McAuley argues that the economic debate was encouraged by 
Khrushchev because of the unexpected low rate of growth in 
the sectors of the economy traditionally favoured by central 
planning organizations. While not dismissing the issue of 
priorities completely, economists no longer saw the
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proportion of resources intended for the consumer sector in 
relation to heavy industry and defence as the main issue. The 
discussion focused on the very nature of central planning.55
First of all, there is a broad consensus among most 
contributors to Literaturnaya gazeta about the progressive 
nature of the reform and the new ideas it promotes, in 
particular, the notion that quality, productivity and profit, 
rather than gross output, must be the criteria used to gauge 
industrial performance. Other popular themes are self- 
financing of enterprises and the need to increase managerial 
powers and material incentives. Some authors give 
enthusiastic accounts of enterprises introducing new methods 
of management, for instance, the famous Shchekino chemical 
plant where management set out to tackle, among other things, 
the problem of the hoarding of labour.56
At the same time, there is a general and strong feeling 
that the reform has been thwarted by the planning 
organizations and the ministries, which have shown no sign of 
wanting to change their methods of work. These institutions 
are still frequently criticized for imposing unrealistic 
targets upon enterprises, altering plans without consulting 
managers or using the same old criteria for the allocation of 
supply and wage funds. Managers have remained reluctant to 
stop hoarding labour as supplies keep being erratic and 
enterprises are still expected to provide labour resources 
for work outside their premises (harvest, construction 
etc...). As a result of the planning organizations and
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ministries' de facto refusal to relinquish some of their 
enormous power, the increased economic autonomy promised to 
managers by the reform has not materialized; neither has 
profit become the yardstick by which industrial performance 
i s measured.
Literaturnaya gazeta published some bold contributions, 
in particular from the reform-minded economist Birman, who, 
in one of his articles, calls for the creation of 'economic 
conditions which would leave enterprises with only two
<•
alternatives: that of working well or closing down!' - a view 
which is far from being unanimously supported by other 
participants in the debate.57 The idea of using the market 
as a regulating mechanism is occasionally advocated, yet only 
in relation to supplies which the planning organizations are 
deemed incapable of rationalizing, hence the phenomenon of 
supply hoarding and the existence of a flourishing black 
market. 5 8
Yet, on the whole, the idea of the market is very little 
discussed. Even Birman, in an article taking stock of the 
reform after five years of its implementation, leaves the 
question of a socialist market aside, although he is 
unenthusiast ic , to say the least, about the changes in the 
management of the economy. While conceding that some 
improvement can be observed in the planning stage and some 
degree of se1f-finane ing has been taking place in a number of 
enterprises, he notes that technical progress is still slow 
to come as managers have no incentive to innovate,
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productivity has not increased sufficiently, overmanning is 
still the rule, and, very importantly, profit still plays a 
minimal part in the life of the enterprise. Birman believes 
that the programme of the reform needs to be modified, 
remarking, however, that, whatever the inadequacies of the 
present reform may be, it has not been fully implemented 
because of the unwillingness on the part of the planning 
organizations and the ministries to cooperate.59
A. Nove points out that while the decree of 1965 
prescribed a move towards greater managerial powers, it also 
restored the Ail-Union industrial ministries, thus 
undermining the influence of republican and other regional 
planning organizations considerably. Therefore, the decree 
itself revealed the leadership's clear intention to preserve 
a highly centralized economy.60 Yet, although Li teraturnaya 
gazeta clearly sides with the opponents of extreme central 
planning, it cautiously avoids any direct criticism of the 
lack of political will to curtail the power of Gospl an and 
the All-Union ministries. On the other hand, the paper gives 
a great deal of attention to issues which, albeit not devoid 
of importance, remain subordinate to the more general debate 
on central planning. There is, for instance, the discussion 
on the need to computerize the management of enterprises, 
seen by some as a panacea while others argue that, however 
useful computerization may be in regulating production, the 
process still remains hampered by an unpredictable supply 
system. There is also the extensive debate on the need to
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train a new breed of managers, capable of delegating unlike 
the 'little Stalins' of old. (Business and management schools 
in the USA seem to be as enticing as the American advertising 
industry in the eyes of several contributors.) Finally, the 
question of material incentive is widely discussed. Wage- 
levelling policies are unpopular, as well as the still 
predominant practice of awarding bonuses on the basis of 
collective, rather than individual, performance - 6l
The weakness of the economic debates published by
«•
Literaturnaya gazeta is not surprising. After the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia the conservatives quickly re-established 
their authority, removing from the 1965 reform everything 
that could have diminished the role of the state in the 
management of the economy. The hopes entertained by the 
reform—minded economists of the sixties were finally dashed 
by the December 1969 Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU, which opted for the old authoritarian centralized 
approach with a reaffirmed commitment to the development of 
science, technology and improved management techniques. At 
the beginning of the seventies it became increasingly 
difficult, and eventually impossible, to defend the theory of 
the socialist market economy in the legal press.62
The political constraints imposed by the Brezhnev 
administration are clearly reflected in the timorous 
contributions on economic issues published by Literaturnaya 
gazeta. There is no doubt that the great emphasis laid on the 
frustrations of Soviet consumers is greatly undermined by the
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paper's failure to publicize an open and thorough debate on 
ways of dismantling the command economy, which is 
intrinsically unresponsive to demands from both producers and 
consumers.
At the same time, Literaturnaya gazeta chose to voice 
the disappointment of the reform-minded section of the 
intelligentsia and contributed to bringing discredit upon the 
existing system. The harsh criticism systematically levelled 
at planning authorities, ministries, organizations providing 
services and the retail trade, which permeates the economic 
section as well as the debates concentrating on consumer 
issues, reveals a keen and openly expressed aversion to the 
command economy. Furthermore, although Literaturnaya gazeta 
was in no position to tackle the political forces working for 
the preservation of central planning, it clearly spoke on 
behalf of Soviet citizens, voicing their consumer demands 
with a high degree of militancy. The implicit subversiveness 
of Literaturnaya gazeta also lies in its consistent efforts 
to place the issue of consumer rights within the broader 
context of a policy for the genuine democratization of 
society.
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PART FOUR
THE LEGAL SYSTEM ON TRIAL
During the years 1967-71 Literaturnaya gazeta allocated 
a substantial amount of space to contributions on crime and
<
legal matters (approximately 180,000 words). While focusing 
on certain aspects of the legislation or the judiciary 
system, these articles often turn out to be sources of 
information about the country's social problems. Indeed, one 
possible approach would be to examine the social issues 
raised by the numerous court cases referred to in the 
articles. The much less frequent, yet outspoken, reports on 
law and order also bring to light social evils that used to 
receive little or no coverage in the pre-g1asnost' Soviet 
press. There is, for example, Cherepakhova's remarkable 
piece about a supposedly successful exercise in law 
enforcement in the Ukrainian village of Chigirinskii, which 
gives her the opportunity to describe in some detail the 
predicament of many similar uprooted rural communities, 
riven by alcoholism and domestic strife, fighting and 
vandalism, theft and juvenile delinquency.!
Admittedly, in the late sixties Literaturnaya gazeta was 
not the only publication to dabble in social realism while
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debating legal issues. In 1968, for instance, only one year 
after the paper's new format was launched, the monthly law 
review Che1ovek i zakon was founded as part of a general 
effort to enhance the legal awareness of the population.2 It 
is rather difficult to establish whether the somewhat 
surprising popularity of the review all through the 
seventies stemmed from the Soviet public's growing concern 
for legality, or whether it testified to its craving for 
human stories revealing the 'New Soviet Man 1 's capacity for
c
reprehensible behaviour. The fact remains that accounts of 
court cases provide valuable, albeit fragmentary, 
information on the state of the Soviet nation.
However rewarding such a reading of the material on 
crime and legal issues may be, a different approach will be 
adopted here, partly because Literaturnaya gazeta is likely 
to contain a much less comprehensive and vivid exposition of 
social 'negative phenomena' than the above-mentioned 
specialized publication. More importantly, this study seeks 
to reflect the main concern of the paper, which was to bring 
the inadequacies of Soviet law to the attention of its 
readers.
The contributions on crime and legal matters fall into 
two broad categories. Some of them concentrate on specific 
areas of the law; others raise questions pertaining to the 
legal system in general.
The number of articles dealing with specific pieces of 
legislation is relatively small (approx. 25,000 words),
-310-
yet a variety of issues are tackled. One day it is a plea 
for the introduction of legislation against cruelty to pets 
in all the republics of the Union; the next, a fierce attack 
on industrial managers and trade-unions who unabashedly 
flout labour laws aimed at protecting workers from health 
hazards and industrial injuries.3 However, most of the 
articles on particular areas of the law deal with family 
problems and economic crimes. For instance, a couple of 
articles examine the new legislation on divorce procedures,
c-
the bone of contention being not so much the liberalization 
of the law as the issue of financial responsibility for 
children of divorced or unmarried parents; the lawyer N. M. 
Ershova argues that fathers should be obliged to pay alimony 
while her male colleague, A. Belyavskii, suggests that they 
be let off the hook and that alimony be replaced by 
substantially increased child benefits.* On several 
occasions L. Libedinskaya harshly criticizes housing laws 
which leave divorcees with no alternative but to keep living 
together.5 Finally, a few articles raise the issue of the 
inability of the law to protect children and teenagers 
adequately, either because the problems of 'difficult 
children' are incompetently addressed by the courts and law- 
enforcing agencies, or because personnel working in 
orphanages can often get away with ill-treating children.6
The most interesting contributions on economic law are 
those which analyse court cases where managers have been 
accused of unlawful activities in the execution of their
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duties. All the different authors agree that managers who 
are committed to running their plants or farms efficiently 
cannot do otherwise than break some of the hundreds of 
obstructive, often obsolete, laws which regulate, or rather 
are supposed to regulate, the country's economic life, in 
particular laws restricting the use of funds. The argument 
is always expounded with great candour and openness. For 
example, A. Shleer, an investigator, quotes the case of a 
dishonest foreman who cooked the books partly in order to 
pay his workers who had been idle through no fault of their 
own, but because supplies had not been delivered on time. 
Shleer draws the following conclusion:
. . . and his C the foreman's] logic is 
very simple: ' If I have to cook the 
books in the interest of production, 
then why not cook them for my own 
profit, too? 1 ... Of course the 
overwhelming majority of builders do not 
do such things. They are honest, decent 
people. Still, they too have to break 
the law because sometimes there isn't 
any other way. And investigators find 
themselves in a position where they have 
to engage in some strange reasoning: 
'Here there's been forgery, yet there 
doesn't seem to have been any serious 
crime; after all he hasn't pocketed a 
single kopeck for himself. On the other 
hand, that one has. He is a 
plunderer. . . ' But the problem is that 
there has been forgery in both cases.7
The authors of these articles call for a re-examination 
of the economic law, which, they insist, should not punish 
managers for being enterprising and efficient.8 This position 
is in line with the paper's defence of shabashni ches tvo . 
Indeed, the hiring of informal building teams is not
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prohibited by the law, yet leads to illegal practices as 
supplies and the money needed for the wages usually have to 
be illegaly obtained.
However outspoken and unambiguous Literaturnaya gazeta's 
position on the issue may be, it must be emphasized that the 
point is made in only a small number of articles and that 
none of them triggered off any lengthy debate analysing the 
reasons for such a situation and ways of putting it right. 
This is not altogether surprising. It makes sense that the
c
great limitations placed on the economic debate should have 
made themselves felt in the discussions of the economic law. 
The inadequacy of the legislation is, indeed, intrinsically 
linked with the nature of the economic system as a whole, a 
fact which has been demonstrated for a considerable number of 
years by Western economists.9
This brief survey of contributions dealing with specific 
areas of the law shows that they were somewhat limited in 
scope. Furthermore, most of them raise issues which go beyond 
the legal dimension and need to be analysed in the context of 
the social and economic problems to which they are related.
The present study will concentrate on these areas of the 
debate which raise issues about the very nature of the 
judiciary system. During the five years currently under 
examination Literaturnaya gazeta gave a great deal of 
importance to two main questions. Firstly, a substantial 
amount of space was allocated to contributions questioning 
official theories in the field of criminology, including the
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question of penalties and society's attitude towards 
offenders. Secondly, the paper publicized the debate on the 
shortcomings of the criminal procedure, paying particular 
attention to the procuracy and the preliminary investigation, 
the role of public assessors and that of defence lawyers.
Literaturnaya gazeta did not pioneer the search for ways 
of ensuring a better protection of citizens' rights. The 
process of change was triggered off by the XXI and XXII 
Congresses of the CPSU (1959 and 1961), at which Stalin was 
accused of violating socialist legality and Vyshinskii's 
ideas were fiercely attacked. The 1961 Party programme 
promoted the notion of socialist law and order and advocated 
the fullest extension of personal freedom and citizens' 
rights. As a result of these major political developments, 
the powers of the secret police were considerably curtailed 
and new, more liberal, codes were introduced. 10
Many Western writers on Soviet law have emphasized the 
limited impact of the Soviet legal reform on the protection 
of the citizens by the law. Herman argues that ten years 
after Stalin's death Soviet law is still totalitarian, in 
particular because political power continues to be beyond the 
scrutiny or control of legislative or judicial bodies and 
because it remains the law of a planned economy. 11 Johnson 
remarks that freedom of expression is guaranteed as long as 
it is used, he quotes, 'in conformity with the interests of 
the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist 
system'.i2 According to Makepeace the new emphasis on the
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rights of individuals does not ensure their protection 
against the state as official ideology still preaches that 
individuals' rights and interests cannot be in conflict with 
those of the socialist state.13 As for the former Soviet 
lawyer Konstantin Simis, he believes that the principle of 
legality does not operate at all in the Soviet Union as the 
all-powerful CPSU places itself above the law.i*
It would be unreasonable to expect Literaturnaya gazeta 
to have denounced the Party's hold on the legal system or the 
restrictions placed on freedom of speech. Nothing is to be 
found on these questions apart from A. Chakovskii's ugly 
piece condemning the dissident writers Ginzburg, Galanskov, 
Dobrovo1'skii and Laskova, who, he claims, were given a fair 
trial, his key argument being that freedom of opinion must be 
used to 'improve the socialist society, not to destroy it'.15
While this crude attack on dissidents by the chief- 
editor must not be dismissed lightly - it is, after all, a 
sinister reminder of the paper's ultimate subservience to the 
political establishment - it would be wrong to judge the 
political significance of Literaturnaya gazeta solely on the 
basis of Chakovskii's isolated, though unambiguous, outburst 
of intolerance and unshakeabl^faith in Soviet justice. The 
debates which will be examined in the next two chapters 
reveal a great deal of dissatisfaction with the legal system 
and raise questions about the nature of the relationship 
between the individual and the state, which are to some
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extent reminiscent of some of the objections made by the 
above-mentioned Western critics.
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IX. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
In his study of Soviet law H. J. Herman establishes a 
link between Soviet conceptions of crime and the Russian 
Orthodox notion of the 'corporate character of sin' . The 
whole community shares in the guilt of the criminal, who is 
perceived as a victim of society or of his own human 
weaknesses. Sympathy for the criminal, however, does not 
necessarily lead to the belief that the crime should not be
<•
harshly punished. As a matter of fact, Berman remarks,:
. . . many Russians waver between a 
religious sentiment of leniency toward 
the offender and a political acceptance 
of the necessity to sacrifice his 
interests to those of the state. 1
It could be argued that this ambivalent attitude towards 
criminal behaviour is reflected in the discrepancy between, 
on the one hand, the progressive, albeit simplistic, Soviet 
theory of the social origin of crime, and, on the other, the 
harsh justice exercised by Soviet courts. The American 
journalist, George Feifer, who had been impressed, during his 
study of Soviet law, by the emphasis placed in Soviet legal 
literature on 'the need to re-educate and reform, rather than 
to punish, criminals', was taken aback by Soviet judges' 
readiness to pass on extremely stiff sentences for minor 
offences.2 Soviet judges tend to punish not so much the 
criminal act itself as the offender's failure to be a good 
member of the community. For instance, theft of state 
property is considered as being extremely reprehensible,
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whatever the value of the goods stolen, because it reveals 
the offender's disregard for the collective. It is 
interesting to note that this concern for what Herman calls 
the 'subjectivity of crime 1 is not regarded as a unique 
feature of Soviet justice, but rather as part and parcel of 
the Russian legal tradition. 3
There was a time when the official theory, that Man 
being a product of society criminal behaviour had its roots 
in negative social circumstances created by capitalism or
c
'vestiges of bourgeois society 1 , was used to justify leniency 
in the courts. During the first years of Soviet power, 
offenders whose crimes were attributed, say, to poverty would 
get away with relatively light sentences.* But the high 
level of lawlessness caused by the social and political 
upheavals following the Revolution as well as, a few years 
later, the drastic regimentation of Soviet society under 
Stalin resulted in a tragic reversal of the trend. In the 
sixties, although the Soviet system had been cleansed of 
Stalin's most outrageous violations of legality and more 
liberal criminal codes were being introduced, Soviet 
justice remained harsh, as though Soviet judges could not 
forgive offenders for disproving the still upheld official 
theory that crime is bound to disappear in a socialist 
society. This is, indeed, the impression that Soviet judges 
seem to have made on Feifer when he observed the work of 
the courts in Moscow at the beginning of the sixties:
'We are building communism 1 , they 
[judges] seem to say (and often they do
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say it), 'and if you are not willing to 
help after we have given you every 
opportunity to do so, then you are not 
worth our effort and we are not willing 
to he 1p you' .5
In the sixties Soviet justice was marked by a rather 
puzzling contradiction which echoes Herman's observation. On 
the one hand, it was based on a theory promoting the, after 
all, enlightened view that social and economic factors must 
be taken into account if a good understanding of criminal 
behaviour is to be reached; on the other, Soviet judicial 
practice appeared * unreasonab1y harsh to many observers both 
in the West and in the Soviet Union. The debates publicized 
by Literaturnaya gazeta (approximately 60,000 words) examine 
both the theory and the practice.
1. The Controversy over the Development of Criminology 
The development of Soviet criminology was virtually 
halted in the mid-thirties. (The last national statistics on 
crime published under Stalin date from 1935.)6 Neither of the 
two tendencies which coexisted during the twenties succeeded 
in resisting the onslaught of official dogmas. The 
biopsycho1ogica1 theories came under attack with the end of 
the NEP, while the 'sociologists', who had had their hour of 
glory when denouncing the biological determinism of their 
opponents, eventually became redundant in the eyes of the 
official ideologists. Indeed, the painfully simplistic 
conception of crime as a product of capitalism meant that it 
was no longer necessary to research into the causes of
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criminal behaviour as they were expected to disappear 
gradually with the building of socialism.7
Like many of their colleagues in other disciplines, 
criminologists and lawyers had to wait until the mid-fifties 
before they could resume genuine research. And after twenty 
years of intellectual hibernation, the profession once again 
found itself divided between 'sociologists' and 'biologists'.
The socio-economic approach has been championed, in 
particular, by the high-powered All-Union Institute for the 
Study of Crime aYid the Elaboration of Measures of Crime 
Prevention, which was created in 1963 and placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Procurator General of the USSR.8 In an 
interview published by Literaturnaya gazeta, the deputy- 
director of the Institute, G. I. Kocharov, emphasizes that 
the mission of his research centre is to investigate the 
reasons why crime has not ceased to exist in socialist 
society. He then summarizes his researchers' latest findings, 
which have revealed that alcoholism and low levels of 
education are the most important factors contributing to the 
unabated presence of crime in the country. (3/4 of crimes are 
committed under the influence of alcohol; 50% of murderers 
are people who did not continue with their studies after 
primary school . )9
This type of research is in line with the authorities' 
acknowledgement of the need for a more realistic picture of 
Soviet society and the subsequent revival of sociology. Even 
though there is no indication in the article that the
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1 vestiges-of-the-past ' theory might have been discarded (it 
is easy enough to claim that alcoholism and low levels of 
education are the legacy of pre-Revolutionary Russia), it is 
nevertheless clearly argued that measures must be taken in 
order to rid socialist society of such negative social 
phenomena, and this requires scientific research as well as a 
public debate. Indeed, judging by Kocharov's contribution, 
the Institute seems to favour a move towards more 'g1asnost'' 
on crime in the media although journalists are warned against
c
the temptation of sensationalism and that of using the press 
as a means of establishing the guilt of the accused before 
the investigators and the courts had time to do their work - 
probably an allusion to the role of the press in Stalin's 
campaigns against 'enemies of the people 1 .10
It is hardly surprising that the sociological approach 
should have succeeded in reasserting itself as the only way 
to further the development of criminology in the eyes of the 
academic establishment. After all, it rests on the postulate, 
never relinquished by Soviet ideologists, that all criminal 
behaviour is socially determined. In the sixties, however, 
some researchers were eager to revive the biopsychological 
school of thought which flourished in the twenties. In his 
study of Soviet criminal law, R. W. Makepeace points out 
that, while these 'distinctly biologically oriented 
theories', such as those of I. S. Noi, enjoyed little 
publicity, they received a great deal of criticism. 11 It is 
all the more interesting to note that Literaturnaya gazeta
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did publicize trends which did not exclude biology from the 
study of criminal behaviour.
The controversy amongst crimino1ogists, publicized by 
Literaturnaya gazeta, between the 'sociologists' and the 
'biologists' is part of the more general debate on the need 
for an 'Institute of Man 1 , which has already been examined in 
chapter 4.12 Literaturnaya gazeta chose to familiarize its 
readers with the issue by asking law specialists to comment 
upon a letter from a reader who expressed the view that the 
explanation for aViy crime is to be found in human nature 
rather than social circumstances. The first contributor, Dr 
V. Kudryavtsev, supports the sociological approach, 
vigorously disagreeing that criminals are born criminals, an 
idea which he sees as summing up the biological argument, and 
reiterates that only social factors can account for criminal 
behaviour. As for psychopaths, who make up a tiny minority 
amongst criminals, they must receive medical treatment rather 
than be punished. Nevertheless, Kudryavtsev welcomes the idea 
of using the expertise of psychologists at various stages of - 
the criminal procedure as well as in law-enforcement 
agencies, arguing that the cause of any crime has its roots 
in the interaction between the individual's personality and 
his environment, the psychological make up of the criminal 
being, itself, a product of the social system.13
On the other hand, professors N. Struchkov and B. 
Utevskii advocate a close cooperation between psychology and 
biology. While agreeing with Kudryavtsev that no one is born
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a criminal, thus indirectly pointing to the simplistic 
interpretation the 'sociologists' tend to make of their 
theories, they criticize him for underestimating the role of 
the personality in assessing the causes of criminal behaviour 
and for failing to recognize that an individual's personality 
is the product of both 'the social and the biological'. 
Criminologists must research into biological, physiological, 
psychological phenomena and their interaction with social 
factors.l*
Four months Mater three letters from academics which 
refer to the above-mentioned exchange of views were published 
in the Discussion Club section of the paper. The 
biopsycho1ogica1 school of thought is supported by only one 
contributor, Ya . lorish from the Philosophy Department of the 
Main Library for Social Sciences, who argues that criminology 
should include research not only in psychology, but also in 
biology, genetics, physiology, biochemistry and anthropology. 
Sexual offences and the infliction of torture are given as 
examples of crimes which cannot be explained solely in social 
terms.l5
Literaturnaya gazeta was careful to print two other 
letters which back Kudryavtsev's argument, thus 
counterbalancing lorish 1 s outspoken defence of the anti- 
establishment camp. Yet the editors conclude this highly 
significant, albeit brief, debate by coming out on the side 
of those who call for further research into the 
biopsycho1ogica1 aspects of crime.
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The position adopted by Literaturnaya gazeta might 
appear somewhat disconcerting to the Western reader, wary of 
the biological argument in the assessment of criminal 
behaviour. Marxists are not alone in arguing that this line 
of thought can sustain the most reactionary theories on 
crime. However, the paper's stand in the controversy must be 
evaluated within the framework of the more general debate on 
the need to break away from official dogmas which reduce Man 
to a social being. As pointed out in chapter 4, Li teraturnaya 
gazeta unambiguously chose to promote the liberal view that a 
p1uridiscip1inary approach is required in order to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of human nature.
Wh ile backing the 'biologists', Literaturnaya gazeta 
nevertheless does not forsake the 'sociologists', whose work 
is publicized, for example, in the interview of the deputy- 
director of the Institute of Criminology attached to the 
Procuracy of the USSR. Nonetheless, in their conclusion to 
the debate the editors argue, firstly, that sociological 
research cannot, by itself, provide adequate answers; 
secondly, that science needs to incorporate a wide range of 
viewpoints, 'otherwise stagnation (zastoi ) sets in. 1 The 
paper's advocacy of academic pluralism echoes lorish's thinly 
veiled allusion to the effect that Soviet science has not yet 
shaken off the yoke of Stalinism. Those who describe any 
attempt to involve biologists in crimino1ogica1 research as a 
'concession to bourgeois ideology', lorish argues, work on 
the depressingly simplistic assumption that 'if non-Marxists
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say "yes", then we should say "no"', and, he goes further to 
assert that :
It is people guided by such a motto who, 
in their times, rejected the theory of 
relativity, classical genetics, 
cybernetics etc...ie
The relatively brief debate on the biopsycho1ogica1 
approach in criminology did not recur at a later stage during 
the years 67-71. On the other hand, the pro-psychology 
argument was frequently propounded in the pages of 
Literaturnaya gazeta throughout this period. This might be 
explained by the fact that both schools of thought emphasized 
the need for crimino1ogists and members of the legal 
profession to resort to the expertise of psychologists, the 
'sociologists' justifying their stand by arguing that the 
psychological is never free of the social . This does not 
necessarily imply that psychologists were made welcome in the 
courts. In fact, judging by several pieces published by 
Literaturnaya gazeta, most investigators, procurators and 
judges seemed to have remained reluctant to involve them in
i
the criminal procedure.
Not all the authors who reprove the courts for not using 
the expertise of psychologists share exactly the same 
concerns. Some are primarily anxious that a better 
understanding of criminal behaviour be achieved so that 
adequate preventive measures can be taken. For example, V. 
Eliseeva, a journalist who has been called upon to exercise 
the duties of a people's assessor, is amazed by the great
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number of 'meaningless' violations of the law, often 
committed under the influence of alcohol, which, she argues, 
cannot be accounted for by unfavourable socio-economic 
circumstances. She wonders how it can be explained, for 
instance, that teenagers steal items that they do not even 
'need', thus indirectly pointing to the inadequacies of 
theories defining needs in purely socio-economic terms. 
Eliseeva is also alarmed by the judges' failure to 
discriminate between offenders according to their personal 
histories, and, in case of youngsters, to trace back the 
causes of their behaviour to a deficient moral education, in 
particular, within the family.17
The call for a greater use of psychological expertise to 
gain some real understanding of criminal behaviour is not 
necessarily motivated by the wish to see more leniency in the 
courts. For instance, Eliseeva deplores the fact that the two 
lads who killed the dog that they had stolen have been 
punished for the theft, but not for their cruelty to the 
animal. Professor K. Platonov, a researcher in criminal. 
psychology, believes that the sentence need not be stiffer, 
but rather must be adapted to the personality of the offender 
in order to be more effective.* 8
Other contributors express the view that the failure to 
use the expertise of psychologists frequently leads to 
miscarriages of justice. The most general complaint is that 
prosecutors and judges tend to present the accused as a 
villain devoid of any redeeming features, thus unfairly
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influencing the outcome of the trial. A more specific 
criticism is that, as little attention is given to the 
psychological state of the offender at the moment of the 
crime, it is often wrongly assumed that the crime was, 
indeed, premeditated. M. Yakubovich, the head of the 
Department of Criminal Law at the High School attached to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, maintains that a great number 
of miscarriages of justice originate from the reluctance of 
judges to consider whether the right to self-defence might 
apply, and for thi^s reason he, too, argues that psychologists 
must be allowed, or even invited, to testify, precisely in 
order to help the court clarify the circumstances of the 
crime.19
It is also pointed ' out by some contributors that 
miscarriages of justice can happen because no attempt has 
been made to assess the psychological state of witnesses. 
Indeed, witnesses are not necessarily reliable sources of 
information whether because they wish to remain loyal to 
their friends or, more simply, because they might have 
wrongly interpreted the situation and jumped to 
cone 1 us ions.20
Finally, the pro-psychology lobby includes those who 
seek to encourage a more compassionate attitude towards 
offenders both in the court and in society at large. In a 
'Discussion club' page devoted to the question of crime N. 
Chetunova suggests that it is not always easy to draw the 
line between right and wrong, and that offenders are not all
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bad. 21 Her article is followed by a reader's letter telling 
the story of a man driven to crime by a series of personal 
tragedies for which other members of his family must be held 
responsib1e. 22 The third contribution is an interview, 
conducted by Yu. Pavlov and V. Perel'man, in which the writer 
and ex-criminal Akhto Levi makes a distinction between 
'professional criminals', who are a minority, and the 
majority of those who just happen to be easily influenced. 
While not condoning the letter's weakness of character, Levi
<•
understands why in corrective labour camps youngsters, in 
particular, should be more impressed by 'courageous 1 hard- 
core criminals always prepared to take risks, rather than by 
the usually badly trained and often corrupt so-called 
' educators'.23
The well-known defence lawyer Arkadii Vaksberg, a 
regular contributor to Literaturnaya gazeta, establishes a 
clear connection between the need to show more compassion and 
the desire to attain higher standards of justice. Referring 
to the case of a jealous husband who attempted to strangle 
his wife, Vaksberg argues that the judge gave him an 
unreasonably stiff sentence because what had driven this 
'perhaps a little dull yet loving ' husband into committing 
an 'unforgivable' crime, in particular the behaviour of his 
'selfish' wife, had been completely overlooked by the court. 
He then offers the following comment:
It is a pity that our courts should call 
on the help of psychological expertise 
so rarely, so timidly, so unwillingly, 
in spite of the possibilities offered by
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the law... If only psychologists were 
more regular guests, or rather advisers, 
in our courts, a much more accurate, 
clear and convincing interpretation 
would be placed on the motives of the 
actions which have led to dramatic and 
intricate conflicts.24
This article triggered off a strong reaction from a 
female reader, who, in a later issue, was given the 
opportunity to argue against Vaksberg that jealousy ought not 
be regarded as an acceptable extenuating circumstance.25 But 
the article is also related to a more general controversy on
c
the harshness of the law, which Vaksberg greatly helped to 
sustain, as will become apparent in the analysis of the 
debate.
2.Vaksberg's Plea for Softer Sentences
It is commonly recognized that the criminal codes 
adopted under Khrushchev testified to a significant degree of 
liberalization in the Soviet legal system. Punishments for 
minor crimes such as, for example, petty thefts, were greatly 
reduced and certain offences, in particular abortion and 
absenteeism at work, were decriminalized. At the same time 
Western scholars have been anxious to point out that the 
legislation introduced in the early sixties stipulated 
extremely harsh sentences for certain categories of offences. 
Some forms of 'hooliganism' were to be treated more severely, 
recidivists were to be given heavier sentences, the death 
penalty became applicable to a wide variety of crimes, 
including those of an economic nature. One should also
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mention the blatantly undemocratic anti-parasite laws, which 
have been used , in particular, against dissidents.26
Although the debate on the harshness of the law 
publicized by Literaturnaya gazeta fails to examine the 
appropriateness of specific sentences, it nevertheless 
highlights the limitations of the process of liberalization 
by questioning the inconsistent and often authoritarian 
interpretation by the courts of the existing legislation.
The debate was triggered by Arkadii Vaksberg's article,
<•
printed in the already mentioned Discussion Club page devoted 
to legal issues.27 Vaksberg compares the case of a man who 
received a three-year suspended sentence for stabbing a woman 
with that of a teenager sentenced to two years' imprisonment 
for fighting with a friend from whom he tried to steal twenty 
kopecks. Outraged by the leniency of the former sentence as 
much as by the unjustified severity of the latter, Vaksberg 
interestingly argues that these unacceptable discrepancies 
stem from the courts' tendency to make a judgement on the 
defendant rather than on the particular crime which has been 
committed, thus criticizing the 'subjectivism' of Soviet 
courts which has always astonished Western observers.28
Vaksberg also reproves judges for systematically
'inflating' sentences because they fear that light ones might
be repealed, yet expect harsh ones to be reduced by the
Courts of Appeal, which, unfortunately, does not always
happen.
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Vaksberg's pieces, and this one is no exception, are 
permeated by a feeling of compassion, compassion, perhaps, 
for the clients for whom he has failed to secure a fairer 
sentence and whose 1ives have been destroyed by undeserved 
prison sentences. After their release from corrective labour 
camps, ex-offenders are no longer entitled to their residence 
permit and do not find work easily. They often come back 
embittered and are likely to remain alienated members of 
society. In the end, Vaksberg concludes, no one gains from an
c
unreasonably harsh implementation of the law.29
The subversiveness of Vaksberg's liberal stand appears 
all the more evident when compared with the replies to his 
article, which are both very critical of him, though to 
differing degrees. In the first contribution, L. Mironov, 
deputy chairman of the Moscow Town Court, systematically 
refutes all the arguments put forward by Vaksberg, taking it 
upon himself, it would seem, to defend the honour of his 
profession. Indignant at Vaksberg's portrayal of judges as 
heartless bureaucrats who give little thought to the 
implications of their decisions for the future of defendants, 
Mironov casts doubt on the defence lawyer's intellectual 
honesty, remarking that he conveniently overlooked the fact 
that the supposedly harmless youngster badly beat up the 
other lad and violently resisted the police. More 
importantly, Mironov reiterates his support for the very 
theory which Vaksberg rejects, i.e., that the extent of the 
theft, in this case a mere twenty kopeck coin, is not
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necessarily a determining factor in establishing the nature 
or length of the sentence, the degree of 'immorality 1 
revealed by the offender being equally significant, if not 
more so. Mironov's contribution does not add anything new to 
the debate, yet shows that the notion that a criminal court 
ought to be a 'court of morals' is deeply ingrained in Soviet 
judicial practice.30 Mironov also reminds us of the low 
status of Soviet defence lawyers as he irreverently dismisses 
Vaksberg's claim by lamely concluding that only a barrister 
can entertain sucK thoughts.31
The author of the second reply, Dr G. Anashkin, takes a 
more moderate view, playing the part of referee between the 
two professions. On the one hand, he deems Vaksberg's 
sweeping criticism of judges unfounded, declares Soviet 
legislation 'one of the most humane in the world' , approves 
of the heavier sentences recently introduced to punish 
certain forms of 'hooliganism' and wishes that other 
offences, such as, for example, theft of material and 
production of defective goods in industry, were more severely 
and more systematically punished by the law. On the other 
hand, Anashkin calls for a stengthening of the role of the 
defence, agrees that unnecessarily stiff sentences are 
counterproductive and believes that, as a rule, a move 
towards softer punishments should be encouraged. 'The closer 
socialism comes to communism', he argues, 'the less coercion 
needs to be exercised 1 . Anashkin also favours the search for 
types of punishment other than imprisonment, an idea which
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Vaksberg, too, will defend later on. However, rather than a 
whole-hearted defence of Vaksberg, Anashkin's piece remains a 
cautious summary of conventional ideas, namely the assumption 
that socialism creates the right conditions for a reduction 
in crime coupled with a pragmatic acknowledgement of the need 
to use the law to protect the system, even though it is 
tinged with a little 1iberaIism.32
Li teraturnaya___gazeta generously publicized the 
conservative argument. Not only is Vaksberg's article
c
subjected to harsh criticism on two consecutive occasions, 
the paper also seems anxious to emphasize that the 
authoritarian approach to crime and punishment might well 
enjoy a great deal of popularity amongst the population. A 
couple of months after the publication of Anashkin's article 
it is brought to the attention of readers that many of them 
have written in to argue in favour of heavier sentences. A 
letter from a certain I. Kalmanovich is printed with an 
introduction from the editors stressing that it is typical of 
many contributions they have received on the subject. 
Kalmanovich guilelessly calls upon the official dogma to 
justify his support for an extremely repressive policy 
towards offenders. As in the socialist society, he 
predictably argues, 'objective reasons' for crime do not 
exist, criminals should not expect to be treated with 
indulgence; it is right, he continues, that the sentence 
should be determined according to the degree of danger that 
the crime or criminal presents to society rather than
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according to the extent of the violation of the law (i.e. a 
theft is a theft whether ten kopecks or millions of roubles 
have been stolen); juvenile delinquents must not be spared 
and capital punishment ought to be extended to a wider range 
of crimes; prison sentences should never be reduced as 
criminals will understand that 'the laws of the socialist 
state must not be violated' only if they go through the 
'bitter experience of imprisonment and forced labour 1 .33
It is always difficult to evaluate the relevance of 
readers' contributions to a debate. Given the censorship 
under which newspapers had to operate at the time, letters to 
the editor cannot be regarded as a reliable source of 
information on public opinion. What's more Soviet researchers 
themselves have frequently pointed out that letter writers 
are mainly middle-aged and elderly men and, therefore, 
unrepresentative of the whole readership. 3 * On the other 
hand the authoritarianism that permeates readers' responses 
to Vaksberg's liberal propositions must not be dismissed too 
hastily. After all, opinion polls carried out in the West, 
for example on the question of capital punishment, usually 
reveal a higher degree of conservatism among the general 
public than, in particular, among its parliamentary 
representatives. It should be noted, however, that not all 
letters published by Literaturnaya gazeta show the high 
degree of relentless vindictiveness that characterizes the 
piece sent by Kalmanovich. Several readers seem particularly 
worried by the frequent occurrence of petty thefts in
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factories and farms which remain unpunished as managers tend 
to turn a blind eye. The advocacy of legal repressive 
measures to solve what is primarily an economic problem might 
not appear particularly shrewd, yet denotes a genuine concern 
for the economic chaos that these readers have witnessed in 
their places of work. 35
Whether Literaturnaya gazeta publicized these letters 
because they really represented a major trend in Soviet 
public opinion or because it wanted to be seen as giving the 
conservative camp c a fair deal, the paper clearly indicated 
where it stood in the controversy by using the letters as a 
means to respond, albeit indirectly, to Vaksberg's critics in 
the legal profession. Ka1manovich's letter is, indeed, 
followed by a 2,000 word reply from a professor of law, B. 
Nikiforov, who is given the opportunity to expound his 
liberal views again four months later when asked to comment 
upon another batch of readers' letters on the subject. In 
both articles Nikiforov openly expresses his indignation at 
the b1oodthirstiness of many letter writers, who are quick to 
demand the criminal's head and unhesitatingly declare defence 
lawyers' judgement untrustworthy on the grounds that they are 
more interested in getting their clients off the hook than in 
promoting justice. Like Vaksberg, Nikiforov believes that the 
extent of the violation of the law, as well as the 
circumstances which have led the offenders to commit the 
crime, ought to weigh heavily in the decision of the judge as 
to the length and nature of the sentence. Repeating the
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argument that cruelty breeds cruelty, Nikiforov refers to the 
findings of sociologists to show that not only have heavy 
sentences not helped to achieve a decrease in the crime rate, 
but, on the contrary, they have resulted in a greater 
percentage of recidivism.36
Another proof of Literaturnaya gazeta's inclination to 
support the liberal camp on this issue is that Vaksberg 
remained a regular contributor and was given other 
opportunities to put forward his progressive views on the
c
question of crime and punishnment. In an article published in 
1969 the outspoken defence lawyer calls once more for a 
softer approach in the courts, arguing that the ultimate goal 
of the judicial system ought not be to punish, but rather to 
facilitate the offender's reinstatement in society. 
Encouraged by the recent introduction of measures allowing 
the early release of prisoners for good behaviour, Vaksberg 
advocates more diversified forms of punishment which would 
significantly reduce the prison population. To give political 
strength and legitimacy to his argument, Vaksberg mentions 
the case of a 'brother country 1 , Bulgaria, where, apparently, 
two thirds of offenders do not serve prison sentences. 
Instead a variety of probation schemes have been set up with 
the result that the incidence of recidivism has considerably 
decreased. 37
A few weeks later, in a lengthy account of a court case, 
Vaksberg continues his crusade for a more compassionate 
attitude to offenders for the good of society as a whole. He
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tells the story of a successful and respectable surgeon who 
has turned out to be the perpetrator of a murder that took 
place thirty years ago. Praising, in passing, the procurator 
who, for all these years, has left the case unsolved rather 
than look for a scapegoat (a chilling allusion to all the 
miscarriages of justice which must have taken place because 
procurators are pressured to fulfill their 'success quotas'), 
Vaksberg expresses his disagreement with those who pleaded, 
albeit unsuccessfully, for a twenty-six-year prison sentence.
c
Obviously, his argument is not meant for this particular case 
on 1 y:
What do we judge and punish lawbreakers 
for? After all, the one and only aim of 
society is not to revenge itself or to 
return evil for evil, but to make these 
people abide by the rules of society and 
expiate their fault with honest work. But 
surely prison is not the only place where 
people can be reformed, surely it is not 
only behind prison walls that this goal 
can be achieved. Surely our society, with 
its moral principles and great 
educational possibilities, is capable of 
exerting a beneficial influence on an 
individual who has seriously wronged it, 
yet has not lost the ability to punish 
himself and soberly evaluate his own 
behaviour.3 8
Vaksberg was not alone in advocating a more humane and 
constructive way of dealing with crime. W. E. Butler notes 
that in the sixties there was 'evidence of a sceptical 
disenchantment with deprivation of freedom in a correctiona1- 
labour institution as a punishment 1 , and as a result of 
research studies carried out in the late sixties and early 
seventies alternative types of punishment were introduced.39
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In the debate examined here, Vaksberg has been efficiently 
seconded by Nikiforov and not all his arguments have been 
rejected by the more moderate Anashkin. Furthermore an 
account of a round table involving writers, journalists and 
the USSR Minister for the Maintenance of Public Order, N. A. 
Shchelokovyi, published by Literaturnaya gazeta in 1967, 
indicates that some of the views put forward by Vaksberg were 
supported by a number of high-ranking officials. Many of the 
Minister's statements are, indeed, very similar to those of
c
Nikiforov and Vaksberg in both content and form. (The point 
is not the punishment itself, but that the offender should 
become a 'fully-fledged* member of society; cruelty breeds 
cruelty, therefore heavy sentences and harsh treatment in 
prison are counterproductive etc...)*o Yet none of them 
defends these liberal views with quite the same eloquence as 
Vaksberg, whose passionate plea, occasionally tinged with a 
little idealism, makes the short-sighted and self-righteous 
authoritarianism of Soviet courts all the more tangible. 41
3. Perel'man on the Unfair Treatment of Ex-Convicts 
In their short study of Literaturnaya gazeta Dzirkals, 
Gustafson and Johnson examine two 'cases of controversy' that 
are meant to illustrate the ambiguous nature of the paper. 
The first one, the cynical campaign orchestrated against 
Solzhenitsyn apparently with the help of the Central 
Committee and/or the KGB, reveals its darker side. The second 
case referred to as 'the scandal over the passport system 1 ,
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which was prompted by Viktor Perel'man's outspoken piece on 
the predicament of ex-convicts, shows that Li teraturnaya 
gazeta was also capable of non-conformity.* 2
Perel 'man was not the first contributor to tackle this 
issue in the pages of Li tera turnaya gazeta. In 1967, in the 
course of the already mentioned round table with N- A. 
Shchelokovyi, the USSR Minister for the Maintenance of Public 
Order, a writer from Leningrad, Scryabin, suggested that 
passport restrictions be abolished and that ex-convicts be
c
allowed to go back where they used to live and work. 43 In 
1968 Grigorii Medynskii, in a long article published in the 
'Various Themes' section of the paper, deplored the harsh 
treatment of offenders in correctiona1 -1abour camps as well 
as the obstacles contrived by the authorities after their 
re 1 ease. 4 4
Medynskii's criticism is initially couched in rather 
abstract terms as he places the issue within the framework of 
a more general debate on the relation between the state and 
the individual, calling upon Karl Marx, who is alleged to 
have remarked that 'the state cannot lightly push aside one 
of its members'. Medynskii argues that potential conflicts 
between collective and individual interests should be settled 
in the most harmonious and balanced way possible - an 
argument strikingly reminiscent of the previously examined 
debates on collectivism. Individuals, Medynskii continues, 
are indisputably responsible for their actions before 
society, yet society too must face up to its responsibilities
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and ensure that individuals find themselves in an environment 
conducive to the development of their 'creative power' and 
'intellectual and moral potential 1 .
Medynskii's article goes on to become more specifically 
critical. In particular, like many supporters of a softer 
line on punishment, Medynskii launches an unrestrained attack 
against the staff in correctiona1 -1abour camps. He describes 
them as being often 'idle 1 , 'indifferent' to the fate of 
their charges, 'without any educational expertise 1 and
c
'completely unaware of what their job entails', thus turning 
offenders into 'stupid brutes' who are bound to resume a life 
of crime after their release.
The passport system is identified as another major 
reason for the high degree of recidivism. Ex-convicts cannot 
easily find work or obtain a resident permit with the result 
that they are forced back into a life of vagrancy and crime. 
Medynskii mentions the case of a former offender who has been 
helped in his efforts to rebuild his life by the city 
executive council of his town, yet stresses that this is the 
exception rather than the norm. He describes the attitude 
adopted by most local authorities when faced with this 
situation in these terms:
It is easier without him Cthe ex- 
convict], so they throw him from one 
place to the other like a football, as 
long as it is far away from them so they 
won't have any problems. But they cover 
it up by hiding behind state power and 
claiming to act in the name of the 
people. . . 4 5
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Perel'man's article, published a couple of years later, 
concentrates entirely on the residence permit issue. His 
article was partly the outcome of his meeting with the ex- 
convict turned writer Akhto Levi, whom he had already 
interviewed with Yu. Pavlov in 1968 a few weeks after the 
publication of Levi ' s 'Notes of a Grey Wolf 1 in the journal 
Moskva . * 6 As it happens, Levi ' s next book deals with the 
difficulties encountered by ex-prisoners on their discharge 
from the camps, the major one being that they are not allowed
c
to go back to their native towns and, therefore, cannot 
easily resume a normal family life. Neither can they easily 
obtain a residence permit from an other local authority as 
managers are reluctant to take them on, either because of 
their police record or their irregular situation. Most of 
them find it difficult, often impossible, to break the 
vicious circle: no work no residence permit, no residence 
permit no work.
Perel'man's attack is, indeed, hard-hitting. He does not 
attempt to soften the blow with abstractions. More 
importantly, he argues that the issue must not be treated 
solely in moral terms. The point is not to lament local 
authorities' lack of courage and irresponsibility; rather it 
is a case of introducing drastic changes to the passport 
system. The law must be changed:
Is it Cthe law] not at variance with the 
very spirit of our legislation, which is 
based on the idea that the punishment 
must be in strict accordance with the 
severity of the crime? But if someone 
who has already drunk from the 'bitter
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cup 1 is still frustrated in his rights, 
doesn't it show that the 'chastising 
sword of the law' continues to be in 
action even when it should be back in 
its sheath?*?
Perel'man, too, pays tribute to indi vi dua 1 s who , like 
the defence lawyer S. M. Bunina, bravely challenge normal 
practice and go out of their way to help ex-convicts. More 
importantly, however, Perel'man argues that an entirely new 
policy, rather than 'philanthropy 1 , is needed to redress the 
situation, and he urges 'the MVD, local councils, trade
c
unions and the Komsomo1' to get together in order to decide:
. . . on the best way to organize a wide 
network of public support for those who 
are firmly determined to follow the 
straifc and narrow.*8
Pere1 'man's open critici sm of government po1i cy is all 
the more striking because it is reinforced by three letters 
from MVD officials who all unreservedly side with the 
journalist and call for a change in the passport laws. I. 
Telepnev, head of the City Department of Internal Affairs at 
Pereslav'-Zalesskii, in the suburbs of Moscow, i s we 1 1 aware 
of the problem as many former prisoners, not allowed to live 
in the capital, try to settle there. It is Telepnev's 
experience that either they move on because they cannot 
accept the idea of living in unfamiliar surroundings, or they 
stay put yet remain estranged from the local community and 
often end up committing another crime. D. Kiselev, deputy 
head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Moscow City 
Executive Committee, believes that most ex-prisoners would
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find it much easier to rebuild their lives if only they were 
allowed to go back where they used to live and work, and that 
correctiona1-1abour camps ought to develop links with 
industry in order to help ex-offenders find jobs after their 
release. All these arguments are reiterated and supported by 
Professor M. Eropkin, deputy head of the Administrative 
Service of the Militia, yet another high-ranking MVD 
official.*9 It is the second time in these debates that 
Literaturnaya gazeta has shown evidence of a reformist
c
tendency within the MVD. As pointed out earlier, N. A. 
Shche1okovyi, the USSR Minister for the Maintenance of Public 
Order, was critical of the harsh treatment of offenders in 
correctiona1 — 1abour camps. 50
The open and strong support of the MVD for Perel 'man's 
article to some extent undermines its subversive effect, as 
it could be seen as merely promoting a policy that has 
already been endorsed by a powerful ministry. On the other 
hand, the article failed to lead to a debate on the passport 
system, which seems to indicate that other sections of the 
political establishment might have disapproved of it. In fact 
Literaturnaya gazeta practically gave up discussing the fate 
of ex-offenders altogether. During the period under 
examination here, only one more contributor dealt with the 
issue in an extremely subdued manner, making vague comments 
about society's regrettable hostility towards those who hold 
a police record.51
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The scenario which Dzirkals, Gustafson and Johnson 
reconstituted on the basis of Perel'man's account confirms 
this analysis. It would seem that the MVD. where some 
research had been conducted showing that passport 
restrictions were indeed a major contributing factor in the 
high rate of recidivism, encouraged Literaturnaya gazeta to 
publish the article, happily providing it with the necessary 
visa. But the relevant department of the CC, which had not 
been consulted, saw the article as an attempt to 'sow
«•
distrust of the Soviet constitution and its laws'. All the 
participants in the drama were called to order by the CC, 
including Chakovskii. Yet no one was sacked, not even 
Perel'man, possibly because, as he himself suggested, the 
minister concerned defended his article before the Party. 52
It is not clear why Li tera turnaya gazeta did not clear 
the article with the CC before publication. Was it simply a 
mistake on the part of the editors, an error of judgement, or 
a conscious attempt to bypass the authority of the Party? The 
last interpretation seems plausible. It is possible that 
Literaturnaya gazeta hoped to benefit from the support of an 
important ministry and intended to use the conflicts existing 
between different centres of power to promote the ideas of 
the more progressive section of the political establishment. 
The incident also shows the paper's readiness to fall back 
into line when needed, which might explain the growing 
disenchantment of a readership whose hopes have been raised, 
yet not fulfi11ed.
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4. Cone 1usion
The debates on crime and punishment paint a bleak 
picture of Soviet justice. The courts are frequently depicted 
as being authoritarian, unfair and unconcerned about their 
role in replenishing a large prison population. The debate on 
criminology suggests that judicial practice lags behind 
theoretical developments. Not only have the courts remained 
impervious to any approach advocating a p1uridiscip1inary
«
study of crime, their work seems to have been little
«•
influenced by the more conventional sociological school of 
thought. They tend to pass harsh sentences with scant regard 
for social, psychological and other factors that might 
constitute a basis for extenuating circumstances. Their 
unsophisticated perception of criminal behaviour leads at 
best to unacceptable discrepancies between the seriousness of 
the crime and the nature of the punishment, at worst to 
actual miscarriages of justice.
Some of the controversies are reminiscent of the law and 
order debates which regularly take place in Western 
democracies, with liberals emphasizing rehabilitation over 
punishment and hard-liners fighting any drift towards an 
increase in non-custodial sentences. But it could be argued 
that rather than being a strength, this similarity is 
evidence of the paper's failure to clearly establish the 
special significance of such a debate in a society where the 
judiciary is dominated by a repressive political party. 
Although the frequently criticized harshness of punitive
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sanctions is a constant reminder to the Western reader of 
Soviet society's highly repressive nature, the issues are 
nevertheless raised within a limited framework of discussion. 
For example, the legacy of Stalinism, which the reforms of 
the fifties and sixties failed to eradicate completely, is 
not systematically analysed; nor are the reasons for the 
'subjectivism 1 of the courts. Their tendency to judge the 
degree of the offender's 'immorality 1 rather than the 
seriousness of the crime may account for some of their
c
inconsistencies, yet the picture remains incomplete as no 
mention is made, for instance, of the pressures under which 
the courts operate as a result of their dependence on the 
Party. Another striking example of the paper's cautious line 
are the remarks on the brutal treatment of convicts, which by 
comparison with accounts published in dissident literature 
appear absurdly timid.
It is, however, to the paper 's credit that it continued 
to publicize liberal views on such controversial issues in 
spite of the increasingly repressive climate. It is clear 
from the debates examined in this chapter that at the time 
the idea of a tough justice system was prevailing in the 
courts and was enjoying some degree of popularity among the 
legal profession as well as, apparently, the general public. 
Since then history has shown that in the seventies even 
reform-minded top officials in governing bodies, such as the 
MVD, were unable to stop the criminal code from becoming 
increasingly repressive.53 Although Literaturnaya gazeta was
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powerless to influence the decision-making process, it was 
nevertheless instrumental in maintaining a debate pertaining 
to the repressive nature of Soviet society, which was to take 
a dramatic turn during the first years of the Gorbachev 
government.
The harshness of the law, the brutality of the 
correctiona1 -1abour camps and the injustice of the passport 
restrictions are denounced on humanitarian, social and, to 
some extent, political grounds. The general message is that a
<•
policy resulting in the formation of a large prison 
population, which is bound to produce a sizeable group of 
bitter and socially marginalized individuals, is detrimental 
to the whole of society. The most outspoken contributors 
frequently suggest that those behind bars do not have a 
monopoly on wickedness and that their judges and gaolers 
would do well to re-examine their motives, thus implicitly 
presenting the inflexibility of the justice system as the 
reflection of a Manichean vision of society fostered by years 
of Stalinist propaganda.
Finally, the debates on the harshness of the law, and 
especially those on passport restrictions, politicize the 
issue of the relationship between the collective and the 
individual. Certain contributions contain a bold criticism of 
the excessive power that the Soviet state wields over its 
citizens. This is an issue which lies at the centre of the 
debate on the inadequacies of the criminal procedure examined 
in the next chapter.
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X. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The criminal procedure underwent drastic changes in the 
fifties. The principles which had transformed Soviet law 
into an instrument of terror under Stalin were publicly 
denounced and forsaken. Confessions were no longer to be 
treated as evidence of guilt. The notion of guilt by 
association included in the 1934 criminal code, which, in 
particular, enabled the courts to send relatives of 'enemies
c
of the people' into exile or labour camps, became invalid 
along with the analogy principle, which was open to all 
manner of abuse. (According to this doctrine a person who 
had committed an act deemed 'socially dangerous' by the 
court, yet not expressly forbidden by law could be sentenced 
under a law proscribing an analogous act.) The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs had to abolish its infamous 'special 
boards' (osobye soveshchaniya), commonly known as ' tro i k i ' , 
and the secret police was no longer allowed to investigate 
crimes under its own rules.
From then on all criminal investigations were to be 
supervised by the procuracy. The drastically enhanced status 
of the Soviet procuracy, whose duties were clearly defined 
for the first time in a decree issued on 24 May 1955, was in 
many ways perceived as a safeguard against misuse of power 
by the secret police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.i 
The new procuracy, often compared to its ancestor 
established under Peter the Great, when the procurator was
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regarded as 'the eyes and the ears of the sovereign' , has 
been entrusted with two main responsibilities. Firstly, it 
is its duty to ensure that the law be observed by all 
citizens and all organizations. Secondly, when it is 
satisfied that the law has indeed been violated its 
responsibility is to prosecute while making sure that the 
court remains within the bounds of the law.2
Investigators, who are expected to be impartial 
officials, work under the control of the procuracy, unlike,
c
for instance, the French 'juge d'instruetion' who is subject 
to the control of the courts. It is the procuracy which 
decides on the basis of the investigator's report whether 
the case should be quashed or referred to the courts. Should 
it become convinced, in the course or at the end of the 
preliminary investigation, that the accused is innocent, it 
is its duty to drop the proceedings, as it must see that the 
truth prevails. On the other hand by transferring the case to 
the court the procuracy clearly indicates that it deems the 
accused guilty. The powers of the investigators and the 
procuracy are all the greater because, although the rights 
of the defence have been strengthened, as a rule defence 
lawyers are still prevented from participating at the 
investigative stage.3
Not only are judges well aware that the procurator 
firmly believes in the guilt of the accused (otherwise he or 
she would not have prosecuted), they conduct the trial on 
the basis of the preliminary investigation endorsed by the
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very same procurator/prosecutor. What's more, unlike what 
happens in the 'adversary 1 system of Anglo-Saxon law 
Soviet judges do not act as mere 'referees' between two 
contending sides in the presence of a jury; they play a 
leading part in the trial examining the evidence, 
questioning witnesses and finally passing sentences with 
the assistance of two lay judges, the people 1 s assessors.* 
Witnesses do not appear for the benefit of the prosecution 
or the defence. Like all the other participants in the
<•
trial , including the defence lawyer, they are expected to 
assist the court in finding the Truth.5
Between 1967 and 1971 Literaturnaya gazeta allocated a 
substantial amount of space to the debates discussing the 
relatively new criminal procedure (approximately 80,000 
words). Most aspects of the proceedings are criticized, and 
the impartiality of investigators and judges is called into 
question. Ways of reinforcing citizens' rights before the 
law are discussed in two different debates. One concentrates 
on the need to increase the participation of lay judges. The 
other deals with the issue of the defence, thereby 
questioning the presently existing relationship between the 
investigator, the procuracy and the court, as well as the 
ability of the procurator to be both prosecutor and guardian 
of the law.
1. Investigators and Judges under Suspicion 
A number of contributions contain harsh criticisms
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levelled at incompetent investigators whose shoddy work has 
or might have resulted in miscarriages of justice. Although 
specific cases' are examined, it is often broadly hinted that 
they must not be regarded as unusual occurrences. For 
instance, K. Yurev relates the case of two boys accused by a 
girlfriend of having stolen her watch. The boys maintained 
that they were innocent, yet the young investigator in 
charge of the investigation charged them with theft. A brief 
mention of the high position held by the girl's father could 
be interpreted as a discreetly suggested explanation for the 
investigator's readiness to believe her story, which was 
uncorroborated by any hard evidence. In the end, the boys 
were not prosecuted thanks to the intervention of the 
procurator supervising the investigation, who felt that the 
girl's testimony had to be challenged. The title of the 
article, 'An everyday, ordinary case...', may as well point 
to the banality of the offence as to the frequency of 
inadequately conducted investigations. The lesson drawn by 
Yurev, though, is clearly intended for the benefit of the 
whole profession. The miscarriage of justice was averted, he 
concludes, because the procurator 'made use of his right to 
doubt until the end'.6
Other articles suggest that not all procurators can be 
relied upon to drop the proceedings when the preliminary 
investigation fails to produce evidence. In this respect 
Bogat's long piece, ironically headed 'Truth, truth... 1 , is 
all the more interesting because it uncharacteristically
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deals with a major case. The article relates the story of 
the manager and senior engineers of a large firm in 
Leningrad, charged with large-scale bribery, report-padding 
and other financial irregularities, endemic in a planned 
economy. Their arrest was decided on the basis of an 
investigation involving the interrogation of no fewer than 
two hundred persons, yet the court deemed the charges 
unsubstantiated. Not only is Bogat indignant at those in 
charge of the investigation, who hastily ordered the arrest 
of these people before they had any evidence of their guilt, 
he is equally disgusted by the procuracy's decision to press 
charges for minor crimes, which practically any plant 
manager could be found guilty of, solely in order to save 
face. The manager was sentenced to twenty months' 
imprisonment for using funds unlawfully, in particular to 
pay teams of shabashniki . 7
Ya . S. Kiselev, introduced by Literaturnaya gazeta as 
one of the most famous Soviet defence lawyers whose 
professional activity dates back to the twenties, relates 
several cases emphasizing the frequent unreliability of the 
preliminary investigation. 8 In an article published in 1967 
Kiselev firstly recalls the years just after the Revolution 
with unconcealed nostalgia. It was a time when each trial 
was a 'school of mora1 i ty' , and the courts, fair and humane, 
saw to it that destitute defendants charged with theft would 
in future receive financial help. He speaks of high 
professional standards among judges, who betrayed no
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preconceived ideas about defendants during trials. 
Surprisingly enough, however, what seems to have begun as a 
thinly veiled criticism of contemporary courts turns out to 
be mostly an attack against those in charge of preliminary 
investigations whose bad work, Kiselev argues, makes it very 
hard for judges to administer justice. The courts can 
operate correctly, he continues, only if the evidence 
gathered in the course of the preliminary investigation is 
'thoroughly' and 'impartially' checked.9
c
Judges who have succeeded in redressing the errors made 
by investigators, sometimes with the help of the defence, 
are the positive heroes in Kiselev's stories. The defence 
lawyer relates how on one occasion he revealed to the judge 
that the defendant, charged with burglary, could not have 
been a participant in the crime because he was with a woman 
friend at the time. His client had refrained from using this 
perfect alibi as he did not want his wife to get wind of his 
infidelity. The judge, who dared to disbelieve the 
conclusions of the preliminary investigation and declared 
the defendant innocent on the basis of this new piece of 
evidence, is reported to have remarked to Kiselev that this 
particular investigator was known for his biased enquiries. 
In a later account of yet another case Kiselev praises a 
judge for establishing that the defendant had stolen some 
valuable objects with the charitable aim of helping a 
girlfriend, a fact that the investigator had failed to 
uncover or consciously chosen to ignore.*o
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Kiselev's harsh criticisms of preliminary 
investigations are greatly undermined by his tendency to 
exonerate judges. By simply presenting them as frequent 
victims of incompetent and unscrupulous investigators, he 
fails to question the system which, according to him, makes 
them so dependent on the investigative agencies.
On the other hand, other contributors make it their 
duty to expose the responsibility of judges in miscarriages 
of justice, fiercely criticizing them for not questioning
c
the investigators' conclusions endorsed by the procuracy. 
Among them is the author of a satirical piece, Van. 
Polishchuk, who tells the story of a restaurant manager in 
the health resort of Minvody in the Stavropol' region, 
wrongly declared guilty of misappropriation of funds by a 
judge in Pyatigorsk. This is how Polishchuk describes the 
way in which the case was handled by the court:
. . . this trial was quick, just and 
benevolent. 'Quick' in the sense that 
the judge V. Kantemirov raced through 
the conclusions of the investigators, 
galloped through Lisitska's inconsistent 
testimonies... 'Just' inasmuch as the 
judge V. Kantemirov, in an ungent1eman1y 
way deprived the defence lawyer of the 
right to put forward counter-arguments 
and the defendant of the right to 
familiarize himself with the report of 
the inquest. 'Benevolent' in the sense 
that the judge did not even try to use 
all the articles made available to him 
by the law, but instead goodhear t ed 1 y 
limited himself to those which 
guaranteed the accused six long years' 
impri sonment. l *
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The defendant has since been cleared by the procuracy 
in the neighbouring town of Essentuki. Yet Polishchuk 
deplores that no action has been taken against the 
investigators whose inquest led to the miscarriage of 
justice, or the judge V. Kantemirov, who, the author 
bitterly remarks, has shown no sign of feeling guilty about 
his role in the affair.
In 1969 L i tera turnaya gazeta gave a great deal of 
publicity to a court case reported and analysed by Olga
<•
Cha ikovskaya . It was published in two parts in two 
consecutive issues of the paper, each article being 
approximately 2,000 words 1ong.12 Like Polishchuk, 
Chaikovskaya virulently attacks untrustworthy investigators 
and biased judges, but her articles are particularly 
interesting because they highlight the survival of 
investigative and judiciary practices that were supposed to 
have been eradicated by the reforms introduced in the 
fifties and sixties.
In the first part of her account Chaikovskaya lists a 
whole series of irregularities in the preliminary 
investigation. The two boys charged with the murder of a 
fifteen-year-old girl, were questioned without the presence 
of a lawyer, whereas the new law clearly stipulates that 
defence counsels must be allowed to participate in the 
preliminary investigation when persons under the age of 
eighteen are charged with serious crimes.13 That they were 
questioned a second time in the presence of teachers did
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nothing to reassure Chaikovskaya , neither did the fact that 
they shared a prison cell with an adult, which is strictly 
forbidden by the law. Finally, it turns out that the two 
lads were charged solely on the basis of their confessions. 
The procuracy did not deem it necessary to drop the 
proceedings against them in spite of a lack of hard 
evi dence.
Chaikovskaya is particularly concerned that confessions 
should continue to be used as a means to establish the
<•
defendant's guilt. In spite of the law a large section of 
the legal profession seems to hold the view that confessions 
can now be relied upon and treated as evidence because they 
no longer are torture-induced. Ironically, this way of 
thinking has been encouraged by the new emphasis on legality 
and the improved work of the investigative agencies. 
Chaikovskaya does not conceal her amazement at the naivety 
(or is it complacency?) of professional lawyers, 
conveniently oblivious of the various kinds of pressure 
which may lead defendants to accuse themselves of crimes 
they have not committed. Referring back to the particular 
murder case that she is covering for the paper, Chaikovskaya 
points out that the two lads confessed at a time when they 
felt lonely and frightened, the more so as they had been 
deprived of their right to a defence counsel and advised 
against arguing with the investigator by the adult with whom 
they shared a prison cell. Switching again from the 
particular to the general, the journalist underlines the
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great discrepancy between the progress achieved by Soviet 
legal theory and the comparatively slow improvement of 
judiciary practice, as shown in this extract:
It is precisely to ensure that there 
will not be any intentional or 
unintentional pressures, any conscious 
or unconscious desire to extract or 
barter for confessions, that the law 
stipulates that confessions are not 
evidence in themselves. For legal 
experts, I repeat, this is crystal- 
clear... In theory that is... But in 
pract ice?i4
In the second part of her account Chaikovskaya focuses 
on the trial. Scathing criticisms are levelled at the 
presiding judge who, apparently from the very beginning, 
made no secret of the fact that she thought the defendants 
guilty. All the observations made by Chaikovskaya combine to 
expose the court's total lack of objectivity. The judge is 
reported to have addressed witnesses with various degrees of 
sympathy, favouring those whose testimonies reinforced the 
case of the prosecution. She harshly treated a young girl 
who retracted her statement that incriminated the 
defendants, the girl arguing that after five long hours of 
questioning she had been too exhausted to read the statement 
before signing it. According to Chaikovskaya the judge was 
not disposed to believe her as it would have meant 
challenging some of the methods used by the investigator. 1 5
The journalist also criticizes the judge for playing 
the tape with the recording of the confessions in court, and 
for making no attempt to contain the elderly schoo1 teacher
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who kept shouting unsubstantiated accusations at the two 
defendants, who, in the end, got ten years each. This 
appalling performance is contrasted with that of the judge 
at the second trial, a calm, softly-spoken man who showed 
great respect for all witnesses, called the vindictive 
schoo1 teacher .to order, and declared the defendants not 
guilty, their confessions having remained uncorroborated by 
any hard evidence. (Obviously more concerned about the cause 
of justice than that of women, Chaikovskaya also suggests
c
that men might make better judges than women as they are 
less emotional . ) 16
A few months later Chaikovskaya was given the 
opportunity to express her views on the work of the courts 
in general. In a lengthy article which takes up a whole page 
of the paper, she relentlessly attacks the courts, obviously 
anxious to dissipate the last illusions of sceptical readers 
who might still cling to the belief that the 'bad judge 1 of 
her story was untypical.17
Chaikovskaya examines the issue from two different 
angles. First of all, she exposes the inadequate conditions 
in which judges often have to work. Not only do the 
frequently dilapidated, dirty, cold and cramped courts' 
buildings pitifully fail to reflect the 'grandeur of 
justice', they do not allow for proceedings to take place 
according to the law. As a result of a shortage of rooms 
witnesses are commonly kept waiting in the corridors where 
they can communicate between themselves. Some cases are
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virtually heard in camera, when the only available room is 
the judge's office, which can only accommodate a small 
number of people. Buildings are overcrowded and judges 
overworked.
In the second part of the article Chaikovskaya focuses 
on the unacceptable behaviour of judges in courts, 
reiterating several points that she had already included in 
her report of the court case. Judges, she claims, should 
refrain from influencing the development of the trial, which
c
they often do by making it obvious that they believe the 
defendant guilty before cross-examining has even begun. 
Judges, she continues, should refrain from intimidating 
defendants, which they often do by adopting a suspicious or 
sarcastic attitude towards them. In his book on Soviet 
justice Berman argues that even though the phrase 
'presumption of innocence' does not figure in the criminal 
codes introduced in the early sixties, 'all that American 
jurists generally mean by that phrase is spelled out in 
Soviet law.' 18 Judging by Chaikovskaya's articles the 
notion still remained unfamiliar to many a judge in the 
Soviet Union by the beginning of the seventies. The 
journalist even recalls a judge asking a witness, as it 
happened the father of the accused, to prove the defendant's 
innocence.1 9
Other contributors are equally critical of the way in 
which trials are conducted. Only a few weeks after 
Chaikovskaya's article Literaturnaya gazeta published an
-364-
interview with a judge in Moscow who does not hesitate to 
criticize a number of court practices, in particular the 
tendency of some of her colleagues to monopolize the floor 
rather than carefully listen to what defendants and 
witnesses have to say.20 Not surprisingly Arkadii Vaksberg 
also finds fault with the manner in which judges handle 
witnesses, often ignoring the testimony of those with a 
police record, or refusing to summon additional witnesses 
suggested by the defence. Echoing Chaikovskaya's criticism
c
of judges unable or unwilling to contain emotional outbursts 
in their courts, Vaksberg also remarks that some sessions 
are, indeed, reminiscent of 'show trials'.21
Chaikovskaya's piece, however, remains the most 
comprehensive attack on the whole profession of judges. Yet 
it falls short of analysing the whys and wherefores of such 
a situation. The only procedural change that she recommends 
is that the indictment should not be read by the judge, but 
rather by the procurator/prosecutor. She also urges judges 
to reject pressure from local dignitaries, a brave, if only 
too brief, allusion to the dependence of the courts on the 
Party apparatus, which, according to the emigre Soviet 
lawyer Konstantin Simis is 'completely institutiona1ized ' . 22
This last issue is nowhere tackled in the paper. Yet 
ways of limiting the power of judges are discussed, first of 
all in the debate on people's assessors, which will be 
examined next.
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2. People's Assessors Versus Judges
People's assessors (narodnye zasedateli) are elected 
for two and a half years and called upon to sit in court for 
a maximum period of two weeks per year so that their 
relatively brief periods of absence from work are not 
prejudicial to the country's economic activity. As the 
concept of lay judges is presented as stemming from the 
socialist belief that the masses are entitled to participate 
in the running of society, they are not expected to have a
«
specialist knowledge of the law. Therefore few assessors 
have legal training, yet, as a rule, they take part in 
elementary law courses and seminars, usually run by 
'people's universities'.23 TO quote the American journalist 
G. Feifer, people's assessors are 'the cream of workers', 
elected by the trade unions at their factories and offices, 
or possibly, albeit less frequently, by general meetings at 
their places of residence.24
The court consists of one professional judge and two 
people's assessors who each have an equal vote with the 
judge. It may, therefore, appear rather odd that all the 
contributors to the debate should call for an increase in 
the number of assessors as the existing system already makes 
it possible for them to outvote the professional judge. The 
problem lies in the fact that most assessors do not use the 
influence that the system grants them. Butler remarks that 
they are 'known to outvote the judge' 'on occasion'.25 
Konstantin Simis claims that they are completely overwhelmed
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by the authority of the professional judge and that in the 
course of his long career in the Soviet Union he 'only twice 
came across cases where the assessors attempted to challenge 
a verdict which they considered unjust 1 .26 G. Feifer, who 
went to observe Soviet courts with an open mind, describes 
people's assessors in these terms:
. . . the vast majority sit quietly and 
awkwardly in their places as if 
embarrassed by their superfluity. 
Overwhelmed by the knowledge, experience 
and professionalism of the judge, they 
look on c passive1y, like spectators with 
good seats ... 2 7
None of the contributors who took part in the debate 
publicized by Literaturnaya gazeta in 1967 (approximately 
8,000 words) would object to this description of people's 
assessors' behaviour in the courts. Not all of them, 
however, share identical views as to the means of achieving 
what is commonly referred to as 'the democratization of the 
courts'.
The discussion was triggered off by the outspoken 
columnist N. Chetunova.28 Not a jurist herself, Chetunova 
seems to have taken it upon herself to promote .the views of 
the reform-minded section of the legal profession. Doubting 
that, in spite of increasing educational standards among the 
population, assessors can ever be expected to know the law 
as well as professional judges, Chetunova believes that 
their self-confidence, independence of judgement and sense 
of civic responsibility would be greatly enhanced should 
they be greater in numbers. Making no secret of her wish to
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see the powers of judges drastically curtailed, Chetunova 
also argues, like F. Burlatskii whose article in the 
review Kommun i s t she frequently quotes, that the verdict of 
guilty or not guilty should be delivered by the assessors 
rather than the judge, who could nevertheless retain the 
responsibility of determining the nature of the sentence.29
Two weeks later Literaturnaya gazeta published a 
second lengthy article, this time from a professor of law, 
who, when not backing Chetunova's arguments, advocates even
<•
more radical changes.30 Professor R. Rakhunov agrees that a 
greater number of assessors would improve the performance of 
the court as a group of, say, eight to twelve individuals is 
less likely to let itself be intimidated by a professional 
judge. He also shares the view that the verdict should be 
delivered by the assessors without the participation of the 
judge. To give political weight to these proposals, Rakhunov 
astutely argues that the present system, in fact, originates 
from the civil war period when a quick judiciary process was 
needed to overcome class enemies. Its continuation cannot, 
therefore, be justified at this stage in the building of 
communism when every effort must be made to 'develop 
socialist democracy' and 'broaden the subjective rights of 
citizens and the freedoms of the individual 1 . The time has 
come, Rakhunov continues, to apply the Leninist principle of 
people's involvement in the running of society more 
systematically and to revive the spirit of the first years 
of Soviet power when verdicts were delivered by rather large
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groups of between six and twelve people's assessors, with 
judges playing only a consultative role.
Rakhunov's treatment of judges is ruthless. While not 
going so far as to expose their dependence on extra- 
judiciary powers, he nevertheless overtly criticizes them 
for failing to resist pressures from within the legal system 
and for avoiding passing sentences which they suspect would 
displease higher courts; hence the need to take power away 
from them and enhance that of lay judges. Rakhunov believes
c
that judges' rights and powers should be curtailed to a 
greater extent even than that suggested by Chetunova. 
According to him, not only should assessors deliver the 
verdict, it also ought to be their job to determine the 
sentence, albeit with the assistance of the professional 
judge. Furthermore, judges should be made to abide by the 
law and call assessors in turn instead of choosing them as 
they frequently do. Finally, unlike Chetunova, Rakhunov sees 
little point in a local experiment and demands that such 
changes be introduced swiftly and throughout the country. 31
The authors of the letters published in the Discussion 
Club section as part of the debate on people's assessors 
also agree that the number of lay judges should be 
increased. The three contributors, a judge, a defence lawyer 
and a people's assessor, seem equally anxious to expose the 
heavy workload of the courts, further hampered by an 
intolerable amount of red tape. They all agree that the 
constantly high number of cases waiting for trial makes it
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practically impossible for assessors, in particular, to 
study each file as well as should be expected. In the light 
of this widely recognized reality, both the judge and the 
defence lawyer suggest that assessors be asked to 
participate in criminal cases only, leaving administrative 
ones in the care of professional judges.32
However relevant these criticisms and proposals may be, 
the letters fail to comment upon what really is the 
fundamental issue, i.e. the division of powers between
«•
professional and lay judges. After all, Professor I. 
Perlov also, whose extremely cautious reply to Chetunova and 
Rakhunov closes the debate, readily concedes that a team of 
four, or even, perhaps, six people's assessors would not 
feel so overwhelmed by the knowledge and expertise of 
professional judges. On the other hand, he fiercely argues 
against any measures aimed at allocating different roles to 
assessors and judges, thus reducing the power of 
professional judges in the courts. Resuming the 
ideological argument, Perlov reproves Rakhunov for wanting 
nothing less than a 'bourgeois 1 jury system based on the 
assumption that the judge defends the interests of the 
state, while the jury (pri syazhnye zasedate 1 i ) represents 
those of society. A loyal supporter of the official dogma, 
Perlov tritely argues that such a conflict of interests 
between state and society cannot possibly exist in a 
socialist country. 33
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The defence lawyer Ya. Kiselev looks at the issue from 
a different angle. Agreeing with all the other participants 
in the debate that for the courts to become 'genuinely 
democratic' the number of assessors need to be increased, he 
does not believe, however, that this reform alone would 
provide an adequate safeguard against miscarriages of 
justice. Whereas in his other articles Kiselev handles 
judges with kid gloves, putting much of the blame for unfair 
trials on investigators, here he argues that the source of
c
many miscarriages of justice lies in the failure of the 
courts to secure an 'equality of the sides', i.e. a just 
balance between the prosecution and the defence. 
Complaining that judges and procurators often gang up 
against the defence, - a grievance shared by many 
contributors -, Kiselev calls for the removal of judges who 
do not conceal their bias against defendants and their 
lawyers. 3 * It could be argued that Kiselev's contribution 
yet again lacks in imagination and boldness, as he 
basically proposes to maintain the existing system, hoping 
that punitive measures will deter judges from behaving 
unprofessiona11y. Shying away from questioning the balance 
of power between people's assessors and professional judges, 
he nevertheless makes the extremely important point that a 
democratic reform of the courts also implies a radically new 
approach to the role of the defence, an issue which was 
comprehensively discussed in Literaturnaya gazeta during the 
years 1967-71.
-371-
3. The Case for the Defence
Zhores Medvedev remarked that when studying for his law 
degree at Moscow University, Gorbachev 'almost certainly 
chose to do his apprenticeship in a procurator's office 1 . 
The historian sees, indeed, no reason why the future general 
secretary of the CPSU should have been attracted to the 
advocacy where jobs 'are usually filled by non-Party 
members..., considered not quite trustworthy and therefore 
unsuitable to work in the procuracy or for the KGB'. In the
c
Soviet Union, Medvedev succintly concludes, 'defence lawyers 
are the pariahs of the legal profession'.35
Defence lawyers have always been regarded with 
suspicion by Soviet power. By 1917 the profession had earned 
the respect of many for its frequent attacks in the courts 
on the political establishment of Tsarist Russia. In his 
book on Vyshinsky A. Vaksberg remarks that a great number 
of barristers assumed functions in the administrations and 
governing bodies that emerged from the February 
Revo1ution.36 Yet the profession was reproved by others, in 
particular the Bolsheviks, for its 'bourgeois liberalism 1 . 
Perceived by the new rulers as being more concerned with 
defending the interests of the individual than those of 
society as a whole, the Advokatura (the Bar) was dissolved 
shortly after the Revolution, on 24 November 1917. After a 
brief period when any citizen enjoying civil rights could 
act as a defence counsel, the profession was brought back 
into existence with the formation of advocates' collectives
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working under the supervision of State and Party 
organizations.37 Far from recovering its pre-Revo1utionary 
prestige, however, it was further driven into submission by 
an increasingly repressive legal system dominated by the 
sinister figure of Vishinsky, who considered the principle 
of equality between prosecution and defence as a vestige of 
the bourgeois society.38
Although Vyshinsky's theories were officially 
discredited in the late fifties, the profession was to find
c
it difficult to rise again after four decades of relentless 
oppression. G. Feifer remembers Soviet law students 
complaining, in the early sixties when the new codes had 
already been introduced, about defence lawyers 'confusing 
the issue 1 and 'wasting Ctheir] time 1 .39 It could be 
argued, of course, that the half—baked reforms of the late 
fifties could hardly have been expected to produce a 
radical change of attitude towards the defence. The new laws 
do stipulate that the accused is now entitled to a defence 
lawyer in all cases, yet the rights of the defence have 
remained limited. Unless the defendant is a minor charged 
with a serious crime, defence lawyers may attend the 
interrogation of their clients only if the investigator 
allows it.40 Their participation in trials is also highly 
restricted as they may question witnesses only through the 
judge.* *
Feifer argues that in the fifties representation at the 
investigation was the most debated issue amongst Soviet
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jurists, and that those in favour of full representation 
from the moment of arrest were, for a time, thought to be 
winning the argument.*2 Complete de-Sta 1inization, however, 
was not to occur so rapidly, and the lengthy discussion 
organized by Literaturnaya gazeta (approximately 30,000 
words), mainly during 1970, is clearly a continuation of 
that of the fifties. The paper gave the debate a high 
profile, publicizing a wide range of opinions and 
encouraging a lively exchange of views. The contributions
c
revolve around two main interrelated issues; firstly, the 
nature of the relationship between defence lawyer and 
client; secondly, the balance of power between the defence 
and the prosecution.
The debate sadly shows that twelve years after the 
reforms of 1958 that were supposed to have reinforced the 
status of the defence, a significant section of both the 
general public and the legal profession still failed to 
recognize the vital role of the defence in the judiciary 
process. It is the year 1970, yet in his contribution, which 
opens the debate formally initiated three months earlier by 
the editors, judge G. Z. Anashkin deems it necessary to 
explain at great length that the socialist justice system 
cannot be fair without defence counsels playing their part. 
'Just remember the events of the past', Anashkin argues. 
'The crudest violations of socialist legality occurred in 
cases examined without the particiption of the defence'. 
That Anashkin should feel the need to reassert these simple
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truths is indicative of the high degree of resistance to 
genuine changes offered by the procuracy and the courts.*3
Curiously enough, however, opponents of a strong 
defence are not to be found amongst investigators, 
procurators and judges only. Several contributors bitterly 
complain that many defence lawyers fail in their 
responsibilities and shame the profession by simply siding 
with the prosecution against their clients. In an earlier 
contribution which foreshadows the debate to come, A.
c
Vaksberg questions the morality of the still prevalent view 
that lawyers, convinced of their clients' guilt, must plead 
guilty even when the defendants claim their innocence. At a 
later stage in the increasingly heated debate, the famous 
defence lawyer makes his feelings perfectly clear:
Of course I do not have the right to 
accuse [my client]; it is not my job; 
it is not my duty. When I see, for 
example, a defence lawyer demanding, in 
the name of the victim, that the 
defendant should be severely punished 
for his crime, I am ashamed of my 
co1 1eague.* *
The vast majority of the participants in the debate 
agree with Vaksberg that the defence has no business adding 
to the case of the prosecution. Lawyers' commitment is to 
their clients; it is their moral and professional duty to 
defend them within the framework of the law. Anashkin and A. 
D. Boikov, a senior researcher at a criminology institute, 
are particularly sickened by defence lawyers who have 
advised clients to plead guilty, leaving it to the judge to
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prove their innocence. Professor M. S. Strogovich, a corres- 
porvchrtcj member o f the Academy of Sciences, vehemently attacks 
lawyers 'afraid of entering into an argument with the 
investigator and the procurator and of disagreeing with the 
court'.*5 At the round table formally closing the debate, 
Chetunova refers to similar cases of 'collaboration' between 
prosecution and defence, concluding that the authority of 
the advoka tura will be enhanced only if lawyers themselves 
adhere to high moral and professional standards
c
( 'printsipial 'nost' ' ).* 6
While urging defence counsels to redeem their 
profession by playing an active part in cleansing it of the 
aberrations of the past, these authors are equally anxious 
to expose the hostility faced by courageous lawyers, already
committed to 'strengthening the defence' in deed as much as
^vJbct 
in word. Anashkin dep1oresYthat lawyers who dare to disagree
with the court should still be badly thought of, and claims 
that many judges, procurators, investigators and police 
officers continue to regard defence counsels as redundant. 
The negative image attached to the defence is succinctly 
summed up by one of the participants in the round table:
... there still exists the rather 
widespread view that the defence lawyer 
only hinders the establishment of the 
truth, that he 'shields' the criminal, 
seeking to save him from the punishment 
that he deserves.* 7
This 'rather widespread view' is shared by only two 
contributors whose articles seem to have been used by
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Literaturnava yazeta to rekindle the debate, or even perhaps 
to take it a step further. In a short letter following 
Boikov's article, a defence counsel from L'vov is filled 
with indignation to think that a lawyer who does not believe 
in his client's innocence can plead not-guilty, which, in 
his view, amounts to obstructing the court in its effort to 
establish the truth.*8 A few weeks later an article by Dr S. 
Berezovskaya provides the rationale behind the argument that 
defence lawyers must not necessarily defend their clients.
<•
Berezovskaya criticizes all the previously published 
articles for presenting defence lawyers and procurators as 
belonging to opposite camps. She claims to have been 
particularly outraged by Vaksberg, who seems to believe that 
only defence lawyers are committed to the idea of justice. 
In the socialist system, Berezovskaya conventionally argues, 
all the participants in a trial must cooperate in order to 
establish the truth, - a notion, already well established 
before Vyshinsky's reign, which originates from the theory 
of class-based justice advocated by the Bolsheviks. 
Consequently Berezovskaya reduces the role of the defence 
lawyer to that of a watchdog whose job it is to make sure 
that the court does not overlook any extenuating or, 
incredible as it may sound, aggravating circumstances.* 9
The effect of Berezovskaya's dogmatic piece was to re- 
focus the debate on the fundamental issue, namely, the role 
of the procuracy. In what is one of the most radical 
contributions, A. Giganov, a jurist with thirty years of
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experience in an investigation office attached to the 
procuracy, fiercely rejects the proposition which lies at 
the centre of Berezovskaya's argument, i.e., that the 
procurator, who is both prosecutor and guardian of the law, 
can be regarded as an impartial participant in the criminal 
procedure. Like many Western observers, Giganov argues that 
the same person cannot be both accuser and defender, and 
that the procurator is bound to be convinced of the 
defendant's guilt before the trial has even begun, otherwise
c
the case would have been dropped in the course or at the end 
of the investigation supervised by the procuracy.50 Giganov 
finally suggests that the prosecution be the 
responsibility of the investigator rather than the 
procure tor. 5 1
Giganov 1 s provocative piece did not go unnoticed. Two 
weeks later Literaturnaya gazeta published a lengthy article 
by Professor I. Perlov, whose cautious position is somewhat 
reminiscent of his conservative contribution to the debate 
on people's assessors.52 On the one hand, Perlov sharply 
criticizes Berezovskaya for disregarding the need to 
maintain a strict 'division of functions between the court, 
the procuracy and the advocacy 1 . Truth, Perlov declares, 
more often than not emerges from the 'opposition between 
prosecution and defence'. On the other hand, he vehemently 
dissociates himself from Giganov's claim that, given the 
nature of the system, the procurator is bound to be ill- 
disposed towards the defendant from the beginning of the
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trial . On the contrary, Perlov continues, the procurator's 
role as guardian of the law, far from being at variance with 
that of prosecutor, ensures a high level of objectivity on 
the part of the procuracy all through the trial.
What's more Perlov's ideas on the role of the defence 
are ambiguous. He eagerly stresses the positive role played 
by the defence in 'strengthening socialist legality'. 
Praising, in passing, the well-known defence lawyers Kiselev 
and Vaksberg for their enlightening accounts frequently
<•
published in Literaturnaya gazeta, he claims to be of the 
opinion that defence counsels must defend their clients in 
all cases. Yet he challenges the view put forward, in 
particular, by Strogovich that lawyers should never be seen 
to side with the prosecution, even when they think that 
their clients are guilty. In such a situation, Perlov 
suspiciously argues, the job of the defence is to highlight 
their clients' extenuating circumstances. This line of 
action, he comments, cannot be regarded as siding with the 
prosecution as long as defendants are kept informed of their 
lawyers' intentions and retain the right to change defence 
counse1s.5 3
However relevant and thought-provoking Giganov's 
criticism of the Soviet procuracy's dual role may be, his 
case arguably contains a major flaw, which both Perlov and 
the next participant in the debate, M. Malyarov, were quick 
to expose. Giganov, an investigator by profession, proposes, 
indeed, to curtail the power of the procuracy by handing
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the prosecution over to the investigator. This idea is 
enthusiastically supported by V. Statkus, Deputy Head of the 
Investigative Board of the USSR Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, who would like to see his ministry responsible for 
both the investigation and the prosecution, with the 
procuracy retaining only its role of supervision (nadzor). 5 * 
Perlov objects that such a reform would inevitably result in 
the investigative agencies losing their objectivity. 
Malyarov, introduced by Literaturnaya gazeta as a famous
c
jurist working for the Procuracy of the USSR and author of 
numerous law text-books, warns that a concentration of 
investigative and prosecution powers in the same hands is 
highly undemocratic. After all, the status of the procuracy 
was enhanced in the late fifties precisely in order to keep 
a check on the investigative agencies and stop them from 
running amok as they had often done, though to various 
degrees, since the beginning of Soviet power. 55
A. Trusov, the last contributor to the debate before 
the round table, disagrees with Perlov and Malyarov as well 
as with Giganov. He believes that the investigative agencies 
should be neither answerable to the procuracy nor endowed 
with too great powers including those of the prosecution. 
Instead, Trusov believes that the courts ought to be 
responsible for supervising the investigation, with the 
procurator remaining as state prosecutor, - a system based 
on the division of powers between the investigation, the
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prosecution and the court, which, Trusov claims, would have 
enjoyed the support of Lenin.56
However, Trusov unambiguously supports Giganov when it 
comes to exposing the disproportionate powers of the 
prosecution in relation to the defence and the procuracy's 
virtually inevitable bias against the defendant. As a rule, 
Trusov argues, for reasons already explained by Giganov, the 
procuracy deems the accused guilty from the beginning of the 
trial. Such practice, Trusov continues, is condoned, if not
c
encouraged by jurists like Berezovskaya, whose argument is 
based on:
... a failure to discriminate between 
the notions of 'accused 1 and 'criminal' 
( 'pres ump t i o n of gu i1t' ), wh ich leads to 
pit the defendant's right to a defence 
against the 'interests of the state 1 . 
(It is logical to grant the right to a 
defence and a defence lawyer to the 
accused, i.e. to someone who is possibly 
a criminal ; but it is hardly in the 
interests of the state to grant these 
rights to someone who is already thought 
to be a criminal.) 57
Trusov claims to have noticed the same tendency to use 
the terms 'accused 1 (obvinyaemyi) and 'criminal' 
(prestupnik) indiscriminately, as if they were synonymous, 
in Malyarov's article. Judging by the account of the 
round table, which gathered more than two hundred defence 
lawyers from Moscow, this confusion was widespread amongst 
the legal profession. One of the jurists participating in 
the discussion is reported to have quoted an extract from a 
decree issued by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the
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RSFSR recommending that court sessions take place 'where the 
offence has been committed, or at the place of work or 
residence of the guilty party' .58 'Of course' , the jurist 
remarks, 'it is a mere slip of the tongue, yet a very 
eloquent one'. 59
Trusov goes one step further by analysing the issue in 
the context of a discussion on citizens' rights. The 
confusion between the terms 'accused 1 and 'criminal', he 
argues, means that in fact the concept of presumption of
«•
innocence is not applied. Being labelled a criminal, the 
defendant ceases to be regarded as a citizen and is 
stripped of his citizens' rights, including the right to a 
proper defence, hence the undemocratic, yet widely accepted 
notion that the defence lawyer is a mere helper in the 
process of administering justice within a system heavily 
dominated by the prosecution, which is also responsible for 
supervising the investigation. Trusov, who, it is important 
to stress, was given the last word in the debate by 
Literaturnaya gazeta, clearly establishes that a full 
recognition of the rights of the defence, and consequently 
of citizens' rights, necessitates a radical reform of the 
procuracy.
That the work of the defence is greatly hampered by the 
omnipotence of the procuracy becomes painfully clear when 
contributors discuss the need to 'broaden the rights of the 
defence'. In an article which foreshadows the debate to 
come, Vaksberg complains that defence lawyers cannot do
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their job properly because, unlike procurators, they are not 
allowed to question witnesses before the trial. 'And why 
not? 1 , Vaksberg retorts. 'After all, we [the prosecution and 
the defence] are supposed to be equal parties. And we do 
have the same aim, i.e. to establish the truth'. To those 
who object that defence lawyers might influence witnesses, 
Vaksberg irreverently replies that it should not be assumed 
that procurators do not.60
Vaksberg is backed by a couple of fellow lawyers who
c
also hold the view that they should have access to 
witnesses. M. Blagovolina, in particular, formulates the 
problem in terms that help to understand the ambiguous 
position of many other contributors. Why shouldn't we be 
allowed to meet witnesses, she wonders. After all, there is 
no law against it, or are we to understand that what is not 
explicitly allowed is in fact forbidden?6i
And, indeed, a number of contributors, like, for 
example, Anashkin, Boikov, Strogovich and Perlov, proceed 
from the assumption that in the present system defence 
lawyers do have access to witnesses if they wish. 
Consequently they blame the lawyers themselves for not 
exercising the rights they already have, although they 
occasionally concede that some obstacles are put in their 
way. Boikov, for instance, reproaches the courts for 
favouring the prosecution and Strogovich acknowledges that 
the failure of defence lawyers to exercise their rights to
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the full is partly caused by 'a last vestige of mistrust' 
towards them.62
It is interesting to note, however, that the 
suggestions made by these authors as to ways of broadening 
the rights of the defence even further show that their 
perceptions of the present system differ quite 
significantly. Anashkin, for example, thinks that defence 
lawyers can intervene only when the investigation supervised 
by the procuracy has been completed, and proposes that they
f
should be allowed to act as soon as the charges are brought. 
On the other hand, Perlov believes that this is already the 
case and, therefore, the way to broaden the rights of the 
defence is to authorize lawyers to represent their clients 
from the moment the police enquiry begins. The confusion 
seems to stem from the fact that whereas defence lawyers may 
be allowed to intervene while the preliminary investigation 
is taking place, they must be allowed to do so once it has 
been completed.63 Obviously Perlov has more faith in the 
procuracy's willingness to facilitate the work of the 
defence than Anashkin. 64
It often seems that a dialogue of the deaf is taking 
place between these frustrated defence lawyers and jurists 
who stubbornly maintain that defence lawyers already enjoy 
the right to meet witnesses before the trial. It could be 
argued that the latter are indirectly urging the procuracy 
and the courts to make room for the defence in the spirit of 
the new legislation. Yet their failure to question the
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impartiality of the procuracy is worrying. Furthermore many 
of them are firmly opposed to the idea that defence lawyers 
should be allowed to conduct their own investigation. 
Boikov, for example, argues that only an investigation 
supervised by the procuracy can be objective. Anashkin 
approves of the defence conducting its own investigation 
only in Western societies where the justice system is 
dominated by the bourgeoisie. On the whole, these authors 
regard increased participation of the defence in the
c
preliminary investigation as an additional safeguard against 
any abuse of power by the investigative agencies, yet they 
still want the procuracy to remain the main player.
Ten weeks after the round table Literaturnaya gazeta 
published an article by A. Sukharev, first Deputy-Minister 
of Justice of the USSR, the title of which 'Problems of the 
Advokatura - Outcome of the Discussion 1 indicates that it 
must be read as the official reply to the debate. Sukharev's 
arguments are remarkably similar to those put forward by 
authors like Anashkin and Boikov. He agrees that the rights 
of the defence need to be broadened (measures are being 
taken to this effect), that the role of defence lawyers is 
to defend their clients and that it is, indeed, regrettable 
that defence counsels do not always command the respect they 
deserve. However, Sukharev continues, it is right that 
defence lawyers should not be allowed to gather or check the 
evidence, this work being best done by the investigative 
agencies under the supervision of the procuracy.65
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It would be incorrect to argue that the official reply 
is in no way different from even the most conservative 
contributions previously examined. The deputy-minister has 
an unpleasant tendency to hammer home the point that the 
advokatura's professionalism leaves much to be desired and 
that many defence lawyers are 'unscrupulous' individuals. 
More importantly, the role of the defence in the 
investigation has been discussed with more subtlety by a 
number of authors. Strogovich, in particular, insists that
c
while defence lawyers cannot be allowed to conduct an 
investigation, they must exercise their right to gather 
information and present evidence.66
Nevertheless, the reply from the Ministry of Justice 
confirms the suspicion that those who call for the need 'to 
broaden the rights of the defence' are not necessarily 
committed to achieving a right balance between prosecution 
and defence. The two hundred or so defence lawyers who met 
for the round table organized by Literaturnaya gazeta had 
probably been more impressed by the contributions which 
question the dual role of the procuracy as prosecution and 
guardian of the law, and its seemingly unwavering resolve to 
restrict the scope of the defence. That day the general 
feeling was, indeed, that whether or not they already had 
many rights in theory, they certainly did not have them in 
practice, as most of the time the procuracy refuses to call 
additional witnesses or take any course of action suggested 
by the defence.67
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4. Cone 1 us ion
In an article published in The Guardian in 1986 which 
examines recent developments in the legal profession, the 
British journalist Martin Walker refers to a 'remarkable and 
laudatory 1 review of a posthumously published book by 
Professor M. S. Strogovich.68 Walker deems 'fascinating' a 
statement made by Strogovich in his book to the effect that 
most serious miscarriages of justice stem from the practice 
of building up the accusation on the defendant's
c
confession. 69 Fascinating as it may be for a relatively 
ill-informed Western audience inclined to regard the pre — 
X 1 a s n o s t' Soviet press as hopelessly muzzled, it is unlikely 
that Soviet readers familiar with the debates publicized by 
Literaturnaya gazeta in the sixties and seventies could have 
been particularly impressed by the statement itself, 
although its endorsement by the USSR Ministry of Justice 
was indeed indicative of a change of mood amongst policy- 
makers .
The similarities between the debates examined in this 
chapter and those that took place in the first years of the 
Gorbachev administration are certainly striking. Recent 
studies have shown that under Gorbachev reform-minded 
jurists called for the need to remove the preliminary 
investigation from the procuracy, to eliminate the 
'prosecution bias' of the courts, to increase the number of 
people's assessors, to raise the status of the defence and
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ensure that the principle of presumption of innocence is 
applied.70 All this sounds terribly familiar.
The recurrence of the issues testifies as much to the 
political and social stagnation of the Brezhnev era as to 
the efforts made by Literaturnaya gazeta to keep the debate 
open during this period. On the other hand the comparison 
with the eighties helps to identify the limitations of the 
debates publicized in the years 67-71. Two essential issues 
were never tackled, one of them being the dependence of the
c
judicial system on the Party and State authorities, which 
the emigre lawyer Konstantin Simis so vividly exposed in his 
book, USSR: Secrets of a Corrupt Society, in particular in 
the chapter called 'Justice for Sale 1 . The issue ceased to 
be taboo with the advent of glasnost'. For example, in 1988 
the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court advocated the 
introduction of a law aimed at penalizing any attempt to 
interfere in the work of the courts, and in the above- 
mentioned article from The Guardian M. Walker refers to a 
contribution published by Literaturnaya gazeta in 1986, in 
which A. Vaksberg denounces the perverse influence of the 
Party on the justice system. 71
Secondly, apart from Chakovskii's spiteful article 
savagely attacking the dissident writers Ginzburg, 
Galanskov, Dobrovol'skii and Laskova, no mention is made of 
the political trials. ?2 This silence is ironic in a way 
because the human rights movement of the sixties and 
seventies, which began in 1965 with the political
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mobilization provoked by the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, was 
very legalistic in its approach. The Whi te Book. a sami zda t 
publication that circulated during the Sinyavsky-Daniel 
affair, included the transcript of the trial and articles 
denouncing the illegal methods used by the investigative 
agencies. Likewise each issue of the Chronicle of Currents 
Events, which first appeared on 30 April 1968, began with 
reports on political trials. Unlike their predecessors, the 
victims of political repression under Brezhnev did not ask
c
for clemency. They demanded that legality be observed, thus 
questioning the competence of the courts. 73
It is interesting to note, however, that although 
political trials were not discussed in Literaturnaya gazeta, 
there are obvious similarities between the legalistic 
demands of the human rights activists voiced in illegal 
literature and the concerns expressed in the organ of the 
very orthodox Writers' Union. Both types of publications, 
for instance, denounce the discrepancy between the reformist 
spirit of the legislation introduced in the late fifties and 
the lingering undemocratic practices that were established 
in the thirties. In December 1965 Yu1i Daniel's wife, Larisa 
Bogoraz wrote a letter to the procurator general, later 
published in a sami zdat publication, in which she protests 
against the illegal methods employed during the 
invest iga t i on:
The senior investigator, Lieutenant 
Gregory P. Kantov, asserted in 
conversation with me that my husband was 
guilty and would be punished.... This
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prejudicial attitude during the process 
of investigation forces me to doubt the 
objectivity of the means used to conduct 
the trial .... The investigator made 
indirect threats: If I did not behave 
myself ('You understand what I mean, 1 he 
said, al tough I had no idea what he was 
talking about), there would be 
unpleasant consequences for me at my 
job. . . I demand that standards of 
legality and humanity be observed. 74
Presumption of guilt and the bullying methods of 
investigators figure prominently amongst the concerns voiced 
in the debates publicized by Literaturnaya gazeta, the only
c
difference being - and it is a major one - that the 
criticisms are never expressed in the context of a 
discussion on the use of the criminal procedure to repress 
political dissent. It is, however, to the paper's credit 
that in the increasingly repressive political climate of the 
late sixties, it should have continued to raise issues that 
are an integral part of the human rights debate.
The importance of the discussions publicized by 
Literaturnaya gazeta lies as much in the outspoken defence 
of some far-reaching reforms of the criminal procedure as in 
the exposure of divergent currents in the legal profession. 
Apart from a couple of hardliners keen to reassert the 
supposedly infallible objectivity of the procuracy, most 
contributors can be broadly divided into two groups: those 
who argue for a stronger defence, yet suggest only minor 
reforms that would not radically modify the existing 
division of powers between prosecution and defence; and 
those who question the dual role of the procuracy as
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prosecutor and supervisor of legality, arguing that a strong 
defence will be possible only if the investigation is taken 
away from the procuracy and if the criminal procedure 
becomes overall more adversarial, possibly with something 
resembling a jury.
Although several contributions contain fairly 
conservative arguments, on the whole the debates on the 
criminal procedure reveal a heartfelt and openly voiced 
concern for the vulnerability of Soviet citizens caught up
<•
in the judicial system whatever the seriousness or nature of 
the charges brought against them. The debates raise crucial 
questions as to the nature of the Soviet state, which in the 
justice system is represented by the procuracy. Some 
contributors cling to the notion of a benign state, the 
interests of wh ich fully coincide with those of its 
citizens. Others, by challenging the excessive powers of the 
procuracy, intimate, or in the case of Trusov, for example, 
openly argue that citizens' rights cannot always be reliably 
protected by the state. It is frequently the case that they 
must be protected against it.
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CONCLUSION
In many respects Literaturnaya gazeta deserved its 
reputation as the 'Hyde Park of Socialism 1 , publicizing a 
range of debates on societal issues which did not pose an 
immediate threat to the political leadership.! There is no 
doubt that the editorial board cooperated with the
c
Brezhnevite establishment, carefully avoiding controversies 
no longer tolerated by the conservatives. The absence of 
material investigating the country's Stalinist past clearly 
indicated that the organ of the Writers' Union would not take 
on the more seditious battles which became the hallmark of 
Novyi mir during the Thaw. The limitations of the economic 
debates were also indicative of the paper's acceptance of the 
political parameters imposed by the post-Thaw conservative 
leadership. The Party's monopoly of power was nowhere 
challenged, political responsibilities were never discussed, 
large-scale corruption amidst the rank of the bureaucracy 
was conveniently overlooked. In many respects Li teraturnaya 
gazeta was indeed typical of what is now commonly referred to 
as the 'period of stagnation 1 .
Ironically, however, one of Literaturnaya gazeta's 
greatest achievements during this period was to publish 
material reflecting the demoralization of Soviet society and 
its inability to change within the existing structures.
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Although it operated under the close supervision of the 
Party, the paper did not attempt to conceal the failures of 
the system. Soviet society frequently emerged as being 
morally corrupt, riddled with individualism, suspicion and 
petty authoritarianism. The society whose mission it was to 
become the embodiment of the collectivist dream had become 
an atomized community whose members showed little civic 
responsibility. Deprived of consumer rights, individuals were 
at the mercy of incompetent and faceless state-run
c
bureaucracies, unconcerned by the plurality of needs. 
Deprived of the rights to a strong legal defence, individuals 
were overpowered by a judiciary system dominated by the state 
procuracy. Literaturnaya gazeta contributed to bringing 
discredit upon the existing system by discussing problems 
affecting the whole population. It also voiced the more 
specific concerns of professionals, who felt hampered in 
their work and careers by the bureaucratization of society.
A great many contributions were permeated with a feeling 
of deep frustration born of an awareness that these 
criticisms had been expressed many times before to no avail. 
Yet Literaturnaya gazeta gave the reform-minded section of 
the intelligentsia the opportunity of sustaining a number of 
debates which began in the late fifties. Academics, 
professionals and journalists continued to raise social and 
economic problems left unsolved by Khrushchev and unlikely to 
be tackled by the Brezhnev administration, as if holding the
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fort until the coming of a political climate more conducive 
to reforms.
The subversiveness of Literaturnaya gazeta, however, did 
not lie only in its effort to highlight the shortcomings of 
Soviet society. It was instrumental in promoting liberal 
values which ran counter to the official dogmas on which the 
system rested. The theory of collectivism was overtly 
challenged and rejected by numerous contributors on the 
ground that it hindered the harmonious development of the
c
individual and, therefore, of society as a whole, the 
organization of society depending as much on collective 
action as on individual talents. This fundamental criticism 
of official ideology contained the seeds of a more 
comprehensive and radical questioning of the system. The word 
'collective' could indeed be understood to refer to various 
units operating at different levels of society, from the work 
collective to the state apparatus, allegedly responsible for 
representing the interests of the collective. Obviously the 
question was not raised with the same degree of openness at 
all levels. It was most outspokenly discussed in the context 
of everyday life, and in more abstract terms by 
educationalists, psychologists and sociologists.
Furthermore, an explicit link was established between 
the neglect of the individual and the bureaucratic system of 
management. Criticisms of the bureaucracy were not a new 
phenomenon in the Soviet press. All leaders, including 
Stalin, had been quick to blame the failures of the system on
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'bureaucratism' and the incompetence of individual officials 
or collectives, never acknowledging, however, that 
'bureaucratism 1 was part and parcel of the system. But the 
harsh criticisms systematically levelled at planning 
authorities, ministries and state-run services in the second 
section of Literaturnaya gazeta suggest that public opinion 
no longer believed in the ability of the bureaucracies to 
reform themselves.
While the controversies were never overtly political,
<•
politics was never far away. The rejection of collectivism 
was the first stage of a debate on the nature of democracy. 
No longer was it assumed that the collective was always 
right. No longer was it assumed that the principles on which 
collectives operate are automatically just and sound, whether 
they are condoned by the majority of the group or imposed by 
individuals. The supremacy of the collective which had been 
used to justify repressive or authoritarian practices was no 
longer taken for granted. The supremacy of the highest 
institution that claimed to represent the interests of both 
the collective and the individual, i.e., the state, was also 
indirectly questioned, in particular in the debate on the 
legal procedure, with some contributors declaring the 
procuracy, which represents the state in the judiciary 
system, incapable of protecting the legal rights of the 
individua1.
Other debates contained the seeds of a discussion on the 
socio-economic nature of socialism. Marxism-Leninism had
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always been able to accommodate anti-ega1itarian policies on 
the ground that economic conditions during the period of 
transition toward communism demanded that rewards be 
distributed in accordance with work rather need. Yet the 
belief shared by many contributors that material incentives 
are among the most efficient ways of involving individuals in 
a collective endeavour could also be the mark of a liberal 
way of thinking, especially when coupled with an outspoken 
defence of the privately hired construction brigades
c
(shabashniki). The emphasis placed on the role and rights of 
the consumer, while weakened by the absence of any talk of a 
market economy, also contributed to challenging the Soviet 
brand of socialism, which had always entrusted the state with 
the control of all activity, including economic performance.
While promoting a more individua1-centred type of 
society, Literaturnaya gazeta highlighted behavioural changes 
that testified to the Soviet population's actual resistance 
to the collectivist ethos and to the power of the 
bureaucracies. Obviously, the list of "spontaneous social 
phenomena* investigated by the paper was far from being 
exhaustive. Yet the material on unorganized leisure 
activities, unsupervised discussion clubs or privately hired 
work teams acknowledged Soviet people's determination to find 
alternatives outside the structures provided by the state and 
the Party. These initiatives taken by large sections of the 
population did not meet with the same degree of approval from 
all contributors. The debates nevertheless emphasized that
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the old values were not questioned exclusively by the 
'chattering classes', thus pointing to the widening gulf 
between the polity and society at large.
It has been pointed out that similarities can be 
observed between the legal and illegal cultures which 
developed in the Soviet Union from the mid-sixties to the 
mid-eighties. Hosking regards samizdat and legally published 
literature 'as part of one Soviet literature', issues raised 
by the Thaw being discussed further in both types of
<•
publications. 'It is true', Hosking argues, 'that samizdat 
works are usually more outspoken and unequivocal: but what 
they say is being reiterated in Soviet publications in ways 
that the informed and sensitive reader cannot fail to 
understand.'2 While paying tribute to the courage of 
dissident activists and writers, Lewin remarks that 'what 
unofficial manifestoes say often dots the "i's" on what is 
largely expressed in published books'.3 Kagarlitsky 
suggests that the legal and illegal cultures actually 
influenced each other - some readers having access to both 
and some authors contributing to both —, which, in the end, 
had the effect of making the censorship more liberal.*
Literaturnaya gazeta certainly tackled issues which were 
discussed in both legal and dissident literature. The theme 
of byt, the indignities and frustrations of everyday life and 
the decline in moral standards, figured as prominently in the 
paper and the legally published novels of Yurii Trifonov as
•
in the works of Aleksandr Zinoviev, one of the most famous
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figures of Soviet dissidence under Brezhnev. Zinoviev's 
extreme vision of the typical Soviet work collective as 
nothing better than a robbers' den recalls some of the less 
virulent, yet disenchanted contributions published on the 
subject by Literaturnaya gazeta.5 Likewise, the concerns 
voiced in the paper by members of the legal profession echoed 
the legalistic demands of the human rights activists. The 
creation in 1978 of an illegal group 'for the Defence of the 
Rights of Invalids in the USSR 1 is further evidence of a
c
strong link between legal and illegal culture.6
Literaturnaya gazeta belonged to a broad cultural 
movement that transcended narrowly defined notions of 
legality and was instrumental in promoting values which were 
to influence the 'new thinking' advocated by Gorbachev and 
his advisers in the first years of glasnost' and perestroika. 
The 'deindividua1ization' of society, the bureaucratization 
of all aspects of public life and the egalitarian ethos were 
constantly denounced as the sources of Soviet society's 
inertia by people closely connected with the new leadership.7 
The rights of the individual were radically re-examined by 
the legal profession, and the bureaucracies were publicly 
attacked by the new leaders in a way never seen before. 
Gorbachev's castigations of Gosplan and the ministries at the 
XXVII Party Congress had been heralded by Zas1avskaya's 
famous 1984 Novosibirsk Memorandum which unambiguously stated 
that the success of economic reforms depended on the 
government's ability to break down the resistance of the
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bureaucracy.a Measures were taken with the aim of re- 
introducing some degree of private farming; green issues, 
actively publicized by numerous informal organizations, began 
to be treated more seriously, sexual politics was discussed 
more candidly.
While there is evidence that both legal and illegal 
cultures contributed to the 'new thinking' of the mid- 
eighties, it remains true that sami zdat literature went much 
further than legal publications in its criticism of the
<•
regime. Literaturnaya gazeta did not cover all the aspects of 
Soviet dissent. Three main contentious issues, which were to 
become of paramount importance under Gorbachev, were nowhere 
discussed in the paper, namely religion, nationalities and 
the labour movement.9 It has been suggested that the 
democratic dissident movement was in fact little interested 
in these questions. After all, the nationalist and religious 
dissident groups operated separately from the human rights 
activists, and what Alexeyeva calls 'the movement for social 
and economic rights', which was dominated by the 
intelligentsia, began only in the late seventies and was 
still at an embryonic stage by the mid-eighties.1o
The lack of debates on the nationality question 
certainly makes Literaturnaya gazeta a very 'Russian' Soviet 
newspaper whether or not its readers were themselves 
sensitive to other nationalities' concerns.11 Furthermore, 
the almost total absence of material on the industrial 
working class, and labour relations in general, begs
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questions as to the paper's commitment to socialist values. 
An individua1-centred society, universal human values, even 
the promotion of anti-egalitarian wage policies, can belong 
to a socialist discourse, but only if these liberal 
principles are backed up by a social programme defining a 
balanced sharing of responsib1ities between the collective 
and the individual.
Shlapentokh argues that the '"personalization" of Soviet 
society 1 lay 'at the centre of the liberals' dream in the
c
1960s' , 12 This theme continued to dominate the debates 
publicized by Literaturnaya gazeta in the post-Thaw period. 
Concentrating on the 'mentionab1e' issues, the paper 
demonstrated the evil effects of the official ideology and 
its failure to keep up with the de facto evolution of Soviet 
society. The Party is never criticized, yet the values 
promoted by the paper have little to do with party ideology. 
Literaturnaya gazeta must be counted among the publications 
that contributed to the slow debunking of official dogmas, 
which began at the XX Party Congress and led to the demise of 
Marxism-Leninism in the early nineties.
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APPENDIX 1
SPACE ALLOCATED TO SUBJECT AREAS (1)
1. This table is based on 26 issues of Literaturnaya gazeta 
(second section) from 4 January 1967 to 28 June 1967.
2. The same articles can be included in two different 
categories; for example, an article on marriage laws is 
listed in the section on women as well as in the section on 
1 aw.
3. The 
defined 
women's
subject areas do not necessarily have a clearly 
counterpart in the paper; for example, there is no 
page in Literaturnaya gazeta.
Subje-ct Areas Approx. Number of Words
1. International Life (analyses) 78,500
2. International Life (short news p.9) 75,000
3. International Life (culture & the Arts) 78,250
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. 
1 1 .
12.
13.
Economic 
Arts and
Issues
Li terature
Science and Technology
Moral issues
The Collective and the
Work
Women
Law
Services (byt)
Socio1ogy
Educat ion
Individua1
14. Environmental Issues
15. Housing / Town-planning
16. Lenini ana
17. Tourism
18. Journa1i sm
19. Local Government
57,450
56,400
39,000
33,300
650
500
250
100
16,500
13,500
19, 
17, 
17, 
17,
10,150
10,000
10,050
8,200
6,600
2,800
N.B.
1. International Life (3): most of it is on the Arts (16,000
words on Life Abroad)
2. The high figure (56,400) for Arts and Literature (5) 
should be interpreted with caution. Most of the material 
listed in this category (41,000 words) is made up of reports 
on the IV Congress of Soviet writers. If it was not for this 
exceptional event, the figure for Arts and Literature would 
be around 15,000 words.
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APPENDIX 2
RELATIVE POPULARITY OF THE VARIOUS SECTIONS
This table is from "Literaturnaya gazeta" i ee auditoriya, I. 
D. Fomicheva (ed.), Moscow: Izdatel'stvo moskovskogo 
universiteta, 1978, p.47. It is based on a survey carried out 
in 1973.
Sect ions
Domestic Life
% of subscribers reading 
the section regularly
96
The Arts
Satire and Humour
Literary Publications
International Life
Foreign Culture
Soviet Literature and Literary Criticism
91
90
89
88
86
71
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APPENDIX 3
RELATIVE POPULARITY OF THE VARIOUS TOPICS ON DOMESTIC LIFE
This table is from "Literaturnaya gazeta" i ee auditoriya, I. 
D. Fomicheva (ed.>, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo moskovskogo 
universiteta , 1978, pp. 59-60. It is based on a survey 
carried out in 1973.
Topics % of subscribers reading
the articles on these 
topics regularly
Private life, marrc iage, the family,
role of men and women within
the family and in society 88
The future of man and mankind 78
Fight against pollution,
protection of the environment 69
Teaching and education problems 68 
Fight against anti-social phenomena 66
Services and trade, transport and
communications 65
Legal proceedings, legislation,
raising citizens' awareness of
law and legality 62
Urbanization, urban growth, urban
1 ife 61
Problems with leisure time,
organization of leisure 60
Medicine and the health service 59
Relationships within the work
collective, the rights and
responsibilities of managers 58
Problems of population and migration 57 
Modern architecture and town-planning 54
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APPENDIX 3 (Cont/d)
Application of discoveries and
inventions 51
Development of social sciences and
sciences studying the individual 49
Moral responsibility for disabled
war veterans 47
Problems of economic management 45
The economic reform, rational
management, scientific organization
of work, improvement of the wage system 43
c
Individual and collective creative
work in the sciences 40
Work of the state apparatus 39
Rational distribution of the productive
forces of the country, in particular,
problems in the development of the North,
Siberia and the Far East 38
Socio-economic and cultural problems
in rural areas 23
Development of socialist competition 18
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APPENDIX 4
SPACE ALLOCATED TO SUBJECT AREAS (2)
1. This table is based on a close reading of Li teraturnaya 
gaze ta (second section) over a period of five years from 
January 1967 to December 1971.
2. The organization of the material differs slightly from the 
way it is presented in appendix 1. Some subject areas do not 
figure at all, either because they are given very little 
attention in the paper or because they do not pertain to 
domestic social and economic issues. Articles on strictly 
scientific and technical matters have also been left aside.
Subject Areas Approx. Number of Words
Economic Issues (Industry &
Agriculture) 530,000
Services and Housing (byt) 300,000
Women / The Family 210,000
Law 180,000
Mora1 Issues
The Individual and the Collective 150,000
Protection of the Environment
(Cultural and Natural) 130,000
Education (Secondary and Higher) 110,000
Research / Specialists 60,000
Youth 25,000
Health Service 20,000
Sociology 18,000
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APPENDIX 5
COMPOSITION OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
(Dec.1962 - Dec. 1977)
- underlined: new members and new functions (dep. ed. = 
deputy editor; sec. = secretary)
- the dates indicate when the changes became apparent in the 
paper
27/12/1962 1/1/1966
Barabash Yu. Ya 
Bo 1khovitinov V 
Bondarev Yu. V. 
Ga1 in B. A. 
Guliya G- D. 
Korabel'nikov G 
Leont'ev B. L. 
Medvedev V. S. 
Prudkov O. N. 
Radov G. G. 
Rozhdestvenski i 
So 1oukhin V. A. 
Surkov E. D. 
Surovtsev Yu. I 
Terteryan A. S.
(15)
(dep. 
N.
ed. )
M.
R. I
(dep. ed.)
B1inov A. 
Ga1anov B. 
Ga1 in B. A. 
Guliya G. D 
Komarov Yu. 
Makarov A. 
Markov G. 
Medvedev V. 
Narovchatov
S. 
S.
Prudkov O. N. 
Surovtsev Yu. (dep. ed.)
Terteryan A. S. (dep.ed.)
(12)
9 left
Barabash
Bo 1khovi t inov
Bondarev
Korabe1'nikov
Leont'ev
Radov
Rozhdestvensk i i
So 1oukhin
Surkov
Changes in 1966
4 joined
3 left :
Syrokomskii V. 
Gorbunov V. A.
A. (1st dep. ed.) (12/7/1966)
(6/ 10/1966) 
Smirnov-Cherkezov A. I. (13/10/1966) 
Krivitskii E. A. (dep. ed.) (22/12/1966)
Blinov (27/9/1966) 
Komarov (13/12/1966) 
Surovtsev (22/12/1966)
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APPENDIX 5 (Cont/d)
1/1/1967 End of 1977
Ai tmatov Ch. 
Ga1anov B. 
Gorbunov V. A. 
Guliya G. D. 
Zhe1eznikov V. 
Krivi tsk i i E. 
Leonov L. 
Makarov A. 
Markov G. 
Medvedev V. S. 
Narovchatov S. 
Novichenko L. 
Pank ina L. 
Prudkov O. N. 
Samarin R.
( 1st sec. )
(dep. ed.)
I .Smirnov—Cherkezov A.
Subbotin V.
Syrokomskii V. A. (1st dep. ed.)
Terteryan A. S. (dep. ed. )
Those who stayed on:
Ai tmatov
Ga1anov
Gorbunov
Gu1i ya
Krivi tsk i i
Markov
Novi chenko
Prudkov
Subbot in
Syrokomski i
Terteryan
Those who left:
Zheleznikov (26/6/1967) 
Leonov (4/6/1969) 
Narovchatov (24/12/1975) 
Pankina (22/1/1969) 
Smi rnov-Cherkezov 
(25/8/1971 )
(19)
1 left :
Gal in
3 died:
Makarov (2/12/1967)
Medvedev (tribute on
28/10/1970)
Samarin (tribute on
6/2/1974)
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APPENDIX 6
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF A. CHAKOVSKII'S NOVELS:
GOD ZHIZNI (1957) AND DOROGI, KOTORYE MY VYBIRAEM (1960)
Chakovskii's 'very positive' hero is Andrei Aref'ev, a 
young graduate fresh from the Moscow Transport Institute, 
who cannot wait to take up his first job at Zapolyarsk in the 
Far North. The year is 1954, and the sequel takes us to 1956
c
with numerous references to the XX Party Congress.
Through the character of Andrei, Chakovskii voices some 
of his views on how post-Stalin Soviet society should evolve 
and what the intelligentsia's contribution ought to be. 
Chakovskii certainly goes out of his way to emphasize the 
urgent need for change - to deny this fact in the restless 
climate of the fifties would have probably cost him his 
credibility - but his criticisms rest on the unimaginative 
assumption that the system goes wrong only when people fail 
to make it go right.
Andrei is first of all presented as the heir of a 
glorious past, which he perceives as a constant source of 
inspiration for future achievements. His bedside books are 
the two classics of socialist realism, The Mutiny by Furmanov 
and How the Steel Was Tempered by Ostrovskii.l Imbued with 
the values promoted by such edifying literature and proud of 
his country's achievements, Andrei feels sorry that his
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generation should have 'missed' the first five-year plan, the 
Great Patriotic War, the October Revolution, the Civil War, 
Magnitogorsk, Komsomol'sk and Lenin in the flesh. 2
The reader who fails to be uplifted by images of 
revolutionary romanticism might deem Andrei to be something 
of a bad-tempered bore. Chakovskii does allow his character 
to be a little uncouth, but only because this slight 
shortcoming is to be evidence of his honesty and laudable 
determination to achieve his goals.
c
Chakovskii endowed his heroic young specialist of the 
fifties with all the qualities which, according to the myths 
of socialist realism, enabled the first generation of 
communists to build the new Soviet society. Loyalty to the 
Party, selfless hard work, a taste for fighting natural 
elements and political opponents alike, and a constant 
craving for action and 'building', all these admi rab1e 
qualities justify the hero's se1f—righteousness and 
ruthlessness toward enemies. They can be found in both men 
and women although one suspects that Chakovskii sees them as 
being primarily male. Indeed, the female characters seem to 
deserve the respect of their creator either when they give 
the hero emotional and ideological support, or when they work 
'just like men 1 ('sovsem ne po-zhenski'). 3
However, the old virtues are seen in the context of the 
fifties' political confusion, which is reflected in Andrei's 
occasional lack of confidence and recurrent doubts. Needless
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to say, he will see through the enemies of socialism and 
'find the right way'.
Although the second novel contains a few pages reminding 
us of the endemic hostility of the West (in Moscow Andrei 
meets a lonely and alcoholic Englishman, who, we are to 
understand, welcomes the XX Congress for all the wrong 
reasons), Chakovskii is more concerned with denouncing 
internal enemies. Andrei has to fight against a whole series 
of home-bred 'baddies', who in the end will get their
t
comeuppance.
The main 'negative characters' are party members who 
hold up the development of the economy and social welfare, 
and consequently the progress of socialism, by using the 
system to protect their own petty interests. The engineer, 
Kramov, a falsehearted cynical careerist, gets particularly 
bad treatment from the author. His main concern is to fulfil 
the plan at all cost, and while he makes sure that the 
workers receive their monthly bonuses, so he can rely on 
their cooperation, he feels only contempt for them and does 
not care two hoots about their living conditions.
The more sympathetically drawn character of Kondakov, 
the managing director of the industrial complex, belongs to 
the old school of managers who would do anything for a quiet 
life and looks back nostalgically on Stalin's time when young 
enthusiasts like Andrei could be easily silenced. His 
retirement, at the end of the second novel, seems to suggest
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that this complacent and timid style of management will 
gradually disappear along with the old generation.
Andrei discovers his colleagues' bad faith and apathy 
when trying to solve two major problems at work. Horrified by 
the appalling living conditions of his workers, he sees 
providing them with decent housing as his responsibility. As 
Kramov and Kondakov do not support his initiative on the 
basis that there is an acute shortage of cement in the plant 
and throughout the country, Andrei puts his case to Baulin,
c
the secretary of the regional party committee, who gives him 
the go —ahead. The same Baulin, definitely a very positive 
character, helps him a second time, albeit indirectly, when a 
year later Andrei asks him to supply him with more cement to 
finish the construction of the tunnel. Baulin gives him some 
benevolent advice which seems to sum up Chakovskii's views on 
how the country's economic difficulties should be solved. The
thing to do is to 'think', in other wo rds to use one's wit
i 
and be resourceful, rather than beg the authorities for
something which is not available. Fortunately, and very 
conveniently, Andrei finds out that metallic sheets can be 
used instead of cement to reinforce the walls of the tunnel.
Chakovskii paints a far from idyllic picture of Soviet 
society in the fifties. It is not altogether denied that 
shortages, low standards of living, social problems, such as 
widespread alcoholism, might be to some extent the result of 
poor management. At the same time, it is made perfectly clear 
that the problem does not lie in the nature of the economic
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system or the Party, but rather in long-standing harmful 
practices, which, in the end, make a mockery of the system. 
For instance, Kondakov is reluctant to assist Andrei in 
getting some more cement because, when the tunnel directly 
linking the mine of phosphorous ore with his refinery is 
built, his plan target will be raised. Indeed, he will no 
longer be able to blame bad weather conditions for slowing 
down production. While Kondakov 1 s approach is severely 
criticized, nowhere is it suggested that new mechanisms are
c
needed to prevent such practices from taking place. The 
underlying message is that good communists will make this 
unquestionably good system work.
The conflicts between Andrei and his opponents are also 
discussed in political terms, whether in private conversa t i ons 
between the characters or in party meetings. (Local councils 
do not seem to have any role to play. ) It is significant 
that Chakovskii does not only condemn careerists and 
complacent party members, but also viciously attacks those 
whose criticisms are supposedly levelled at the wrong 
people. While disillusioned Soviet citizens might have had 
their faith in the system rekindled by the indignant and 
tireless crusader portrayed in the character of Andrei, the 
liberals gathered around Novyi Mir could not have failed 
to notice Chakovskii's lesson in how to handle criticism.
The character accused of publicizing ill-advised 
criticism happens to be the local journalist, Polesskii. (It 
is difficult not to suspect Chakovskii, the journal and
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newspaper editor, of wanting to give journalists a warning.) 
Polesskii is eventually expelled of the Party for unfairly 
assessing the work of the planning organizations and failing 
to point out that the shortage of cement results from the 
implementation of an ambitious housing programme throughout 
the country. Polesskii made the additional mistake of 
attacking Kondakov not so much for making the wrong 
decisions, but for enjoying a secure position, unlike the 
workers, who might find themselves out of work overnight for
<•
lack of supply. His articles are judged to be defeatist and 
irresponsible inasmuch as they can only undermine the 
workers' faith in their managers and leaders. Criticism 
should only aim at reinforcing the cohesion of Soviet 
soc i ety.*
Chakovskii'S acknowledgement of the need for some 
changes stems from his fear of instability. He seems, 
indeed, to be acutely aware of discontent amongst the 
population; hence the emphasis on the nationwide housing 
programme and the reference to the brand-new Yugo-Zapadnyi 
district on the outskirts of Moscow. It is also suggested 
that Soviet workers' behaviour might fall short of what is 
expected of revolutionary heroes because they still live in 
unsatisfactory conditions and tend to be kept away from the 
decision-making process. 5
Although the workers have a certain role to play in the 
novels, they are very much in the background. While 
Ckakovskii still clings to the romantic and convenient idea
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of a revolutionary class of workers adhering wholeheartedly 
to the revised goals of the Party, the ' leading role 1 seems, 
in fact, to have been surreptitiously handed over to the 
technical intelligentsia. It is Andrei's responsibility to 
improve his workers' living conditions. (Workers indulge in 
heavy drinking only when they are not provided with an 
alternative such as, for example, a 'house of culture'.) It 
is also his responsibility to guide them in their choices. 
(Inspired by good leadership, good, 'real' workers do not
c
desert the factory even if their new job in the same factory 
means lower wages.) Finally, it is Andrei's responsibility to 
break through the army of bureaucrats, up to and including 
those in Moscow if necessary, to obtain what the factory 
needs in order to function adequately.
Chakovskii's claim that the intelligentsia is to play an 
increasingly important role in the management of Soviet 
society is probably the most progressive message in the story 
of Andrei. It indicates an awareness of irreversible social 
changes and the need to move away from the rule of badly 
educated apparatchiks. The transformation of Li tera turnaya 
gaze t a into a broader forum aimed at the scientific and 
technical intelligentsia stems precisely from such 
rea1i za t ion.
However, this broad statement contains many grey areas 
caused by the author's careful avoidance of any serious 
investigation into crucial issues, such as, for example, the 
relationship between the intelligentsia and political power,
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or the existence of bureaucratism, which is so keenly 
denounced throughout the novels. Chakovskii pays lip service 
to the XX Congress. Only an act of faith can make the reader 
believe in the Party's proclaimed redemption, and nowhere is 
it suggested that the Congress should be the beginning of a 
public debate on the nation's past.
Chakovskii refers to the labour camps with significant 
offhandedness. Churin, the 'troublemaker', who makes an 
unsuccessful attempt at setting the workers against Andrei,
c
happens to be - again, very conveniently - an ex-convict. He 
had been charged with theft of socialist property (like the 
majority — so we are told - of the people sent to labour 
camps). Shocked by Andrei's lack of compassion for ex- 
convicts, a fellow engineer points out to him that he was 
forgetting the innocent people who also ended up there. 
Andrei - or is it Chakovskii? - brushes the issue aside, 
replying that 'one cannot forget 1 , but that it had nothing to 
do with Churin. 6 It is clear from these two short novels 
that Chakovskii, unlike his colleagues from Novyi mir, was 
not prepared to ask awkward questions.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Chakovskii wrote a short tribute to Ostrovskii for 
the press, which was published in 1971 in a collection of 
articles entitled Blazhenny li nishchie dukhom?. In this 
article, 'Stal' plameneet', Chakovskii rates Ostrovskii 
infinitely more highly than the 'decadent writer 1 Proust and 
argues that his novels are undoubtedly relevant for Soviet 
young people as his heroes set 'examples for any generation 
of fighters for communism'. Finally, Chakovskii deplores that 
so many contemporary novels should be so 'anaemic' and wishes 
there should be more 'writers-fighters'; see 'Stal 1 
plameneet 1 , Blazhenny li nishchie dukhom?. Moscow: Molodaya 
gvardiya, 1971, pp.109-21.
2. A. B. Chakovskii, God zhi zni , Moscow: Sovetskii 
pisatel', 1957, p.39.
3. A. B. Chakovskii, Dorogi, kotorye my vybiraem, 
Moscow: Sovetskii joisatel', I960, p.67.
4. It is what Chakovskii referred to as 'constructive, 
responsible and businesslike criticism' in an article 
entitled 'Pisatel ' v sovremennom mire 1 ; see B1azhenny 
nishchie dukhom?, Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1971, pp.85-95.
5. Ibid. pp.8-26: Chakovskii seems to have been 
similarly concerned with the disaffection of Soviet youth. In 
the article entitled 'Blazhenny li nishchie dukhom?', he 
expresses his fear that, unlike their elders, young people 
could be easily lured into embracing the cynical pragmatism 
of the West. These two short novels were probably to be his 
contribution to the teaching of the young.
6. Chakovskii, Dorogi, kotorye my vybiraem, Moscow: 
Sovetskii pisatel', 1960, p.219.
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APPENDIX 7
LEAFLET ADVERTISING THE NEW LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
WINTER 1966
V:
1 JHBAPfl 1967 FOflA VBHflHT CBET M• •-_.--- . <&£. ".-,
H O B A 51
JIHTEPATyPHAfl FA3ETA
EOJIbUIOrO &OPMATA!CTPAHH
cc/lMTeparypHaa raseraw 6yAei BbixoflMTb pas a nefle/ijo, HO MMTarejin Bbt- 
Hrpator: ee o6i»eM >no cpasHeHMio c HbweuuHMM ysenMHMTca Ha 
B neAe^iKD, TO ecTb na i^e^bin HOMep.
3ro 
;ibi M py6pMKM «J!mepaTypHOM ra3erbi» n MHOPO HOBOPO.
HMTASI «JlMTEPATyPHYIO TASETYw, Bbl CMO>KETE
3HaxoMMTbC5i c pasflHMHbiMH MHeHHnMH o 3^o6oAHesHbix npoSneMax nn-
Teparypbi H HCKyccrsa,
3H3KOMHTbC5) C HOBbIMM, TO^bKO MTO HaPHCaHHblMM H A^>Ke 6111,6 H6 OKOH-
, HO3TO8,
Bbl BYflETE HHOOPMMPOSAHbl O TOM,
xaKMe KHMfM nocryn^r na npn/iaaoK a 6/iHmaHiuee speMa, 
KBKMe npeMbepw o>KHAa»OT spmeneM na rearpa/ibHOM cuene,
K3KH6 (KHbMbl nO5)B»TC5) Hd 3K3HaX —— 6o^bUJHX M Ten€BM3HOHHbU.
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APPENDIX 7 (Cont/d)
LEAFLET ADVERTISING THE NEW LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
WINTER 1966
SECOND SIDE
BAG, HECOMHEHHO, MHTEPECyET
MH6Hne nMcare^en, yneHbix,. o6mecrBeHHbix AefliejiePi B CBSSM c
3-KOHOMMMeCKOM peCJDOpMOH B HdlliePi CTpaHG,
npo6.neMaMM HapoAHoro oSpasoeanMa, 
BonpocaMM Mopa^n, STMKM, noasa, 6bira,
M BC6MM ApyrMMM CTOpOHaMM AyXOBHOM, o6lUeCTBeHHOM, TpyAOBOM >KM3-
HM coaeTCKoro MenoseKa.
B 6>KeHeAe/1bHOM MSAaHMM 3TM T6Mbl 6yAyT OCBemaTbCfl 3HaHMTe/1bHC
no/iHee.
TA3ETA» BYAET OTBOflHTb 
3HAHHTE^bHO BOJlbUJE MECTA
sonpocaM Me>KAyHapoAHoro
HOB6HUJMM nO/IMTMMeCKMM, COLtMO^OrMHeCKMM, Cf>M^OCO(|)CKMM TeOQMSIM, 
H051BJ151HDLUMMC51 3B py6e>KOM,
nO^SMMKe C HaiUMMM MAeOJlOrMHeCKMMM npOTMBHMKaMM,
HOBOCTJIM JiMTeparypbi M MCKycciBa scex RSITM
Bbl CMOKETE flOCMEflTbCJl,
ocrpbiM 0enbeTOH, /iHTeparypHyto napOA^K), ocrpoyMHyto >nnrpaM-
, K>MOpMCTMH6CKHM paCCK33. KDMOp, B TOM HMC^e 3apy6e>KHblM, 6yA8T
npeAcras^eH Ha crpaHMuax HOBOM «JlMTeparypHOM raseibiw. 
HAKOHEU, Bbl CMOKETE HEnOCPEflCTBEHHO BKJlHDHMTbCS
B AHCKyccMM M o6cy>KAeHM5«, KOiopbie 6yAyr secTncb na crpaHHuax «J1nTepa- 
rypHOM raseibD), BbicnasaTb CBOKD TOHKy speHMa no ;iK>6oM us Bo/iHy>o- 
U4.XM sac TOM. wJluTeparypHaji raseTa» npeAocraBHT ropasAO 6onbiue Mecra,
M6M AO CHX n°P' fl;15' MMTate^bCKKX nMC6M M OTK/1MKOB —— 3TO 6yA6T CH6-
iM pasAe/i a Ka>KAOM HOMepe.
E>KEHEAEJlbHASl ((JlMTEPATYPHAfl TA3ETA» — 
HE EWEHEAEJlbHMK!
3io HOBWM TMH M3A9HM51, coBMemaiomMM raseiHyio c^e^M(t)MKy (TO ecib 
aKiyanbHyio o6mecTBeHHO-nonMTMM6CKyio MH^opMauMio) c ny6nnKai*Me* 
npo6neMHbix
MbI VBEPEHbl B TOM,
4TO M HailJH FIOCTOflHHbie MMTaTCJlMH, H HaillH HOBblC Apy3bfl
H MMiajb HOByio «JlHTepaiypHyK) ra3ery».
UEHA HA rOU — 7 p. 80 K. 
UEHA OTHEJlbHOPO HOMEPA — 15 K.
Twnorpa4)HH Nt 32 F^aBno^Hrpa(|)npoMa. 3aK. 1649. Tnp 500000 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CC Central Committee
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Glavli t Chief Administration for the Preservation
of State Secrets
Gosp1 an State Planning Committee
<•
KGB State Security Committee
LG Literaturnaya gazeta
MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs
NEP New Economic Policy
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic
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